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Over the last couple of decades libertarianism has gained a lot of attention and 
garnered much public support.  The movement stands at a critical juncture with a great 
opportunity before it.  It has the option of continuing as it is—as a marginal critique of other 
mainstream political ideas and institutions, or it can present an alternative, viable individual 
ideal, together with a positive political and social vision (a new constitutional order or a 
“good society.”)  Assuming such a transformation is appealing to its members, how might a 
new vision look?  This thesis offers one possible vision, and it does so by criticizes existing 
libertarian visions for their narrow focus on economics and law.  David Boaz and Charles 
Murray have done much to broaden libertarian ideas, but they still fall short of the potential 
that exists at the heart of libertarianism.  Instead, this thesis proposes a richer ideal, one of 
romantic libertarianism—or individuality--that includes a significant role for culture and  
self-cultivation.  Drawing on the work of Humboldt, J.S. Mill, and the Emersonians, it 
argues for the self-cultivation of the individual in his most individual—unique—form. 
The ideal for the libertarian self is supported by a regime theory, sketching out a 
 
possible libertarian society that might help to foster such an ideal.  This includes a political 
structure, a legal structure, and a vibrant civil society. For any proposal to be genuinely 
attractive to libertarians it must be practically possible. The conclusion considers the 
organization of the current libertarian movement and speculates on reasons why these kinds 
of ideas have been neglected thus far.  Finally, it questions whether such ideas are likely to 
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  INTRODUCTION 
 "The future is unknowable but not unimaginable" 
Ludwig Lachmann1
Why Libertarianism? 
Fifteen years ago it would have been difficult to imagine a mainstream press 
publishing not one, but two books on the subject of libertarianism.2  Even after the 
publication of Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia  in 1974 libertarians were largely 
regarded as purveyors of a strange peripheral jeremiad.3  Yet over the past decade or so 
libertarianism has gained much ground.  Indeed, while not (yet?) mainstream,4 it is now 
possible to discuss libertarianism seriously within both the academic and public policy 
                                                 
1Ludwig M. Lachmann, "From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic 
Society." Journal of Economic Literature, (March 1976), 55. 
2 David Boaz, Libertarianism, and David Boaz (Ed.), The Libertarian Reader, (New York: Free Press, 
1997). 
3 In a survey of think-tanks published in 1992, The Economist gave the Cato Institute a full five marks 
(out of a possible five) for "kookiness," with other scores of 4, 1, 3, and 2 respectively for how far they were 
considered to be clever, connected, canny, and cushy.  "The Good Think-Tank Guide, The Joys of Detached 
Involvement" The Economist, December 21, 1991-January 3, 1992, 53. 
4 Whether it is, in fact, possible or desirable for libertarianism (as an ideology and a political and 
social movement) to become mainstream is an interesting question in itself—for instance, in relation to the 
structural constraints of the American regime (including its political, legal and economic institutions of check 
and balances,) the vagaries of politics (which tend to favor compromise, particularly between the two major 
political parties that dominate the political landscape,) the psychological attitude of those who support 
libertarianism (who frequently like to characterize themselves as purists and "revolutionaries," and who would 
not, therefore, consider themselves as participants in any sort of formal governing structure,) and, as Robert 
Michels famously noted in Political Parties (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949), the tendencies of democratic 
political organizations to become oligarchies—the so called “iron law of oligarchy,” thereby giving up it’s own 
commitment to democratic principles. More recently James Buchanan and other public choice economists have 
made similar arguments in connection with the potential for the individuals who fight on behalf of freedom 
outside the state to become self-interested rent seekers once they enter the realm of political power. In short, the 
question of the extent to which libertarianism may permit itself and its practitioners to go mainstream (or 
indeed, may be able to go mainstream)--and therefore become part of the system it was established to fight--is 
an extremely important one, and it will be addressed throughout this thesis.   
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worlds.  At a minimum, libertarianism as it currently exists has come to be treated as a 
significant and useful critique.  For instance, as mentioned above, within analytic political 
philosophy Nozick's response to Rawl's Theory of Justice has come to receive respect.  
Further, libertarianism and communitarianism are currently invoked as alternatives to, or at 
least important critiques of, the prevailing liberal-democratic consensus among those who 
discuss and implement public policy.   In terms of recent visibility, there is evidence that 
libertarian proposals are receiving discussion and support in some policy areas, including tax 
policy (the flat tax), term limits, social security reform, and school vouchers.  Moreover, 
some commentators believe that underlying political and economic trends indicate a 
tendency toward less government, suggesting an opportunity in the long term for 
libertarianism to gain increasing influence.5   
Supporters of libertarianism have a chance to gain further power and influence if only 
they can appeal to a larger audience to gain additional support from the public at large.  But 
this will require a different approach to the issues libertarians typically address from the one 
they have taken heretofore.  Indeed, it may require tackling a different set of issues 
altogether.  The question now is, is libertarianism capable of providing something more than 
a critique?  In theory, is there such a thing as a libertarian vision of a good society, and if so, 
what is it, or what might it be?  In practice, if we venture beyond the critique, to what extent 
 
5 See, for instance, E.J. Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1991), chapter 10, and, more recently, “Lexington: The Charge of the Think-tanks,” The Economist, (February 
15, 2003), 33. David Boaz, “The Coming Libertarian Age,” Chapter 1, 1-26 in Libertarianism, A Primer (New 
York: Free Press, 1997). 
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are libertarianism's substantive policies likely to be adopted as viable public policy and 
social practice,6 and beyond that, as a personal ethical code for living?  Indeed, one question 
that needs to be considered at the outset is does libertarianism require a sort of freedom that 
"goes all the way down," or only robust political freedom?  How much may be said about 
individual lives beyond the state, and remain consistent with libertarianism?  Many of its 
supporters claim that libertarianism is only a political theory and therefore has nothing to say 
about morality and other aspects of life in the voluntary sphere.  According to this view there 
is no such thing as a libertarian good society.7  However, the same supporters are all too 
 
6 I introduce the terms, "public policy," and "social practice" here since they connote different but 
related ideas. "Public policy," as I understand it, refers to a set of actions instituted and financed by the state (or, 
more properly, the taxpayer).  Social practice is a vaguer term that is intended to refer to collective action that 
occurs within society, but does not involve the state.  (Except in so far as the state has secured the political and 
legal conditions within which people act collectively.)  I.e. it refers to collective actions carried out by civil 
associations rather than public (state) entities.  Both concepts will be important to highlight the variations of 
theory and practice within the libertarian movement, which is itself a coalition of purists, pragmatists, 
economists, philosophers, and policy analysts, etc.  Theoretically, libertarian public policy is to some degree 
incoherent, if the point of libertarianism is to minimize the role of the state.  However, in practice it may be 
considered a legitimate means to an end, so that, for example, the use of (publicly funded) school vouchers to 
finance the education of less well-off children may be regarded as one step on the way to privatizing all 
education.  The use of "public policy" will tend to highlight libertarianism as it now is--in a stage of criticism, 
and incrementalism (one might say, "becoming",) whereas the use of "social practice" will be associated with a 
less pragmatic, more fully realized conception of a libertarian good society. 
7 E.g. David Boaz: “Libertarianism is a political philosophy, not a complete guide to life.” 
Libertarianism, A Primer, 98.  “Libertarianism is not at base a metaphysical theory about the primacy of the 
individual over the abstract, much less an abstract theory about “abstract individuals.”…it is a political theory 
that emerged in response to the growth of unlimited state power…” Tom G. Palmer, “Myths of Individualism, 
Cato Policy Report, XVIII:5, (September/October 1996), at http://cato.org/pubs/policy_report/cpr-
18n5-1.html, 2. 
Cf. “Few would dispute the suggestion that an animating principle is central to the whole socialist 
perspective. But many professing classical liberals have seemed reluctant to acknowledge the existence of what 
I have called the soul of their position. They seem often to seek exclusive “scientific” cover for advocacy, 
supplementing it occasionally by reference to enlightened self-interest. They seem somehow to be embarrassed 
to admit, if indeed they even recognize the presence of, the underlying ideological appeal that classical 
liberalism as a comprehensive weltanschauung can possess. Although this aloof stance may offer some 
satisfaction to the individuals who qualify as cognoscenti, there is an opportunity loss in public acceptance as 
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anxious to discuss the virtues of the market as an alternative to the state, thereby suggesting 
that while they might not self-consciously recognize them, that in fact, if one does want to 
facilitate the establishment and maintenance of a libertarian life for free individuals, some 
fairly specific values, institutions, and relevant modes of behavior are to be preferred over 
others.8  Libertarianism is not neutral with respect to the good, nor is it agnostic with respect 
to individual character, although it is broad enough to encompass many diverse ways of life, 
or so I shall argue.9
In an effort to go beyond the critique, and to present some values, institutions, and 
modes of behavior that would seem to be consistent with a libertarian ethos in a libertarian 
good society this thesis will outline what I take to be a distinctively libertarian attitude to 
 
the central principles are promulgated to the nonscientific community.” James M. Buchanan, “The Soul of 
Classical Liberalism,” The Independent Review, V:1, (Summer 2002), 113.  
8 Of course, Adam Smith and others from the Scottish Enlightenment School knew this, however 
discussion of virtue and certain characteristics appropriate to and necessary for market-based societies have 
been all but ignored ever since by free-market economists with the exception of a few economists including 
Paul Heyne, James Buchanan, and Diedre McCloskey. 
9 In discussing the liberal state William Galston has said “Like every other form of political 
community, the liberal state is an enterprise association.  It’s distinctiveness lies not in the absence but, rather in 
the content of its public purposes.  Nor can the liberal state be properly understood as “neutral” in any of the 
senses in which that term is currently employed.  Like every other political community, it embraces a view of 
the human good that favors certain ways of life and tilts against others.” Liberal Purposes, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 1991), 3.  Commenting on the approach of a society that more closely approximates a libertarian 
society, Richard Flathman says something similar: “A strongly voluntarist liberalism would be the most open 
and accommodating, the least censorious and restrictive, of any theory or ideology that is political in the sense 
of countenancing—however ruefully—such as the state, authority, and rule.  But such a liberalism is and must 
be more than “a series of denials.”  As with Nietzsche, it is a form of idealism in that it affirms and promotes 
values such as individuality and plurality.  These values can be manifested in and realized by a great diversity 
of ends and purposes, dispositions and styles, manners and modes of life.  But they are somethings, not 
anythings or nothings.  There are arrangements and understandings that are conducive to and supportive of 
them, others that hinder and thwart them.  If liberalism stands for these values, it cannot be antiliberal to stand 
against thoughts and actions that are antagonistic to them or otherwise incompatible with them.” Willful 
Liberalism, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1992), 208. 
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life, not simply a libertarian attitude to politics. A vision of an entire life should have more 
appeal for individuals seriously concerned with individual freedom--and indeed living such a 
free life is the point of libertarianism--than the bare politics or economics typically 
associated with theoretical and practical libertarian positions because it helps to show the 
breadth, complexity, and sheer potential of libertarianism at its best.  Put differently, one 
might characterize this project an attempt to render more explicit that which is sometimes 
left implicit in arguments for individual freedom insofar as it is an effort to say something 
about how the facets of a free life might actually look and work together in practice. 
Moreover, if such a case were made it might have practical payoffs in helping to persuade 
those who are sympathetic to the critical aspects of libertarianism, but who are unable to 
commit themselves to it fully as a set of principles and practices because they are unsure 
about what a libertarian future might bring in the place of the current status quo. Only then 
will libertarians have a chance of seizing the opportunity before them, so that they might 
have a chance of moving from the margins of critique toward the mainstream of political and 
social life.  
In sum, to the extent that libertarianism has affected public policy through its critique 
of more conventional policies, together with its own concrete initiatives, it affects the lives 
of people in the United States now.  The old jeremiad has evolved into an influential political 
and social philosophy, and public policy.  Consequently, libertarians and non-libertarians 
alike need to be clear about the theory and practice of libertarianism.  Libertarians should be 
concerned because they have an opportunity to further shape their world and to gain more 
support if they can present an attractive case to the public at large. Others should be 
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concerned because of libertarianism’s increasing power and influence.  What, then, are the 
appropriate subjects of future libertarian discussions?  What are libertarianism's bounds--its 
limits and its potentialities? 
The Project: A Libertarian Vision-Individuality 
This thesis assumes that a sort of mainstream libertarianism is both possible and 
desirable, and tries to suggest how such a future might look.  It is an internal critique of the 
ideas and practices of the contemporary libertarian movement in the United States.  The 
argument rests upon a sympathetic, but also somewhat dissatisfied commitment to 
contemporary libertarianism.  However, it is a friendly, constructive critique: while the 
central ideas in this thesis stem from a conviction that thus far libertarianism has not lived up 
to its promise, the point will be to try to save libertarianism from itself, rather than to give up 
on it altogether.  This is an ambitious project, moving as it does from critique to a 
constructive vision, and from discussion of libertarian theory, to the libertarian individual, 
and then the constitution of a libertarian society.  Proceeding in this order is consistent with 
the priorities of the theory itself, since libertarianism cares first and foremost about 
individual persons, and second about the world—the society or regime such individuals 
inhabit to preserve and maintain their liberty.  Various problems and difficulties having to do 
with the move from a critique to the positive practical application of libertarian ideas and 
practices will be discussed throughout, especially as this relates to the particular 
interpretation of liberty (individuality) proposed here. The concluding chapter will offer 
some speculations relating to difficulties internal to the libertarian movement in realizing this 
ideal. 
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Properly understood, libertarianism denotes a doctrine within which the freedom of 
the individual is an achievement that rests on both political-economic and personal or 
individual liberty.  However, the contention here is that libertarian freedom is frequently 
improperly understood--as nothing more than political-economic liberty (“market 
liberalism”) or narrow political-legal freedom (“legalism”)--and this has important 
implications for the theory, libertarian public policies, and most importantly for the 
individuals libertarians claim to represent.  Moreover, it is an impoverishment of the views 
that are located within its predecessor, the classical liberal tradition.  Consequently, the aim 
is to highlight the excessive attention many contemporary libertarians grant to economic and 
political liberty, and the corresponding lack of attention given to personal liberty, in the 
pursuit of individual freedom, both theoretically and practically.  I will question why this is 
so, but then show how libertarian ideas and practices might be reconceived to help 
libertarians fulfill their ideals and aspirations in maximizing freedom for individuals by 
retrieving some of the ideas classical liberals espoused in the past.  Different interpretations 
will give varying weight to economic and political freedom and individual or personal 
(cultural) freedom,10 but all varieties of libertarianism properly understood would need to 
include elements of both. Liberty for individuality will give clear weight and emphasis to 
personal or cultural freedom in an effort to redress the current imbalance favoring political 
and economic liberty.  This is, then, a type of correction that involves the supplementation of 
 
10 I.e. freedom that takes individual development or self-cultivation (but not self creation, as in the 
thought of Nietzsche or Ayn Rand) seriously. 
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political and economic liberty with a sort of romantic ideal of self-cultivation.  On this view, 
freedom is valued not only because it recognizes the individual as being separate or different 
from all other individuals—all liberal theories do this to some degree in their commitment to 
individualism of various kinds. But, on the view proposed here, freedom is to be valued for 
its role in relation to individuals’ individuality, which denotes individuals’ uniqueness, for 
individuality is an ideal that celebrates the individual in his most individual form.   
No doubt those who are familiar with the purely political theory/minimal state and 
free market varieties of libertarianism will argue that individuality is not central to 
libertarianism at all.  Indeed, the kind of perfectionism that it relies upon might even be 
argued to be antithetical to the skepticism at the heart of libertarian political theories. 
However, self-development and self- cultivation are neither new ideas nor foreign imports  
to libertarianism or it’s intellectual forbearers within the classical liberal tradition. As we 
shall see, they exist within the works of figures such as Humboldt, Mill, and the American 
Transcendentalists, who, if not proto-libertarians themselves, were at least fellow travelers. 
The hope here is that some of these previously overlooked fragments of classical liberal 
theory and practice might be retrieved and reintegrated into contemporary libertarianism. The 
reasons for doing so are not historical, but rather inspirational or expressive and practical.  
Individuality is an attractive goal for libertarians, but it is also a necessary one since it calls 
forth the kind of a strenuous character or personality that is needed to make a libertarian 
regime—one that is based upon individual freedom and responsibility--functional.  
The Argument
Essentially, the main argument beyond the critique has two components.  It calls for a 
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revised, more complex conception of the self (a libertarian moral psychology), and a shift in 
attention to a different set of institutions in society as the site of the realization of individual 
freedom (a libertarian sociology or regime theory, including a narrowly constrained political 
theory.)  Taken together, I shall argue for the following: 
1. a shift in focus away from the value of competition and wealth creation, and 
2. toward self discipline, self government and education, together with 
3. a move away from the institution of the free market11 in favor of the legal sphere 
and civil society  
 4. for the purpose of fostering individuality through self development rather than 
individualism via political and economic liberty.    
So that I am clear about my departure from conventional libertarian theories I should 
reiterate that typically libertarians do not (consciously) advance beyond negative political 
rights theories.  As noted above, when they do so, they tend to look to the market to lay out 
their visions of a good society. My alternative view, following, among others, John Stuart 
Mill and George Kateb's interpretation of the Emersonians' romantic individuality,12 builds 
upon, and goes beyond, negative political rights theory to attend to liberty realized in civil 
society via a type of positive ethical and aesthetic theory.  Borrowing from William Galston's 
characterization of Kant's practical philosophy, one way of conceiving the argument then, is 
 
11 This is a relative not an absolute shift in attention.  Economic liberty remains an important goal in 
my version of libertarianism, but it is not the dominating and decisive factor.  Pursuing personal liberty beyond 
economic wealth is my primary concern. 
12 See The Inner Ocean (Ithaca: Cornell, 1992). 
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to think of it as an attempt "to combine an ethics of positive freedom with a politics of 
negative freedom."13  To remain consistent with libertarianism--maximizing political liberty 
for individuals--the reigning principles and actions in this interpretation of libertarianism 
will not be political (since politics, conventionally a synonym in libertarianism for statism, 
or coercion, is the antithesis of freedom14); rather they will be social, moral and aesthetic 
(each of which allows for some degree of choice and therefore freedom, but how, and how 
much, are the crucial and interesting questions that would have to be worked out 
empirically.)  This is precisely why my positive ideal differs from Berlin's notion of positive 
(political) liberty in “Two Concepts of Liberty.”  His argument is an argument for a political 
theory, albeit one that rests upon a moral theory.  
The Subject 
This thesis will not deal with all libertarian thought, but only that which is closely 
connected to political and social practice.  Consequently, it will not focus on the type of 
abstract philosophical theory found in the work of John Hospers, Murray Rothbard, and 
Robert Nozick.  However, I expect to draw on their ideas to the extent that they have become 
influential constituents of the theoretical body of ideas that is analyzed and employed by 
members of the movement since they are the people I wish to engage.  Precisely who and 
                                                 
13 William Galston, "Defending Liberalism," American Political Science Review 76, 1982, 622. 
14 See, for instance, F.A. Hayek, “Coercion and the State,” Chapter 9, The Constitution of Liberty, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 133-161.  Later, a more neutral definition of politics will be 
considered in connection with the construction and maintenance of institutions of a regime through rules, 
especially the rule of law.  Here, since I am appealing to libertarians I start with their conventional terms and 
rhetoric to situate the argument.  
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what constitute "the movement" is an important subject.  The movement's ideas are not to be 
identified with pure abstract theory, but rather theory oriented to action.  That is, it refers to a 
collection of individuals and organizations that work at the intersections of theory and 
practice.  This includes some academic theorists at universities, but also, and especially, 
members of other non-university organizations including think tanks, educational 
foundations, and other non-profit entities.  In particular, I examine some of the ideas 
presented by David Boaz and Edward Crane of the Cato Institute, as well as those of Charles 
Murray, from the American Enterprise Institute.  My project seeks to examine the 
relationship between a political theory and its social practice, and to criticize the ideas 
generated by the movement both for themselves, and for the potential impact that they might, 
and in fact, do, have on the world, especially the individuals whose freedom it claims to 
champion.  The question I am interested in exploring is the following: if one were a strong 
supporter of individual freedom and therefore committed to the political theory that is 
libertarianism, how might one best conceive a libertarian individual and a society in which 
she lives?  My project may be regarded as an attempt to save libertarianism from itself--to 
make it the best that it can be,15 on its own terms.  The intention is not to devastate 
libertarian theory, to show why it is silly or worthless.  Rather, it is to continue developing a 
body of thought that is currently underdeveloped and inadequate for fulfilling the new tasks 
before it.  Certainly, Boaz and Murray have done much to advance libertarianism beyond the 
 
 15 I borrow this formulation from Karol Soltan and the United States Army. 
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identification of libertarianism with near-anarchy and narrow self-interested money-making. 
 But a good deal more can and should be said. To do this I begin with an exploration of 
individual moral psychology (states of mind or mentalities) and then move on to different 
domains within an imagined libertarian regime (phenomenology) in an effort to show where 
I believe greater attention needs to be given in order to realize individuality in theory, and 
especially in practice. 
Methodological Approach 
Since the project is an exercise in applied political theory, I shall approach my 
subject--the ideas and practices of the libertarian movement--with an eye to both theory, 
including abstract principles, and political and social practices.  As I have suggested, I mean 
to treat libertarianism charitably, to try to make it the best that it can be, on its own terms.  
The point is not to try to persuade people that they should choose libertarianism over other 
forms of, say, liberalism.  Rather, the argument will proceed from the presumption that those 
interested in this critique have an initial commitment to libertarianism.  The thesis does not 
contain a fully formed foundational argument; I leave that for others.16  Indeed, in many 
respects what I am trying to do is the opposite of foundationalism, since I am positing a good 
that is the achievement of  libertarianism and glancing back from that ideal (what I call 
individuality--libertarian freedom combining economic liberty with personal liberty, with an 
emphasis on personal liberty) to ask what it would take (in terms of a disposition of the self, 
                                                 
 
16 My reasons for doing this are 1. My concern is at the other end of theory, looking to the ideal, 
rather than the foundations. 2. Space constraints--the thesis is ambitious enough as it is, without including a 
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a cultural context, and a set of institutional arrangements) for an individual and the society 
she lives within to approach such a goal.  
Having said that, it is evident that some foundational approaches are clearly better 
than others.  If one is strongly committed to respecting--indeed promoting--the freedom of 
the individual then it seems obvious that on a theoretical level any kind of consequentialism, 
including utlitarianism, must be ruled out because it cannot guarantee the sanctity of the 
individual.  By a process of elimination, this would suggest that other ethical theories such as 
Kantian deontology or a variety of virtue ethics would be preferable, but it seems to me that 
given the practical orientation of this project that too is not suitable since the burden on 
individual reason necessary for the kind of robust autonomy Kantianism requires is too great 
for a broad political theory that applies to all individuals.17  Instead, if pressed to point to a 
foundational theory I would probably rely upon a kind of Humean empiricism that blends 
moral experience with reason for the political-legal framework.  (The moral theory in civil 
society is a separate issue and will be guided by a type of romantic perfectionism.)  
Consequently this project has a dualist character to it--on the one hand a relatively 
undemanding procedural framework that establishes a type of negative political-legal liberty, 
that is linked theoretically and empirically to a self-imposed positive perfectionist moral and 
aesthetic cultural liberty on the other.  But again, since foundations are not the focus of this 
 
foundational theory, which would require an entire thesis on its own. 
17 A point made throughout William Galston’s work on liberal pluralism.  See especially the 
discussion of autonomy versus diversity in “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105, (April 1995), 516-534, 
and more generally Liberal Purposes, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991).  
 14
project this is as much as I can say about the matter here. 
The thesis is arranged in the following manner: Chapter one describes libertarianism 
as a general theory or approach to politics.  Particular varieties of libertarianism, including 
those espoused by David Boaz and Charles Murray, will be compared and contrasted, 
highlighting some of the neglected fragments of classical liberal theory that encompass self-
cultivation and individuality.  The second chapter focuses on the assumptions about 
individuals within libertarian theory and discusses the mentality or moral psychology 
consistent with the variety of libertarianism I am proposing. The following three chapters on 
politics, law, and civil society flesh out the priorities of the regime within which self-
cultivation rather than political freedom and economic self-interest and wealth generation is 
treated as the primary goal. The conclusion discusses some reasons why individuality, in 
spite of its intellectual heritage among certain theorists who resemble today’s contemporary 
libertarians, has not been popular within the movement thus far, and provides some 
speculations as to the viability of individuality in future incarnations of libertarianism.  
 15
                                                
CHAPTER 1: LIBERTARIAN POLITICAL THEORY AND VARIETIES OF 
LIBERTARIANSM 
In their specific ways both the Human Rights School and the utilitarians 
emphasized the need for liberating man from traditional fetters, from the 
excesses of the established monarchical and aristocratic forces.  Bentham and 
James Mill regarded men as basically motivated by self-interest, seeking to 
secure a maximum pleasure and to avoid a maximum pain. Though these 
thinkers concentrated on freeing the individual from the shackles of an 
arbitrary and obsolete political and legal order, by a rational method, they 
were not interested in raising the potential of the individual.  Man should be 
free to follow his own bent, but to improve and to develop his talents and 
aptitudes was no more than a sideline in their reflections.  It was no concern 
of the elder utilitarians whether people preferred poetry to gin, paintings to 
beer.  They wanted people to obtain a maximum of happiness but they did 
not inquire into the nature or degrees of this happiness.  They neither wished 
to develop personality and character, nor did they deplore an imitative 
behavior.  They were concerned with the desirability, but not with the quality 
of happiness.18
 
 What is libertarianism? Among libertarians there is continual debate about 
precisely what constitutes the theory.  It is frequently associated with calls for minimal 
government or even anarchy, which are said to devolve into an extreme form of 
individualism or atomism.19  Sometimes libertarianism is considered to be synonymous with 
free market economics.20  However, neither of these captures an essential truth that defines 
libertarianism. Rather, they are particular, limited manifestations of it.  If we were to define 
 
18 . E.K. Bramsted and K.J. Melhuish, Western Liberalism, (London: Longman, 1978), 26 describing 
the difference between human rights liberals, utilitarian liberals and aesthetic liberals. Emphasis added. 
19 For instance, varieties of “anarcho-capitalism” propounded by David Friedman in The Machinery of 
Freedom (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1995), or Murray Rothbard’s For a New Liberty, (San Francisco: Fox & 
Wilkes, 1996). Also Ayn Rand’s objectivism, in The Virtue of Selfishness, (New York: Penguin, 1964) 
20 For example, see e.g. Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1962). 
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it in general terms it would be tempting to say that libertarianism may be best defined 
negatively (as an ideology that identifies the object that it’s followers are against: big 
government), but it is much less clear what libertarians are for. (The free market? Strong 
individual rights?  Radical individualism? Free will?)  Having said that, there are some core 
elements that may be identified and these are necessary if not sufficient for all libertarian 
theories.  Particular varieties of libertarianism interpret these elements in different ways.  
And it is here that there is scope to criticize, revise, and develop aspects of libertarianism.  
But to understand why we might want to do this, we must first understand what 
libertarianism is, what it is lacking within certain varieties of it, and then how it might be 
supplemented and revised. 
Libertarian Political Theory 
All libertarians agree that libertarianism is, above all else, a political theory that 
defines a relationship between the individual and the state.  As its name suggests, it treats 
liberty or freedom as the foundational principle to which all other principles (such as 
equality) must be compared and subsumed.  As we shall see below, although particular 
varieties21 of libertarianism argue about the precise magnitude of the freedom of the 
individual and the correlative size and reach of the state, all conceptions agree that the 
                                                 
     21 Current varieties of libertarian theory include: 1. Neoclassical/Free Market economics (Hayek, 
Von Mises, Rothbard, Stigler), 2. Law & Economics (Early Posner, Epstein, Siegan), 3. Neo-Lockean Analytic 
Philosophy (Nozick), 4. Ethical Egoism (Ayn Rand--drawing on Aristotle and Kant), and 5. Classical Liberal 
tradition (Locke, Smith, Mill, Spencer). 
 
 17
                                                
purpose of the theory is to arrange society in order to maximize the political freedom of the 
individual.  Indeed, such prioritization of individual political freedom, together with the 
emphasis on limited government, are precisely what distinguish libertarianism from other 
varieties of liberalism. This is usually expressed negatively, as it is by Murray Rothbard in 
his seminal Libertarian manifesto For a New Liberty, who says: “The Libertarian creed rests 
upon one central axiom: that no man or group may aggress against the person or property of 
anyone else. This may be called the “nonagression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the 
initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone 
else.  Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.”22 Similarly, although put slightly 
more positively perhaps, John Hospers has explained “…it is the use of force against 
individuals, particularly by government, that is considered the ultimate evil by the 
proponents of the political philosophy…called libertarianism. As the name implies, it is a 
philosophy of personal liberty—the liberty of each person to live according to his own 
choices, provided that he does not attempt to coerce others and thus prevent them from living 
according to their choices. Libertarians hold this to be an inalienable right of man; thus 
libertarianism represents a total commitment to the concept of individuals rights.”23  
To start, then, we may think of libertarianism as a political theory that establishes a 
framework within which the individual is as free as he may be, consistent with the freedom 
of others, to pursue the life he wishes to pursue.  However, this is very abstract and the 
 
22 . Rothbard, 23. 
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primary concern of this paper is not to engage at this level, but rather at the level of 
particular interpretations of these ideas as they manifest themselves in a set of institutions 
and practices.   
At this point we are typically introduced to the notions of the rule of law and 
constitutional government, which limit state power, and thereby help to preserve individual 
political liberty negatively.  The government exists to secure life, liberty, and property, but 
little more than that. We are told that social interactions within this protected, secured sphere 
of the state are carried out by individuals who come together voluntarily to pursue projects in 
civil, as opposed to political, society, especially the free market.  The market helps to 
promote freedom since power is dispersed between competitive individuals and businesses.  
Order exists, but this is spontaneous, not planned or centrally directed.  Markets generate 
wealth and prosperity, and help to promote peace as conflict is channeled into competitive 
business relationships rather than physical disputes, conflicts and even wars.  Libertarian 
society limits political power and maximizes economic liberty.  This much, it seems, is not 
controversial among libertarians.  Indeed, the (purely) political and economic institutional 
implications of libertarianism are well-known and well established, but even among existing 
libertarian theory this does not exhaust the doctrine.  
Varieties of Libertarianism
If we take a fairly cursory glance at the range of libertarian discussions ongoing in 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 . John Hospers. Libertarianism. A Philosophy for Tomorrow, (Los Angeles: Nash, 1971), 5. 
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areas among academics we get a sense of the breadth of current libertarian theory. As one 
would expect, academic theorists with connections to different disciplines (philosophy, 
politics, and economics, law, and history) have a tendency to give priority to aspects of 
libertarianism that vary according to the discipline with which they are associated.  For 
instance, philosophers talk about the freedom of the individual being guaranteed by natural 
or inalienable rights (e.g. Robert Nozick, Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rassmussen), 
political theorists discuss the size and scope of the state (e.g. Chandran Kukathas), while 
economists champion wealth maximization of the free market, as well as it’s other benefits 
such as spontaneous order, efficiency, and competition. (e.g. Friedrich von Hayek, Milton 
Friedman.)  Lawyers, on the other hand, promote private property rights and private systems 
of law (e.g. Richard Epstein, Randy Barnett), and historians emphasize the continuity of 
ideas over time, discussing the roots of modern libertarianism within classical liberal 
theories of the eighteenth century, or even earlier.  (E.g.  Amy Sturgis, Forrest McDonald, 
Ralph Raico.)  
On the other hand, there are some purists who distinguish themselves from classical 
liberalism, arguing that libertarianism is a new phenomenon that has developed within the 
last 30 years or so as a response to the growth of big government.  According to such 
theorists, the size and reach of the government, as well as the legitimate functions of the 
government is a good deal more circumscribed by libertarians than it is by classical liberals.  
For instance, Hayek and Friedman are considered to be classical liberals rather than 
libertarians because they believe there is a legitimate role for the welfare state to play in a 
free society.  Many libertarians would reject this claim, confining the role of the state to the 
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very narrow functions of protecting against force and fraud, while enforcing voluntary 
contracts between consenting adults only.24   
Relatedly, yet another distinction is made between those who favor a deontic rather 
than a consequentialist approach to matters, meaning that the former will tend to ground 
arguments for freedom and limited government in appeals to the duty and obligations of 
individuals agents rather than general statements about the interests, efficiency, and long-
term prosperity of a process (usually the free market) for the greatest number in a society, 
economy, or some other aggregating entity.  On this latter view, individuals are treated 
indirectly, and rights are considered to be useful or functional, not natural or fundamental, 
serving to denote, for instance, the bundle of -property rights attaching to different 
distributions of goods.25  
Taken together what all of this suggests is that, apart from the fact that libertarianism 
is still developing both as an ideology and as a set of practices, parsing the idea of 
libertarianism is tricky and likely to provoke disagreement even, and perhaps especially, 
among those who claim to adhere to the doctrine.  If this is so, any given interpretation is 
likely to receive criticism, including one that champions individuality.   That said, if self-
identified libertarians recognize that politics and economics alone do not exhaust legitimate 
 
24 See, for instance, David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom, as well as the discussion of this 
matter in Richard Epstein’s Skepticism and Freedom, A Modern Case for Classical Liberalism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), Introduction.  
25 See Norman P. Barry, On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism, (New York: St Martin’s, 1987), 
especially chapters 1-3. 
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areas of concern or subjects appropriate for analysis, why should they object to further 
extension of it to other areas, including culture?  Is it possible to reorient libertarianism so 
that culture (cultivation of the self and the pursuit of artistic subjects) rather than politics or 
economics is the core animating reason for establishing a libertarian society?  If so, how 
would this fit with some of the more practically-oriented varieties of libertarianism currently 
being promoted?  An examination of some of the ideas from the classical liberal tradition, 
together with a comparison with some of the varieties of contemporary libertarianism 
articulated by David Boaz and Charles Murray will help to begin to answer these questions.  
Introducing cultural matters into libertarianism might be something of a departure.  
However, there is precedent for this within the classical liberal tradition, indicating that 
aesthetic matters and cultivation of the self have been considered to be compatible with 
views articulating strong commitments to individual freedom in the past.  
Individuality within the Classical Liberal Tradition 
As with contemporary libertarianism, classical liberalism, it’s intellectual forbearer, 
is frequently associated with little more than limited government or laissez faire economics.  
In this connection Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is often cited as the best-known text that 
shows how economic self-interest may be aggregated to achieve peace and prosperity within 
a free society.  But, Smith was also concerned with the moral character of individuals, and he 
wrote another work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, to discuss the education, habituation, 
and cultivation of it.  For Smith, the relationship between freedom and character was 
something of a precarious one. However, he maintained that only a free people could be 
virtuous, and this aspect of the tradition is often forgotten. What this means is that classical 
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liberalism is frequently treated as a doctrine that merely encourages narrow self-interested 
behavior and looks to utilitarianism for its grounding value theory.  Alternately, some 
classical liberals such as Tom Paine and Richard Overton, who subscribed to a natural rights 
view of human nature and used this to justify their political theory, are also mentioned.  
However, there is a strand within the tradition that self-consciously focuses upon the 
cultivation of individual character and cultivation not merely so that free individuals might 
be disciplined and productive producers and consumers, or individuals who jealously guard 
their natural rights,26 but so that they might be beautiful, distinct, unique persons. These 
ideas, which have been labeled “aesthetic liberalism” by E.K. Bramsted and K.J. Melhuish in 
their Western Liberalism or “romantic liberalism” by Nancy Rosenblum in her Another 
Liberalism, and which this thesis refers to as individuality, may be found in the works of 
thinkers such as Constant, Godwin, Shelley, Wollstoncraft, de Staël, as well as Humboldt, 
J.S. Mill, Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman.  Writing in The New Individualist Review, Ralph 
Raico has described the sensibility associated with one theorist who championed 
individuality, Benjamin Constant. He says, 
[A] feature distinguishing Constant from earlier liberals was what he conceived to be 
the ethical ends of social organization. In this respect, the philosophes had 
anticipated the central idea of Bentham, Constant’s fellow liberal and almost exact 
contemporary.  While the liberalism of writers like Mercier de la Riverie and Du 
Pont de Nemours, like Bentham’s, was based exclusively on a utilitarian ethic, 
Constant’s had a vaguer, but, it will appear to many, a more elevated foundation.  
This ought to be emphasized, since many writers on the history of liberalism—both 
 
26 The concern with natural rights has been emphasized and amplified by contemporary libertarians, as 
we shall see below. 
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conservatives and modern left-liberals—often write as if utilitarianism were 
historically the sole philosophical basis of liberalism.  This was not the case with 
many of the most prominent liberals, including Constant, who emphatically rejected 
utilitarianism: 
 
… is it so true that happiness—of whatever sort it might be—
is the unique end of man?  In that case, our road would be 
quite narrow, and our destination not a very lofty one.  There 
is not one of us, who, if he wished to descend, to restrict his 
moral faculties, to degrade his desires, to abjure activity, 
glory and all generous and profound emotions, could not 
make himself a brute, and a happy one…it is not for 
happiness alone, it is for self-perfectioning that destiny calls 
us… 
 
Thus, Constant found the ethical ends which he wished to realize through a 
system of liberty not in the greatest happiness principle, but in the 
development and enrichment of personality.  This view was in keeping with 
the humanism then prevalent in Germany, and was possibly, in the case of 
Constant, traceable to his study of Kantian philosophy, and to the influence 
of certain of his many German friends, including Schiller and especially 
Wilhelm von Humboldt.27   
 
In contrast to those who celebrated the utility of liberalism or the natural or human 
rights of each individual within liberal society, Bramsted and Melhuish explain that this kind 
of liberalism is normative not merely functional.  Among nineteenth century classical 
liberals, as we shall see, such a view is most often associated with John Stuart Mill, 
especially after he experienced his breakdown, causing him to modify his classic 
utilitarianism substantially with romantic ideals.  For while aesthetic liberalism 
(individuality) certainly seeks to free individuals from the bonds of the overly powerful state, 
 
27 Ralph Raico, “Benjamin Constant,” citing Constant from his Cours de Politique Constitutionelle 
vol.2, 599, in the New Individualist Review 3:2 (Winter 1964), 501. Emphasis added. 
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but also from the pressure of public opinion, promoting negative political (and to some 
degree, social) liberty, it is also concerned with positive moral and aesthetic freedom to 
cultivate oneself.  Such a distinction is not altogether lost on contemporary classical liberals 
and libertarians, some of whom have adopted versions of aesthetic liberalism in their own 
work, but it has tended to remain at the margins of discussion and among those who engage 
in academic rather than practical or applied debates.  For instance, writing in the first issue of 
the Humane Studies Review, a publication of the Institute for Humane Studies at George 
Mason University that was designed to help graduate students learn about the intellectual 
history of classical liberalism and libertarianism in the early nineteen eighties, David M. 
Hart defined a program for work on what he called “Real liberalism,” which he took to be 
synonymous with “libertarianism or classical liberalism” (Hart does not distinguish the two) 
in the following manner: 
…we are concerned with the dignity, worth and sanctity of the individual. 
We hold that all individuals are unique and that their uniqueness and 
differences are the source from which their various, different values flow.  
From this difference in values and interest comes, in turn, the need to engage 
in exchanges, to trade peacefully, and to form voluntary associations to 
satisfy the human need for companionship, security and culture. 
 
We also believe that each individual human being is morally 
autonomous and should be held fully responsible for his or her actions, if and 
when they impinge upon the rights of others.  Only when human uniqueness 
and autonomy are respected (by respecting others’ privacy and tolerating 
their differences) can the individual achieve self-actualization and develop 
his or her potential to the full.28
 
28  David M. Hart, “The Humane Studies Review: A Research and Study Guide.” 1:1, (No date), 1. 
Emphasis added.  In the second issue of the Humane Studies Review Hart calls attention to various figures in the 
German Enlightenment, including Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Fichte, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Humboldt also 
appears as the subject of an essay by Ralph Raico in the New Individualist Review, 1:1, (April 1961), 22-26. 
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To what degree have these ideals been incorporated into the pragmatic libertarianism 
of  proponents such as David Boaz and Charles Murray?  If they have been overlooked, as 
seems likely, why is this?  Is there some chance that individuality might be taken seriously 
by contemporary libertarians, and what are the practical implications for the doctrine and it’s 
practices if it were? 
Boaz and Murray 
David Boaz and Charles Murray share some similarities with respect to their 
libertarianism.  Both claim to ground their ideas in the classical liberal tradition.  Both focus 
on political and economic concerns, and both try to make a case for libertarianism being 
practically possible and desirable.  However, Boaz’s version emphasizes the natural or 
human rights variety of libertarianism, whereas Murray’s approach is more broadly 
consequentialist. Accordingly, David Boaz defines libertarianism in the following manner: 
Libertarianism may be regarded as a political philosophy that applies the 
ideas of classical liberalism following liberal arguments to conclusions that 
would limit the role of the government more strictly and protect individual 
freedom more fully than other classical liberals would.29
 
For Boaz, classical liberalism refers to a doctrine that includes individualism, individual 
rights, spontaneous order, the rule of law, limited government, free markets, the virtue of 
production, natural harmony of interests, and peace.  Thus, there is a good deal of continuity 
in his views with others that stretch back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the 




                                                                                                                                                            
work of Locke, Smith and Jefferson.  But there are also important pro-liberty ideas that he 
cites in the works of theorists as diverse as Benjamin Constant, Frederick Douglas, Ayn 
Rand, and Milton Friedman.   
Murray’s views draw on the Founding Fathers, Burke, Smith, and Aristotle.  He says 
he is less strict about the limits of his libertarianism than some others, and might be better 
defined as a classical liberal since he wants to retain a significant role for tradition and the 
“non-rational aspects of human spirit” within his perspective.30  As such, his social and 
moral theory is more conservative than Boaz’s.  Still, these are relative tendencies, and might 
properly be characterized as an amalgam of some of the versions of libertarianism mentioned 
above.  What is significant for this discussion is that they conspicuously fail to mention the 
ideal of self development and the cultivation of character or personality when they present 
libertarianism as a desirable and practical ideal.  (There are some incidental references to 
these ideas throughout the Primer, but most of Boaz’s discussion is concerned with rights-
based individualism and institutions.  Murray’s discussion of cultivation is better described 
as Aristotelian habituation or Smithian sympathetic imitation and conformity, emulating 
what he calls Smith’s principle of “approbativeness.”  It has more to do with personal 
responsibility, than liberty.  It is, in this respect, diametrically opposed to the sort of 
liberation Mill called for in his famous work on individuality—liberation from the strictures 
of public opinion, in On Liberty.)   
 
29 Libertarianism, A Primer, 25. 
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To persuade his audience that libertarianism is an attractive ideal Boaz draws on a 
mixture of moral intuition in relation to the nature of the individual and empirical claims 
about the inefficiency and inefficacy of large, powerful government as contrasted with the 
free market and the rest of civil society.  It is both theoretical and practical, and largely 
political and economic.  Thus, his argument draws on ontological claims about the status and 
nature of individuals (that they have natural individual rights and dignity, that they deserve 
equal respect from others, that they make choices and pursue projects according to their self 
interest.31)  But he also points to the failures of socialism and social democracy in providing 
e.g. welfare or in distributing goods and services to suggest that less government would be 
beneficial for society.  He, like Murray, shows that socialist and social democratic ways of 
ordering institutions in society have failed to produce the kind of freedom, prosperity, and 
peace that a libertarian regime promises.  To the extent that civil society is mentioned 
outside the free market, it is to discuss its benevolent and charitable functions in helping 
groups of individuals to help themselves, rather than turning to the welfare state.  The 
potential for developing oneself alone or in concert with others is mentioned as a possibility, 
but it is not treated as a vitally important goal for individuals, and certainly not highlighted 
as a primary reason for adhering to libertarianism in the first place.  The majority of his 
 
30  Murray, What It Means to Be a Libertarian, (New York: Broadway, 1997), xii-xiii. 
31 .”Because individuals are moral agents, they have a right to be secure in their life, liberty, and 
property. These rights are not granted by government or by society; they are inherent in the nature of human 
beings.  It is intuitively right that individuals enjoy the security of such rights; the burden of explanation should 
lie with those who would take rights away.” 16.  And “…liberty itself is the right to make choices and to pursue 
projects of one’s own choosing.” 15. 
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discussion might be characterized as anti-big government, pro-natural rights style 
individualism, and strongly supportive of the market in its ordering and supplying functions. 
 There is relatively little mention of character, culture or cultivation.   
It would be unfair to claim that for Boaz libertarianism is nothing more than limited 
government and laissez faire market liberalism. He is not hostile to the notion of self-
development.  Throughout the Primer and within his Reader he mentions some of the 
theorists who are closely associated with theories of individuality, including Benjamin 
Constant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Germaine de Staël, as well as Emerson and Thoreau.  
However, these are mentioned almost in passing. (In the Primer Humboldt, Goethe, Schiller, 
Kant, Constant and de Staël are discussed in about a page or so along with Mill, and Boaz 
translates Mill’s famous cite of Humboldt’s ideas concerning individuality in On Liberty in 
which he argued “that the full flourishing of the individual requires not only freedom but a 
manifold of situations,” into “the modern term alternative lifestyles,” but that is virtually the 
only discussion individuality receives.  Boaz is open to the idea of liberty for individuality, 
but it is not one of his priorities. 
In Boaz’s defense there seem to be a number of good reasons for this.  First, any 
broad work on libertarianism cannot be expected to be totally comprehensive.  Selections 
and choices have to be made, and some thinkers will inevitably take precedence over others, 
as he himself admits at the beginning of the Reader.  Still, the reasons for including some 
thinkers at the expense of others reveal an important sense of priority when the thinkers who 
share a commitment to political libertarianism diverge on matters of morality, their 
conceptions of the individual for whom freedom is being sought, and the kind of freedom 
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one is trying to achieve.  Historically, libertarianism has focused on political and economic 
concerns.  It makes sense to try to highlight a doctrine’s strengths, especially if one is 
appealing to a broad mass of people who are potential new supporters.  On the other hand, 
Boaz’s program is not primarily historical.  Rather, it is self-consciously forward-looking, 
and even programmatic, so we should expect to be able to go beyond the historical elements 
of the tradition, and he does try to do this in his discussion of technological changes and the 
information revolution.  
Secondly, libertarianism is concerned with improvement of society (relative to the 
situation we find ourselves in now,), but it is not perfectionistic.  As Boaz says, 
“Libertarianism holds out the goal not of a perfect society but of a better and freer one.”32  
The lessons of history have taught us to be wary of such theories, especially when they 
involve the coercive force of the state.  Citing Thomas Sowell, Boaz claims that libertarians 
are skeptical about power, and share an appreciation for the limits of human knowledge.  
Again, this seems reasonable enough, but the bounds of skepticism and the limits to 
improvement of individuals by the state should not preclude individual pursuit of 
improvement for themselves or the families and the groups that they live within in civil 
society, as Boaz himself admits.  However, again, this is not his primary concern, although 
he mentions it when he discusses civil society. 
Boaz notes that as a matter of moral value libertarianism subscribes to moral 
 
32 Primer, 26. 
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pluralism and a robust theory of toleration.  It is wedded to a belief in the value of individual 
choice, and wants to leave the choice about how one lives one’s life as open and wide-
ranging as possible. He says  
Liberal theory accepts that in modern societies there will be irresolvable 
differences over what the good for human beings is and what their ultimate 
nature is.  Some more Aristotelian liberals argue that human beings do indeed 
have one nature but that each human has an individual set of talents, needs, 
circumstances, and ambitions; so the good life for one person may differ 
from the good for another, despite their common nature.  Self-directedness, 
the ability to choose one’s own course in life, is part of the human good. 
 
…libertarians believe the role of government is not to impose a particular 
morality but to establish a framework of rules that will guarantee each 
individual the freedom to pursue his own good in his own way—whether 
individually or in cooperation with others—so long as he does not infringe 
the freedom of others.  Because no modern government can assume that it’s 
citizens share a complete and exhaustive moral code, the obligations imposed 
on people by force should be minimal.  In the libertarian conception, the 
fundamental rules of the political system should be essentially negative:  
Don’t violate the rights of others to pursue their own good in their own way.  
If a government tries to allocate resources and assign duties on the basis of a 
particular moral conception—according to need or moral desert—it will 
create social and political conflict.  This is not to say that there is no 
substantive morality, or that all ways of life are “equally good,” but merely 
that consensus on the best is unlikely to be reached and that when such 
matters are placed in the political realm, conflict is inevitable.33  
 
Does this then mean that libertarians can say nothing about character?  Surely not.  
All that it says is that government may not direct morality.  Certainly, as a matter of 
judgment about the kind of character that is desirable in itself, but also one that is functional 
for the kind of society Boaz aspires to live within, something may be said.  Indeed, at one 
 
33 Ibid, 105-6 
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point Boaz gives some hints about the kind of character that he believes a libertarian society 
would need—a “bourgeois character” that is committed to the virtues of “work, thrift, 
sobriety, prudence, fidelity, self-reliance, and a concern for one’s reputation…”34  But it is 
not quite clear where these virtues originate or how they are to be maintained.  Citing David 
Frum, Boaz says that government can do little to foster these traits, but it can do much to 
undermine those that already exist.  Indeed, much of Charles Murray’s early work, which is 
also cited by Boaz, documented this “crowding out” in his books Losing Ground and In 
Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government.  
For his part, Charles Murray has a good deal to say about character and personal 
responsibility.  But on this view he is mostly concerned with the kinds of informal 
institutions within society that help to keep people focused on their private concerns within 
families, associations, and communities.  Certainly he and Boaz agree that libertarianism 
should not be equated with total liberation of the individual from all constraints either, only 
“emancipation of the individual from artificial, coercive restraints on his actions.”35  Boaz 
and Murray stress the importance of individual responsibility to give and discipline 
individual actions or warn that we will get a society “characterized not by thrift, sobriety, 
self-reliance, and prudence but by profligacy, intemperance, indolence, dependency, and 
indifference to consequences.”  And yet, in Murray’s case, we get a small gesture towards 
something resembling the ideal of self development when he says: 
 
34 Primer, 146. 
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Satisfaction in human life consists of exercising our abilities and thereby 
realizing our potential. The more complex and demanding the exercise of our 
realized capacities, and the more important the function our effort serves, the 
greater the satisfaction.  The rest is amusement. 
 
The truth of the principle accounts for the towering achievements of human 
civilization.  Great art, literature, science, industry, and statesmanship are the 
products of individuals who exercised their capacities at the highest levels of 
complexity.  But it is a mistake to think of the principle as applying only to a 
gifted few; it applies to human satisfaction.  Millions of people find 
satisfaction every day in doing something well by their own standards.  Only 
a handful of them are doing something as well as it can be done by anybody. 
 But we all have an internal set of calipers for measuring how we perform 
against how well we are capable of performing, and to approach our personal 
potential is satisfying—not because anyone tries to bolster our self-esteem 
with praise but because the observer within us knows what we have 
accomplished. 
 
Opportunities to exercise our realized capacities depend on freedom.  
Actually to do the thing itself requires taking personal responsibility.  To take 
responsibility is to infuse freedom with life.36
 
Still, the vast majority of Murray’s argument has to do with criticizing large, 
powerful government for its inefficiencies and illegitimate usurping of authority, and by 
implication making his case for deregulating large areas of politicized society.  The promise 
of the kind of ideal set out by the aesthetic classical liberals is not one that, in the end, 
Murray subscribes to himself.  At bottom, the crucial difference between Boaz’s and 
Murray’s version of libertarianism and individuality are summed up by Bramsted and 
Meluish’s quotation at the beginning of the chapter.  Both stress the reasonableness of their 




                                                                                                                                                            
Connecting their arguments to commitments to individual rights is intuitively attractive to an 
American audience whose constitutional structure is founded on the belief in such rights.  
Both are open to including the possibility for self-development within their libertarian 
societies.  But they are certainly not structured around this ideal.  As we shall see, treating 
self-development more seriously within this framework of pragmatic libertarianism requires 
more than simply adding individual cultivation to the laundry list of benefits to increased 
individual freedom within a libertarian regime.  But to understand how this might be done 
we have to delve a little more deeply into the respective notions of the self.  
 
36  Murray, 1987, 33. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE LIBERTARIAN SELF 
. . . from the unquestioned ethical centrality of the person it does not follow 
that the philosophy of individualism, as we have inherited it from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is equally valid.  For individualism is 
more than an ethic, historically; it is also a psychology and an implied theory 
of the relation between man and his institutions.  And most of our difficulties 
with the philosophy of individualism at the present time come from our 
unconscious efforts to make the ethical aspect of individualism remain 
evocative when we have ceased to hold to the psychological and sociological 
premises of this philosophy.37
 
In his most recent book, What It Means to be a Libertarian, Charles Murray states 
that "to choose limited government is to choose once again to do things for ourselves."38  
This is the grounding assumption--and motivation--of all libertarian theory.  It is the belief 
in, and hope for, personal autonomy at its most robust.  The question I would like to explore 
in this chapter is what would it take for libertarian individuals to choose to do, and then 
actually to do things for themselves?  For the realization of liberty is both a theoretical and 
empirical matter, so a good deal needs to be said about the types of theories and practices 
that are necessary for the achievement of liberty.   As stated in the introduction, overall the 
thesis is based upon the following question: If one wants to move beyond the critique of the 
state toward a libertarian vision or good society, what kinds of mentalities, cultures, and 
institutions are assumed by libertarians to exist, and would need to be developed, for a 
libertarian individual and the regime that she lives within to maximize individual freedom?  
 
37 Robert A. Nisbet, Community and Power (formerly The Quest for Community) (New York: Galaxy, 
1962,), 225. 
38 (New York: Broadway, 1997), 59. 
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Here I shall outline what kind of personality or model of the self libertarianism assumes and 
requires--and most importantly, the self that might potentially be created through moral 
imagination within a libertarian order--drawing on the work of Humboldt, Mill, and 
Emerson, placing emphasis on a libertarian moral psychology or state of mind.  First, 
however, the selves of Boaz’ and Murray’s libertarianism will be compared and contrasted, 
to show what is missing from their interpretations, and what needs to be included if 
individuality were to be treated as an important goal. Subsequent chapters will deal with the 
manner in which that self, including capacities other than a mentality, is likely to be 
cultivated and shaped by a political sociology via the cultural and institutional elements of 
such a regime that would permit and encourage libertarian persons to act for themselves.      
Boaz’s and Murray’s Libertarian Individuals 
Typically, when considering the libertarian self we have in mind one of two models.  
Either we think of an abstract entity that is the bearer of negative political rights (e.g. as in 
the work of Robert Nozick,) or we envisage rational economic man (e.g. Milton Friedman).  
Within political theory the negative rights model has been roundly criticized by friends of 
liberalism for paying insufficient attention to how an individual might live a life supported 
merely by negative rights (e.g. Rawls’ discussion of the need for primary goods in A Theory 
of Justice).  Critics of liberalism have argued that all liberal selves are politically and morally 
unrealistic and undesirable because they are disembodied and rootless (e.g. Sandel's 
"unencumbered procedural liberal").  The model of economic man, on the other hand, is 
regarded as rationalistic and frequently criticized for its perpetuation of selfishness to the 
point of egoism.  (E.g .difference feminists, various critics of capitalism, and especially 
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Marx).  From the perspective of a constructive libertarianism, rather than dismissing the 
political and economic models of the liberal (libertarian) self outright, it seems to me that 
what is needed is a more complex model that contains both the political and economic 
aspects, but which is further supplemented and enlarged by cultural considerations, where 
culture is interpreted both in the anthropologists', but also, and especially, the aesthetes' 
sense of the term--as informal norms that guide and constrain action, as well as the 
education, cultivation and development of the self.   
In the work of David Boaz and Charles Murray, the political and economic models of 
the self are joined together to outline political systems based upon limited government that 
would substitute private provision of goods and services through the competitive free market 
system for the public provision of goods and services by the state.  In a brief discussion of 
libertarian individuals Charles Murray talks about "mindful human beings" who "require 
freedom and personal responsibility to live satisfying lives."  According to Murray  
the phrase mindful human being refers to nothing more complicated than 
people who are conscious of living a human life, want to live a good one, and 
accept their responsibility to try.  This is not a demanding standard.  It 
embraces people with all sorts of physical disabilities, mental impairments, 
and moral shortcomings, as long as they try to figure out what a "good" life 
means, try to live according to their understanding and accept responsibility 
for the choices they make.  The term mindful emphasizes that the possession 
of a reasoning, self-conscious mind is what separates human beings from all 
other things.39
 
In fact, it seems to me that libertarianism does (and must) require a rather more 
 
39 Murray, 1987, 18-19. Italics in the original. 
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demanding, perhaps even strenuous standard from individuals.  This is true for both those 
who are living a free, but fairly static and undeveloped life, but who do not rely upon 
government institutions for goods and services beyond the basic provision of peace and 
security,40 but also, and especially for those who pursue the type of ethical ideal that is being 
proposed here—for those who are concerned with human flourishing and self-cultivation.  
Murray goes on to claim that "Libertarians assume that, absent physical coercion, everyone's 
mind is under his own control."  Similarly, David Boaz states “the modern concept of liberty 
. . . emphasizes the right of individuals to live as they choose, to speak and worship freely, to 
own property, to engage in commerce, to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention--in 
Constant's words "to come and go without permission, and without having to account for 
their motives and undertakings."41 And, 
Libertarians see the individual as the basic unit of social analysis.  Only 
individuals make choices and are responsible for their actions.  Libertarian 
thought emphasizes the dignity of each individual, which entails both rights 
and responsibility.  The progressive extension of dignity to more people--to 
women, to people of different religions and different races--is one of the 
great libertarian triumphs of the Western world.42
 
The stress on individual dignity is a way for Boaz to highlight the sanctity of the 
individual who should be accorded due respect on the basis of the kind of thing he is—an 
 
40 Libertarians can and do make cases for the provisions of security, for example, through the 
provision of private insurance as a substitute for welfare.  See Jonathan Macey, “On the Failure of 
Libertarianism to Capture the Popular Imagination,” Problems of Market Liberalism , Ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, 
Fred D. Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 372-411. 
41 Boaz, Primer, 15 
42 Ibid, 16 
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individual who’s rights are presumed to take priority over other claims of authority over his 
life, liberty, and property.  These statements would seem to hint at a belief in each 
individual's fundamental capacity for autonomy or self government, but it is not clear exactly 
how this ought to be interpreted, and still less clear how these ought to be achieved.  For 
some, Boaz and Murray present the worst of all possible worlds, combining radical free-
market economics with vulgar anti-Marxism to produce a self that espouses bourgeois 
morality and a type of Nietzschean will-to-power mentality.43  Such characterization is 
probably overstated, yet it calls attention to important deficiencies in contemporary 
libertarian theory, even and perhaps especially, when libertarianism is judged on its own 
terms.  If libertarians are genuinely concerned to advance the freedom of individuals (who, 
after all, are more than citizens and consumers or producers) then they should be concerned 
about the narrowness of the subject matter of libertarian discussion and the attendant 
impoverishment of their conception of the self.  Boaz and Murray have made some gestures 
in the right direction by mentioning civil society and community in their versions of 
libertarianism, but these are still deficient, especially when compared to some of the ideas 
found within the classical liberal tradition.  Libertarians must look beyond political and 
economic liberty to personal or individual liberty--individuality-- developed within civil 
society.  One way to negotiate the limits of market liberalism, but then to go beyond it is to 
map out a self that relies upon self development for individuality.  Thus, my concern is both 
 
 
43 Ellen Willis, "Our Libertarianism and Theirs," A review of Libertarianism: A Primer by David 
Boaz and What It Means to Be a Libertarian: A Personal Interpretation by Charles Murray, Dissent, (Fall 
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with the broad and diverse scope of the libertarian self (that extends across political, legal, 
economic and personal or cultural liberty,) as well as its dynamic attitude and approach in 
thinking about the content of the life lived by the self.  Together the broad and diverse scope 
of an individual life, along with the dynamic attitude and approach to the way that that life is 
lived form the basis of liberty for individuality.   
Within contemporary political theory among advocates, critics and those who we 
might describe as allies, it is standard practice to identify libertarianism with free market 
economics, and little more than that.  Richard Flathman and Nancy Rosenblum are 
exponents of theories that have a central place for individuality and an underlying ethos of 
strong, independent freedom and yet they prefer to call themselves liberals rather than 
libertarians.  At least part of their aversion to libertarianism seems to be due to libertarian's 
perceived reliance upon economics and the attendant bourgeois (rather than aristocratic) 
virtues that it promotes.  Hence, in discussing the individuality and plurality that he places at 
the center of his "willful liberalism" Flathman writes: 
In these respects willful liberalism has affinities with libertarianism and 
especially with various strains in romanticism.  The notion of liberation from 
state and others forms of power is reminiscent of libertarianism and even 
individualistic anarchism, and the notions of self-making, self-enactment, and 
self-fashioning have manifest affinities with major tendencies in romanticism 
and expressivism. 
 
These comparisons, however, are seriously misleading.  As against 
libertarianism, especially in recent American and British formulations that 
identify with so-called classical liberalism and promote laissez faire or 
 
1997), 111-118.  
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market economies, strong voluntarists from Montaigne and Hobbes to 
Nietzsche, James, and Oakeshott are interested in the making of lives not in 
the making of livings.  They find the economistic character of much 
libertarianism dreary and dispiriting.44  
 
(The notion of creating a life rather than making a living was also important to Mill 
who distinguished between "the art of getting on” and the Art of Living."45)  Rosenblum, on 
the other hand, explains how the heroic individualism of romanticism she draws upon to 
supplement liberalism to produce "another liberalism" is a revolt against the regularity and 
conventional order of law and the "narrow selfishness of commercial types."46 
What these criticisms point to is the fact that at bottom there is a fundamental 
divergence in the model of human nature upon which economic and cultural psychologies 
are based.  The economic model rests on a narrow mechanical Hobbesian self whose 
preferences are given and are (hopefully) satisfied by the market; there is little or no 
consideration of any change in these preferences, except perhaps over the very long run.  
Certainly it is not assumed that there is much potential or desirability for the development of 
an individual's preferences.  As Murray said this is "not a very demanding standard."  When 
Hayek distinguishes himself from conservatives at the end of The Constitution of Liberty, he 
does so by pointing to his belief in progress.  But this is the progress of a free society, not of 
 
44 Richard Flathman, Reflections of a Would-Be Anarchist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1998), 14. Emphasis added.  Flathman goes on to distinguish "strong voluntarism" from romanticism 
because of the latter’s want of discipline.   
45 See Bernard Semmel "John Stuart Mill's Coleridgeian Neoradicalism," in The Political Science 
Reviewer 24 (1995) 158.  Also noted in Alan Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 45 citing a passage in Mill's Principles of Political Economy.  See n.67 at 177. 
46 Nancy Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 19. 
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single human beings.  Hayek, like many classical liberals, is somewhat skeptical about the 
potential for individuals to change and develop, and like Isaiah Berlin, he notes in particular 
the dangers to society that have occurred when political power has been used in the service 
of perfectionism.47  These points are well taken.  However, I wonder if Hayek is too 
pessimistic when he says that in practice it is likely that a few great leaders and 
entrepreneurs will rise and flourish, but the great mass of democratic society will not, and 
cannot be expected to want to do so.   
By contrast, the cultural perspective rests upon a set of natural capacities (such as 
reason, passion, energy, imagination and creativity), but its emphasis is upon the 
development of those capacities to create a broader, better educated human being, who has 
the potential to experience more of life.48  It looks to human nature, but also, and especially 
human action (both internal and external) in connection with living a free life.  As Nancy 
Rosenblum says "The language of economic preferences and maximization is inappropriate 
to self-cultivation, which entails a different relation to oneself than simply knowing what 
one's preferences are or when one's desires have been sated."49 Indeed, as we shall see, self-
 
47 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). See 
Postscript: “Why I Am Not a Conservative,” 397-411 and Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four 
Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118-172. 
48 One brief caveat: This discussion of a libertarian self and its moral psychology should be 
understood as an exploration within moral and social philosophy, not metaphysics.  As such, I do not wish to 
argue for the kind of pure, acontextual, Nietzschean metaphysics of someone like Richard Flathman whose 
work on individuality provides an inspiring and eloquent critique of some varieties of liberalism, but whose 
theory is ultimately too radical and, I think, too undemocratic for my friendly reform of libertarianism.  
49 Rosenblum, 133. 
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cultivation requires critical consideration and evaluation of one’s preferences which may 
lead to attempts to change those preferences or to cultivate new ones altogether.  To 
understand this difference more sharply we need to return to the ideas of Humboldt, Mill, 
and Emerson. 
Humboldt, Mill and Emerson and the Theory and Practice of Individuality
Why Wilhelm von Humboldt?  When political theorists consider individuality, they 
usually start with John Stuart Mill.  However, Humboldt is the first theorist to extend 
political consciousness to the previously apolitical concept of individuality.50  From a 
theoretical point of view, his ideas are attractive because he lays out a relatively pure and 
uncluttered theory of individuality.  Furthermore, unlike John Stuart Mill in On Liberty and 
elsewhere, he does not resort to advocating political51 participation as a means for fostering 
self-development and individuality.  Rather, he recommends participation within civil 
society--the apolitical domain of society that is secured, but not actively fashioned, by the 
state.  Accordingly, at first glance Humboldt's theory of individuality would certainly seem 
                                                 
50 See Gerald N. Izenberg, Impossible Individuality, Romanticism, Revolution, and the Origins of 
Modern Selfhood 1787-1802, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Introduction and Chapter 1, 27-35, 
 especially 34.  Political theorists who study his work today regard Humboldt as fundamentally apoliticial, and 
sometimes even anti-political, but of course such categorization depends upon one's perspective.  Izenberg 
examines a literary, philosophical, and even theological ideal--individuality--that was made political by 
Humboldt's discussion of it in relation to the state and the limits he wanted to place upon political authority in 
order to realize individuality.  Political theorists, many of whom share an implicit commitment to, and faith in, 
the activist state, and who accordingly hold a belief in the virtues of civic (political) participation start with an 
altogether different set of standards from which to evaluate the nature of Humboldt's theory.      
51 I employ the term "political" to mean that which is associated with the state.  Others may prefer that 
I identify statism more directly since political activity, properly understood encompasses more than simply 
activity within the state e.g. democrats talk about "political discourse," meaning communication that is public, 
social, civic (such as voting, etc.)  By contrast, the "apolitical" activity to which I refer is that which is public 
and social but not directly associated with the state, taking place within civil society. 
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to be more consistent with libertarianism than Mill's.  However, Mill's theory is also 
important because of his critique of cultural constraints, based upon both theoretical and 
practical considerations, mentioned above and discussed further below.  At the same time, 
Emerson's ideas need to be considered because they are democratic in a way that Humboldt's 
and Mill's ideas are not, or at least not unambiguously democratic.  Furthermore, the kind of 
libertarianism that I am criticizing is associated with an American political movement and it 
is likely that it will be easier to persuade people to adopt a "native" political theory rather 
than a foreign import.  Consequently, each theorist has something useful to contribute to the 
development of a practical libertarian theory of individuality.  Therefore the ideals, 
assumptions, and the necessary means for the achievement of individuality of each theory 
will be compared and contrasted.  In particular, I want to draw on some of Humboldt's, Mill's 
and Emerson's ideas to sketch out a type of libertarian aspiration that might be used to 
broaden (mere) political theory and to counterbalance market liberal economism.  Returning 
to my initial questions, what does each of these theorists tell us about what it takes for 
libertarian individuals to choose to do, and to do things for ourselves (where what we want 
to do is to develop our individuality)?  What kind of self does each assume and then develop, 
and how is this to be achieved?   
The Ideal  
Humboldt's ideas are consistent with libertarianism because he places the individual 
at the center of his theory while also making strong criticisms of state power.  Indeed, his 
best known work--The Limits of State Action--is an argument for a minimal state--the classic 
nightwatchman state of libertarian theory.  However, his reasons for doing so differ 
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markedly from most contemporary libertarian arguments since Humboldt has an explicit 
commitment to the good life.  Freedom is valued, but not intrinsically.  Rather, it is used 
instrumentally along with a theory of cultural pluralism to argue for--or perhaps even assert--
the value of self- development or what I shall call individuality.   
At bottom, Humboldt's libertarianism is not political, or even moral, but rather 
aesthetic.  He champions liberty because it is beautiful, not because it helps us to lead lives 
that are happier, more satisfied, or more virtuous.52  Instead, his is a romantic vision--a 
positive ideal that rests on an aspiration to explore one's potential by living creatively and 
energetically.  According to this conception, life is a work of art that needs to be defined, 
refined, and continually expanded upon.  But unlike a work of art, it is never finished.   
Mill drew freely on Humboldt's ideas concerning self-development; however he was 
rather more restrained in his treatment of the ideal than Mill,53 using it to criticize the 
"despotism of custom" in society, rather than the state.  To appreciate Mill's variety of 
individuality it is necessary to recognize that it grew out of his condemnation of nineteenth 
century England's social arrangements, and in particular (as he saw it) the social conformity 
and mediocrity propagated by Calvinism and commercialism.  Indeed, for Mill, like 
Tocqueville, the primary threat to freedom is not the authoritarian state, as it was for 
 
 
52 Cf. J.S. Mill, who, as we shall see, lays great emphasis on individuality in connection with social 
progress and the "improvement of mankind" in general. 
53  Stephan Collini says that Mill was less interested in the romantic ideal of self-exploration, and 
more concerned about "the better development of the social part of [the individual's] nature. See "Introduction," 
in Mill's On Liberty (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), xvii.  See also Ronald Terchek, 
Republican Paradoxes and Liberal Anxieties (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) chapter 5, and 
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Humboldt, but rather democratic society.54  This is an argument to which libertarians need to 
pay attention since today, given its proximity the local community may pose more of a threat 
to liberty than the extensive, but frequently highly inefficient state.  Indeed, libertarians 
should be criticized for ignoring the conformity of mass opinion and focusing only on the 
oppressive actions of bureaucrats.  
    So what is Mill's ideal?  While still promoting many of the ideas put forward by 
Humboldt, Mill does so in a rather more practical fashion, and tries to negotiate the limits of 
both state and society for individuality.  Like Humboldt, Mill believes that individuality is 
the proper goal of human beings--indeed he cites Humboldt's definition of individuality at 
the beginning of his chapter on individuality in On Liberty.  Again, in general terms 
individuality consists of freedom to choose how one lives one's life, which is itself a 
continual project, using and developing one's faculties.  But Mill's individuality is a moral 
not an aesthetic ideal; it is more concerned with individual and social progress through 
many-sidedness and diversity, as opposed to the development of individual spiritual beauty 
and harmony.  Also, and importantly, it has to do with action that is primarily associated 
with self-regarding behavior that does not harm the interests of others.  So Mill introduces a 
more complex picture than Humboldt by noting the contestation of boundaries for the self 
and for the respective domains of society that it inhabits. Mill's individuality is eclectic and 
 
Nancy Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, 134.  
54 See Jon Roper, Democracy and Its Critics. Anglo-American Democratic Thought in the Nineteenth 
Century, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
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draws on several diverse sources.  As he describes it, the ideal contains elements of "pagan 
self-assertion" as well as "Christian self-denial."  It is also influenced by the Greek ideal of 
self-development (particularly its platonic and stoic varieties), and the Christian notion of 
self-government.  In addition we know that Mill was affected by romanticism after he read 
Wordsworth's poetry to help him to recover from his nervous breakdown.55  Further, the 
ideas of Coleridge and Carlyle profoundly influenced Mill's thoughts on culture and the 
masses, while Comte's notion of creating a "religion of humanity" is said to have been 
adapted by Mill in his own construction of a social theory.56  In contrast to Calvinism, which 
wears people down into uniformity, Mill says that individuality cultivates and calls forth a 
true individual--to become a human being that is a "noble and beautiful object of 
contemplation."  It calls on individuals to develop their mental and spiritual selves, thereby 
giving priority to intellectual capacities, but these are by no means the only capacities valued 
by Mill.  Like Humboldt, Mill seems to suggest that, individuality has intrinsic value for the 
individual, independent of its social value.57  Furthermore, this is a democratic standard in 
 
 
55 J.S. Mill, Autobiography (London: Penguin, 1989), 120-122.  He was also familiar with Goethe, 
Fichte, and other German thinkers, 191. 
56  See J.S. Mill, Autobiography, 162-164.  Joseph Hamburger, "Individuality and Moral Reform: The 
Rhetoric of liberty and the Reality of Restraint in Mill's On Liberty," Political Science Reviewer 24, 1995, 7-70.  
57 See C. L. Ten, "Individuality," in Mill on Liberty, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), chapter 5, 68-85.  
Some commentators maintain that Mill is only interested in the social uses of individuality, pointing to the 
absence of natural rights to guarantee the priority of individuals and their freedom (including individuality) over 
social happiness.  See Collini, xxv, who says that Mill was a liberal, but not a libertarian or a liberationist.  
Others regard Mill as a true idealist and collectivist in the manner of T.H. Green, and who therefore considers 
the individual and his individuality as mere instruments to be used for the creation of a perfect society.  See, for 
instance, Michael Oakeshott, Morality and Politics in Modern Europe, Ed. Shirley Robin Letwin, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1993), 78-83.  Joseph Hamburger considers Mill in an even more sinister light, saying 
that On Liberty deals with conditions for a transformational society that would lead to a future organic state, and 
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that, in theory at least, it applies to all.  Mill says  
. . . nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry 
on their lives in their own way.  There is no reason that all human existence should 
be constructed on some one or some small number of patterns.  If a person possesses 
any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out 
his existence is the best, not because it is the best itself, but because it is his own 
mode.  Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably 
alike.58
 
However, unlike Humboldt, Mill also notes the social value of his ideal, in order, he 
says, to persuade those who are not likely to be persuaded by the intrinsic worth argument.59 
 "In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable 
to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others.  There is a greater 
fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more 
in the mass which is composed of them."60 And, indeed, for Mill they are complimentary, not 
contradictory sides of the argument, since he is trying to accommodate several theoretical 
and practical concerns simultaneously, (as, indeed, am I.) in this thesis.  The breadth of his 
vision and consequently the kinds of questions he asks is substantially broader than 
Humboldt's, which accounts for some of the tensions in his work.   
When discussing the social value of individuality, Mill looks to three characteristics: 
 
that therefore Mill's romantic ideals and commitment to individuals were tenuous at best. Cf. Nancy 
Rosenblum's reading of Mill in Another Liberalism, chapter 6. 
58 J.S. Mill, 1989, 67. 
59 Andrew Valls, “Self Development and the Liberal State: The Cases of John Stuart Mill and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, “The Review of Politics, 61: 2, (Spring  1999), 252. 
60 Ibid, 63. 
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genius, originality and eccentricity, and shows how they may serve social progress, or as he 
puts it "by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to."  In mentioning genius, 
originality and eccentricity it might be argued that Mill is calling for an aristocratic, or at 
least an elitist standard, pointing to the possibility and perhaps desirability of individuality 
being pursued by a few heroic souls only, chosen from a particular class or group in society. 
 Obviously this would contradict the democratic pronouncement mentioned above.  
However, as described by Mill, genius, originality and eccentricity are illustrative of kinds of 
personality traits that are consistent with individuality and that were still easily identifiable 
during the period he was examining. I.e. what they demonstrate is a larger commitment to 
excellence and freedom of choice.61  They are not exclusive or exhaustive of all forms of 
individuality--nor could they be, given Mill's understanding of progress and discovery of 
new ideas and new experiments in living.  In fact they are meant to be examples of a critical 
and thoughtful approach to life.   Drawing on Mill's essay "On Genius," David Spitz notes 
that Mill says "originality. . . need not be identified with the discovery of new truth; it is 
enough if the individual discovers truths by himself even if they are truths already known to 
and accepted by others.  Originality, in other words, is a process of discovery, not an attitude 
of that which is discovered. . . Thinking for himself, the original mind might well arrive in 
fact at conclusions altogether consistent with those current in his society and thus turn out to 
be a conformist after all.  It cannot be argued that conformity on such terms negates the 
 
61 See Alan Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 4-5. 
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claims to individuality, for as long as a decision is arrived at through autonomous thought, it 
meets Mill's notion of individuality."62  As such, Millian individuality must be relatively 
open-ended, inspiring the cultivation of different personalities in different ways and to 
varying degrees.  As Peter Berkowitz says, “Mill's liberalism puts first neither markets nor 
procedures nor rights.  Rather, his liberalism grows out of, and constantly returns to, 
questions of character and the ends of human life."63   
The problem with using Humboldt and Mill for libertarian individuality is that they 
share an aristocratic bias: Humboldt's ideal is explicitly aristocratic in theory and in practice; 
Mill's individuality is theoretically democratic, but open to elitist readings in practice.  At 
least, his writings demonstrate a preoccupation with higher minds, the intellect, and the 
progress of society guided and shaped by the thoughts and actions of "great minds," and in 
On Utilitarianism he champions the “higher pleasures.”  Little attention is paid to the 
cultivation of individuality by ordinary people, although he says in passing that it is an ideal 
that is available to all.  Still, the underlying tone is somewhat elitist. In a democratic age this 
is problematic to say the least; to some it will render individuality wholly unacceptable as a 
justification for any contemporary political theory.  What is needed, then, is a democratic 
theorist of individuality, and here, as the work of George Kateb has shown, the ideas of 
 
 
62 "Freedom and Individuality: Mill's Liberty in Retrospect." NOMOS IV, Liberty, (New York: 
Atherton, 1962), 203.  Mill himself says the value of originality is that it serves to open others eyes.  Ibid, 65. 
Ten says that in mentioning eccentricity Mill did not mean to promote peculiarity and idiosyncrasy.  Rather, 
"eccentricity provokes thought.  It shows men that alternative ways of life are possible.  It shakes men out of 
their unthinking complacency, and thereby encourages them to accept or reject custom as an act of conscious 
choice." J.S. Mill, 1989, 71.   
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Emerson are relevant.  Furthermore, Mill and Humboldt are European, not American 
theorists.  Since the point is to propose reform of the ideas of an American political 
movement it would seem appropriate to examine the ideas of an American exponent of 
individuality.  This inclusion is important because libertarianism is largely an American 
political and social movement (and certainly the sector of it with which I am concerned is 
located in the United States) and there are those who will claim that individuality is based 
upon a foreign--specifically German--interpretation of freedom.  Moreover, some will claim 
that such idealism runs counter to the essentially pragmatic tenor of much American political 
and social theory.  On the contrary, however, the ideas of the Emersonians demonstrate that 
individuality is not an alien import and should be acceptable to the theory and practices of 
American freedom so long as it is combined with other elements, including pragmatism, 
within a broader liberal pluralism.  Furthermore, one might argue, as indeed, George Kateb 
does, that the very notion of founding--the creation of the First New (Democratic) Nation--
itself provides the very idealistic historical and cultural context from which these ideas 




64 George. Kateb, "Democratic Individuality and the Meaning of Rights,” in Nancy Rosenblum, Ed. 
Liberalism and the Moral Life, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 186. 
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individuality for libertarian individuality. 
Emerson's individuality finds its influences most notably in Plato's philosophy and 
Carlyle's social commentary, as well as, and especially, Unitarian religious 
transcendentalism.  Like Mill, much of Emerson's approach to individuality stems from his 
complaint about the social conformity that he sees in society.  On Emerson's view, public 
opinion in America is preoccupied with moneymaking, so he exhorts individuals to liberate 
themselves from it, and to think critically for themselves.  Politics and the state are also 
viewed with skepticism since these rest upon conventions (or what we might today call 
"constructs,") that constrain our vision of the world.  In one of his most famous pleas for 
robust autonomy, "Self Reliance," Emerson says: 
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its 
members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for 
the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty 
and culture of the eater.  The virtue in most request is conformity.  Self-




Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist . . . Nothing is at last 
sacred but the integrity of your own mind.65   
 
Such statements have given rise to concern from some communitarian critics who 
interpret his statement as a kind of manifesto for atomism and Nietzscheanism before 
 




                                                
Nietzsche.66  However, this seems to me to be uncharitable to Emerson, who condemned 
egoism in an essay titled "Culture," and who noted the individual uses and abuses of society 
in essays such as "Society and Solitude."   
But worse than the harping on one string, nature has secured individualism by giving 
the private person a high conceit of his weight in the system.  The pest of society is 
egoists.  There are dull and bright, sacred and profane, course and fine egoists.  It is a 
disease that like influenza falls on all constitutions.  In the distemper known to 
physicians as chorea, the patient sometimes turns round and continues to spin slowly 
on one spot.  Is egoism a metaphysical variety of this malady?  The man runs round a 
ring formed by his own talent, falls into an admiration of it, and loses relation to the 
world.  It is a tendency in all minds. 67
 
The antidotes against this organic egoism are the range and variety of attractions, as 
gained by acquaintance with the world, with men of merit, with classes of society, with 
travel, with eminent persons, and with the high resources of philosophy, art and religion; 
books, travel, society, solitude.68
Instead, the plea for individuality should be seen as an instance of self-assertion and a 
motivation for self-culture.  As Judith Shklar says, "It is not a call to reject the usual bonds of 
family life but to take them on as one's own discovery."69 It is not a casting off of 
responsibility, but rather an embrace of it.  This, in part, is what it means to choose to live a 
 
66 See, for instance, Wilfred M. McClay, "Mr. Emerson's Tombstone," comparing Protestant Christian 
"constrained individuality," with Emersonian "boundlessness", First Things  1998, No. 83, (May 1998), 16-22. 
67 “Culture,” in The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ed. Brooks Atkinson, (New York: 
Modern Library, 1950), 718. 
68 Ibid,721.  
69 "Emerson and the Inhibitions of Democracy." Political Theory, (November 1990), 603. 
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free life. 
 Emerson's individuality is both moral and spiritual, and as such it shares some of the 
attributes of Humboldt's romantic individuality along with Mill's more grounded reformist 
individuality.  Ultimately, in its highest religious and metaphysical form it results in the 
harmony of the soul with the universe (a kind of perfection in the obliteration, or at least the 
radical transformation of the self), but in its cultural and social forms it calls for many-
sidedness, curiosity and intensity in both thought and behavior.   Since I am bracketing 
metaphysics I only mention the highest form of metaphysical ("impersonal") individuality in 
passing and concentrate on the moral aspects (negative and positive individuality).  Negative 
individuality has to do with a disposition to disobey bad conventions and unjust laws, 
whereas positive individuality is closer to autonomy or self-government. 
As George Kateb explains it, Emersonian individuality begins with a concern for 
individual integrity that demands honesty and self-trust.70  Like Humboldt before him, 
Emerson invites individuals to share a vision of life.  He calls on them to live life intensely, 
not merely to exist passively and customarily, but rather to "achieve a new relation to 
reality."  But to do this they must see social conventions as the constructs that they are, and 
this in turn requires that they approach conventions with "honesty," 
. . . to acceptance of the dangers and opportunities of being self-conscious 
creatures, able to see ourselves, see through and around ourselves, and this 
able to reject identification with any role or set of conventions.  Individuals 
 




                                                
are detached from even the conventions they accept, and are free to change 
conventions.  Let us not be afraid of self-consciousness, they urge:  
Democracy will thrive on it.  Democracy is, in secular terms, the realization 
of the grand historical effort to sustain social life without bad faith, and 
without superstition, mystique, and misdirected religiousness.71
 
Such individuality is democratic on a number of levels.  It is democratic politically 
because it rests upon and is made possible by democratic political institutions, especially 
representative government and rights that recognize the dignity and worth of each individual. 
 Thus, the political is also moral because it respects each human being.  But this is also 
located within a democratic culture, based upon commitment to a set of ideas (ideals) that 
are expressed most eloquently in the Founding documents, not blood or tradition.  This 
informs the way that we live our day-to-day lives, and our respect for each other.72  Further, 
it indicates a disposition toward independence or self-government that is taken beyond mere 
self-government to the individual self expression of the unique personality when it is joined 
by the concept of individuality.  As such, potentially democratic libertarian individuality 
would be attainable by each human being, not just each citizen or entrepreneur, although in 
practice different people will achieve it and experience it to different degrees.73  
 
 
71 Ibid, 339. 
72 For Emerson this meant joining the movement to abolish slavery.  See Emerson’s Antislavery 
Writings Ed. Len Gougeon and Joel Myerson, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). See also Nancy 
Rosenblum's discussion of the democracy of everyday life in Membership and Morals (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998). 
73 Another example of the idea of democratic individuality may be found in a short essay by Ralph 
Ellison, “The Little Man at Chehaw Station.  The Artist and  His Audience.”  The story uses the metaphor of the 
little man behind the stove in the waiting room at the Chehaw Station to convey the often unexpected glimpses 
of knowledge and appreciation for art and excellence more broadly, that we sometimes stumble across in 
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Human Nature: Essence and Its Cultivation 
The next question that needs to be considered is what is the source of this 
individuality?  Humboldt asserts   
The true end of Man or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable 
dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the 
highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and 
consistent whole.74
 
How do we know this?  Humboldt's assertion rests upon an intuitive claim about 
human nature. For him, human nature contains physical, intellectual, and moral faculties--
natural capacities, or as he puts it, "powers"--that are to be developed according to his notion 
of Bildung, i.e. the inner self- development of capacities and inclinations.  Originally, 
Bildung is said to have carried with it a religious connotation.  German mystics in the 
fourteenth century used it to describe the means by which the individual advances towards 
God.75  However, in Humboldt it represents a form of humanism and that is the way I mean 
to employ it here.76  In contrast to the usual rational self-interested individual of liberalism, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
American Society.  We should always strive to do our best not only for ourselves and the benefit of our 
particular art, but also and especially because we never quite know who will be watching us performing our art. 
 Ellison says the American artist will do his best not only because of his dedication to his form and craft, but 
because he realizes that despite an inevitable unevenness of composition, the chances are that any American 
audience will conceal at least one individual whose knowledge and taste will complement or surpass his own. 
The Collected Essays of Ralph Ellison,  Ed. John F. Callahan, (New York, Modern Library, 1995), 494.   
74 Wilhelm von Humboldt The Limits of State Action, (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1969), 10. 
75  Of course, this tradition is continued by Emersonian transcendentalism, or what Kateb calls 
"impersonal individuality," however I prefer to leave individuality more open-ended.  See his "Democratic 
Individuality and the Claims of Politics," Political Theory 12:3 (August 1984), 331-360.   
76  Steven M. Young, "The Unified Self and the Cultural Community: Romantic Self-Development 
and the National Ideal in Wilhelm von Humboldt," paper presented to the American Political Science 
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and particularly neo-classical economics, the self in Humboldt's theory relies upon a 
combination of natural capacities including energy (vital forces) reason, sensuality (or 
passion) and imagination.  Reason acts as a guide to behavior, while sensuality and 
imagination provide the motivation and creativity for action.  Together these features 
constitute a self that interacts with the world to forge a unique, multi-faceted, but unified 
individual. 
The philosophy of Leibniz and Kant--specifically the metaphysics of Leibniz, and 
Kant's moral theory--appear to have been particularly influential in developing these ideas.  
Paul Sweet says that although Humboldt had read and carefully studied Kant, he was heavily 
influenced by Leibniz's idea of "individual entities driven by mysterious energy toward 
higher development and perfection.  When he thought of essences, whether of individuals or 
collectivities, he thought of vital energies. . . 77  But Humboldt adapted Leibniz for his own 
purposes, transforming metaphysics into social and political theory, while retaining the basic 
idea of harmony that he found in Leibniz.78  Rather than splitting personalities into higher 
and lower selves like Mill, Humboldt thought that personalities could be fashioned into 
harmonious wholes.  In this we see the influences of some of his more romantic tendencies 
 
Association Annual Meeting, Boston, September 3-6, 1998, 6, drawing on Klaus Vordung, "Unity Through 
Bildung: A German Dream of Perfection," Independent Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 516 (1988), 47-55, at 47. 
77 Paul R. Sweet, Wilhelm von Humboldt's Writings (1798-93) Reconsidered,  Journal of the History 
of Ideas, 34:3 (1973), 471. 
78       David Sorkin, "Wilhelm von Humboldt: The Theory and Practice of Self-Formation (Bildung), 
1791-1810." Journal of the History of Ideas, 44 (1983), 59-60. 
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that moved toward aesthetics, but also his reliance upon moral theories.  Drawing on Kantian 
moral theory Humboldt developed a theory of autonomy that is submerged beneath his 
critique of the state and celebration of the goal of self-development and individuality.  Like 
Kant, he maintained that the grounding for the moral law was the recognition of the dignity 
and worth of each person according to her capacity to reason for herself.  He believed that 
moral law prescribes duties to others to avoid violating their rights to negative liberty that 
are enforced by the state.79  But the moral law also instructs individuals to develop 
themselves, applying their own inner resources to a multitude of diverse experiences in the 
world.  Mill and the Emersonians shared a similar belief, maintaining that all individuals 
have a moral duty to themselves, and to a lesser extent, to others,80 to develop themselves 
according to the dictates of reason, conscience, and imagination.  (For Humboldt all 
experiences are potentially valuable to self-development, and are to be valued accordingly so 
long as they do not violate others' rights to freedom.)  Freedom of choice is vital--he says 
"whatever does not spring from man's free choice, or is only the result of instruction and 
guidance, does not enter into his very being, but still remains alien to his true nature; he does 
not perform it with truly human energies, but merely with mechanical exactness."81  Yet 
 
79 Limits, 90. 
80 At least, Humboldt and Mill seem to recognize this duty to others see below, and 63 On Liberty "In 
proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself and is 
therefore capable of being more valuable to others."  The Emersonians do not.  Kateb says that the only duty 
they recognize is a negative duty not to hinder others' freedom and development.  This is particularly true of 
Thoreau. Kateb, 1984, 343. 
81 Ibid, 23. 
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Humboldt modifies Kant’s moral law to include a synthesis of reason with passion to 
motivate the freely choosing individual to act in the world.82
On this view freedom is not simply an absence of restraints (negative liberty), rather 
it is potential: it contains "the possibility of a various and indefinite activity."  A variety of 
situations help the individual to experience the world and develop the various facets of her 
character (and indeed other's characters as she interacts with them in the world, as we shall 
see in a moment.)  As J.S. Burrow explains: 
Life lived as it should be, according to Humboldt, consists of an endless 
endeavor to reconcile a coherent individuality with the utmost receptivity to 
the most diverse experience, an acceptance of an eternal tension between the 
need to be uniquely and harmoniously oneself and the duty to assimilate as 
much as possible of life's emotional and intellectual possibilities.83
 
To the extent that individuality resembles Aristotle's telos it may be regarded as the 
pursuit of human flourishing.  However, it is also different because individuality is a process 
not an end--it is never fully achieved in the sense of there being an achievable end, a 
perfection of the self.84  Furthermore, there is no single standard by which an individual may 
judge her life plan.  Rather, each must follow her own path according to her own 
 
82 Humboldt says: This individual vigor, then, and manifold diversity combine themselves in 
originality; and hence, that on which the whole greatness of mankind ultimately depends--towards which every 
human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and of which especially those who wish to influence their 
fellow-men must never lose sight: individuality of energy and self-development." ibid, 11-12. 
83  J.S. Burrow, "Introduction to Humboldt's Limits of State Action," xxix-xxx. 
84  Cf. Kateb, 1984. ". . .democratic individuality is not an ideal that one can ever be certain has been 
reached.  It is not meant to be so unequivocally defined as to be unambiguously reachable.  It is not a permanent 
state of being, but an indefinite project.  It allows degrees, approximations, attenuations. . . the cultural ideal is 
lived fitfully; telos is often avoided," 338. 
 
 59
                                                
particularities of character and situation.  Consequently, Humboldt's vision is far less 
constrained than Aristotle's. 
In On Liberty, in contrast to the neo-classical economists’ model of the self, Mill 
proclaims "Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model and set to do exactly the 
work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, 
according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing."85 Again, we see 
that human nature is constituted by both reason and passions ("desires" and "impulses," 
including, and especially, energy, as well as discipline to control those impulses.)  These are 
natural or innate, but they must be used frequently since they are like muscle; if they are not 
exercised, they lose their strength and agility.  For Mill, one is not born a human being, but 
rather becomes one through the frequent use and cultivation of one's capacities.  Mill says: 
"He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need 
of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.  He who chooses his plan for himself, 
employs all his faculties."86    In developing a free life Mill says an individual ". . . must use 
observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for 
decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to 
hold his deliberate decision.  And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in 
 
85 J.S. Mill, On Liberty,  60.  But cf. Ronald Terchek's discussion of Mill's interpretation of basic or 
raw uncultivated human nature which is not so very different from Hobbes'.  The difference is that on Mill’s 
view we learn to change and the history of the race is to develop. Republican Paradoxes and Liberal Anxieties, 
chapter 5. 
86  J.S. Mill, 59  
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proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and 
feelings is a large one."87  This is what is meant by autonomy or self-government.  
Individuality has to do with creating an independent and unique life of one's own.  
Elsewhere, in Utilitarianism, Mill tells us a little more about the natural capacities when he 
famously develops the doctrine of the higher and lower pleasures, claiming that no 
individual who had had experience of the higher pleasures would be likely to choose to live 
life like a lower animal.  He says "A being of higher faculties requires more to make him 
happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at more 
points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish 
to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence."88  He attributes this to pride, the 
love of liberty and a stoic personal independence, the love of power or excitement, and a 
sense of dignity.  These appear to be innate capacities that are refined through experience, 
especially education.  The final goal that is achieved by the autonomous individual who has 
developed his individuality--happiness--departs from the romantic conception favored by 
Novalis and others.  It is not "a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement" since that is 
impossible.  Nor is it a kind of "state of exalted pleasure that lasts only moments," but more 
of a quiet, steady contentment that Mill believes is perfectly possible if cultural conditions 
are reformed.  He says "The present wretched education and wretched social arrangements 
 
87 Ibid, 59. 
88 J.S. Mill, "Utilitarianism," in On Liberty and Utilitarianism (New York: Bantam, 1993), 147. 
 
 61
are the only real hindrance to its being attainable by almost all,"89 suggesting that there is a 
democratic aspect to Mill.  Thus, nurture within a certain type of culture (primarily one that 
is tolerant and diverse) is at least as important to Mill's theory of individuality as the innate 
capacities that constitute basic human nature.  In On Liberty Mill comments ". . . what more 
or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings 
themselves nearer to the best thing that they can be?  Or what worse can be said of any 
obstruction to the good, than that it prevents this?"90
What are the sources of Emersonian individuality?  Like the two previous theorists 
discussed above, part of Emerson’s theory relies upon natural capacities or powers that are 
said to be possessed by all, and he assumes that all human beings are capable of achieving it, 
at least experiencing it partially and perhaps intermittently.  Kateb says that Emerson 
preaches self-reliance because he thinks that all people already have self-reliant moments 
and could more successfully become self-reliant if they tried.  “Self-reliance is thus not a 
doctrine of superiority to average humanity.  Rather it is a doctrine urging the elevation of 
democracy to its full height, free of the aristocratic, but also free of the demotic.”91    
Institutions 
Yet thinking and acting for oneself in such a critical and spontaneous manner do not 
                                                 
89 Ibid, 151.  
90 Ibid, 64. 
91 Emerson and Self-Reliance,  (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995), 18.  
 
 62
                                                
simply come naturally, so more still needs to be said.  Humboldt is not terribly clear about 
the details of the development of autonomous individuals, and Emerson is even more vague 
than Humboldt.  In his own writings Emerson is a good deal less concerned with the concrete 
institutional mechanisms needs to cultivate individuality than Mill, and even Humboldt.  
Beyond his support for democracy, many of his claims have to be taken on faith.  However, 
he makes the occasional remark about the roles of culture and education.  Emerson says: 
This individuality is not only not inconsistent with culture, but is the basis of it.  
Every valuable nature is there in its own right, and the student we speak to must have 
a mother-wit invincible by his culture--which uses all books, arts, facilities, and 
elegancies of intercourse, but is never subdued and lost in them.  He is only a well-
made man who has a good determination.  And the end of culture is not to destroy 
this, God forbid! but to train away all impediment and mixture and leave nothing but 
pure power.  Our student must have a style and determination, and be a master in his 
own specialty.  But having this, he must put it behind him.  He must have a catholic-
ity, a power to see with a free and disengaged look every object.92   
 
Self development also requires a new attitude with respect to education:  
Let us make our education brave and preventative.  Politics is an after-work, 
a poor patching.  We are always a little late.  The evil is done, the law is 
passed, and we begin the uphill agitation for repeal of that which we ought to 
have prevented the enacting.  We shall one day learn to supersede politics by 
education.  What we call our root-and-branch reforms, of slavery, war, 
gambling, intemperance, is only medicating the symptoms.  We must begin 
higher up, namely in Education. 93  
 
In Humboldt's case we know from his discussions concerning the state and education, as well 
as children’s rights, that he believed that schooling was extremely important to the 
 
92 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Culture," in The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson (New York: 
Modern Library, 1950), 719. 
93 Ibid, 722. 
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cultivation of a critical inquisitiveness.94  State sponsored education is roundly criticized for 
the same reasons that all state activity is criticized (as we shall see below)--it is overly 
rational and mechanistic and cannot adapt to the spontaneous flowering of particular 
individuals.  It is, by nature, too rigid and narrow, imposing a special civic form.   Instead, 
parents are charged with the duty of bringing their offspring to full maturity and presumably 
this includes teaching their children at home, or paying for tutors to instruct their children on 
their behalf.  If they are incapable of fulfilling their duties, the state is to appoint guardians to 
ensure that the physical and moral well-being of minors is met.  However, his discussion of 
formal education is severely abbreviated--especially when one considers the burdens implied 
by self-development.  This is precisely because for the most part Humboldt’s concern is with 
mature adults who have already learned how to live by the moral and legal laws of a society. 
 He employs self-development (autonomy) at a higher level to help the individual develop 
himself with others above and beyond meeting the requirements for material necessity and 
social peace.  And to do this he requires two institutional mechanisms: the state and civil 
society.  
The State  
   Freedom is the first and indispensable condition that the possibility of such a 
development presupposes; but there is besides another essential--intimately con-
nected with freedom, it is true--a variety of situations.  Even the most free and self-
                                                 
94 Ibid, 48-50; 127-133. 
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reliant of men is hindered in his development, when set in a monotonous situation.95
This statement sets up Humboldt’s argument so that he can talk about freedom in 
relation to the state (i.e. freedom from the state), and voluntary associations in civil society.  
As I have mentioned above, Humboldt’s criticisms of the state are that it is at heart 
antithetical to individuality beyond securing the conditions of liberty. (I.e. it creates peace 
between members of civil society.)  The state, because it operates through procedures of 
formal rationality, will always do violence to the complexity and richness of human 
experience.96 Individuality cannot be imposed from above because the state inevitably uses 
general or universal standards and this violates the essential diversity at the heart of 
individuality.97   Accordingly, participation in the offices of the state--indeed, any form of 
citizenship is to be kept to a bare minimum.  Hence, Humboldt's attitude, like all theorists of 
individuality, is broadly anti-political and apolitical or social, and therefore tends toward 
anarchism.  However, in practice Humboldt does think that there is a place for the state in 
securing the basic conditions for liberty, but that is all.  
More than that, however, personal struggle is considered to be a crucial part of the 
process of self-development, so individuals must solve their own problems and work out 
their own life plans.  Even if the state were capable of treating different people differently--
 
 
95  Limits, 10 
96 Ursula Vogel, “Liberty is Beautiful: von Humboldt’s Gift to Liberalism,” History of Political 
Thought 3:1 (Spring/January, 1982), 77-101. 
97 Limits, chapter 3. A similar argument has been made more recently by Judith Shklar in Legalism, 
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for example, by instituting various therapeutic programs, this would only make individuals 
weak, dependent, and feeble.  Certainly it would inhibit their ability to govern themselves.98  
Since Humboldt’s first concern is for individuals to develop themselves, it is vitally 
important that they do as much as they can themselves so that they are self-sufficient.  
Therefore, even if it were possible for the state to take over individuals’ tasks and provide 
them with everything that they needed to be happy Humboldt says that such citizens would 
always seem to me a multitude of well-cared-for slaves, rather than a nation of free and 
independent men. 
In fact, as one reads this literature it seems that what is needed above all is not a 
certain state apparatus, but a state of mind, or mentality.  (In The Limits Humboldt does not 
specify which particular political regime would best serve self-development.  However, 
Steven Young says that in later works he favored representative democracy.99)  In his 
introduction to The Limits of State Action, Burrow highlights this different sensibility well 
when he distinguishes between a political theory that sets up a system of "traffic-lights" 
(political liberalism) as compared with a moral exhortation--"an invitation to live life in a 
 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), and Nancy Rosenblum in Another Liberalism. 
98  Charles Murray makes this point when he argues for a type of communitarian libertarianism in his 
In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).  However, he is less 
critical than Mill of the kinds of standards particular communities promote.  Christopher Lasch is well known 
for his criticisms of the therapeutic state, and while not a libertarian, he was, in this respect, an anti-statist.  See 
The Culture of Narcissism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978) and The Minimal Self, (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1984). 





A State is such a complex and intricate machine that its laws, which must 
always be few in number, and simple and general in their nature, cannot 
possibly prove fully adequate here.  The greater part is always left to the 
voluntary and cooperative efforts of the citizens.101
 
For Humboldt, the bulk of individual development and education takes place within 
voluntary associations in civil society in groups of one's peers.  Again, he is not very specific 
about the details of the arrangements of civil society, but he anticipates some of the aspects 
of the current liberal/communitarian debate when he outlines the practices exhibited by 
individuals who develop themselves together in voluntary organizations.  For Humboldt’s 
individuals are neither atomistic individuals nor thickly encumbered citizens, but rather 
social individuals who act together to develop separate and distinct personalities.  Indeed, 
one of the elements that Humboldt, Mill, and to some degree Emerson share, is the 
importance of community or what we now call civil society, for developing aesthetic and 
moral values.102  Free persons come together to enhance their individuality.  However, in so 
doing they refine themselves and others as individuals; they do not cast off their highly 
personal identity to transform themselves into a general will or spirit.103
                                                 
100  Burrow, Limits, xlix. 
101 Ibid, 63. 
102 Limits, 27. 
103 Cf. George Kateb's reading of Whitman's democratic individuality that does in fact appear to end 
with a kind of Heglian geist as the self is transformed to become part of the impersonal individuality. 
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Humboldt says: 
. . . men are not to unite themselves in order to forgo any portion of their 
individuality, but only to lessen the exclusiveness of their isolation; it is not 
the object of such a union to transform one being into another, but to open 
communication between them.  Each is to compare what he is himself with 
that he receives by contact with others, and, to use the latter to modify but 
not to suppress his own nature. . . the principle of the true art of social 
intercourse consists in a ceaseless endeavor to grasp the innermost 
individuality of another, to avail oneself of it, and, with the deepest respect 
for it as the individuality of another,  to act upon it.  Because of this respect 
one can do this only by, as it were, showing oneself, and offering the other 
the opportunity of comparison. 104
 
This rests on a natural sociability, and would seem to call into question the rather 
rigid use of the idea of self-ownership105 employed by contemporary libertarians to highlight 
the sanctity of the self.  However, this goes to the point I made in the previous chapter about 
the underdevelopment of libertarianism.  For, it seems to me that self-ownership is used by 
libertarians to challenge the power of the state, whereas theories of individuality move 
beyond political theory to social theory.  If one is going to advocate a minimal political 
theory, this makes sense.  After all, someone or something needs to carry out the functions of 
the state once it is rolled back.  Moreover, theories of individuality emphasize that freedom 
is an achievement, not a natural fact, and it is achieved through actions with others in civil, 
rather than civic, society.  Indeed, civil society is critical for individuality.  It is the domain 
within which individuals are neither coerced by the state, nor competing furiously to 
 
104 Limits, 27-28. 
105 See, for instance, Richard Overton, "An Arrow Against All Tyrants," in A Libertarian Reader, Ed. 
David Boaz, (New York: Free Press, 1997). 
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generate material wealth.  Instead, it is a sphere within which individuals are free to come 
together with others (or not106) to join, remain within, or exit, groups, associations, and 
communities for the purpose of advancing interests and values that they hold in common.   
Such engagement with others is not assumed to rest on peaceful exchanges and 
toleration.  Humboldt notes that in free society there will be differences between people, 
sometimes quite sharp differences.  Moreover, these will lead to clashes between 
personalities and this is valued positively since it serves to expand one's critical abilities and 
experiences as one struggles with difference and opposition.  However, there are implicit 
limits to such clashes and oppositions in so far as it is understood that according to nature 
and critical rationality--i.e. his model of the autonomous individual--one is open to change as 
one develops.  Engaging with others in civil society to develop oneself requires individuals 
to do more than put up with or tolerate other points of view.  Rather it requires individuals to 
give serious attention to others' perspectives--indeed, to invite them--and to appreciate them 
as such.  This is because in experiencing such difference we can learn to value alternative 
ways of behaving and thinking, and this helps us to think about other plausible ways of 
living for ourselves, contributing to the modification of one’s individual personality.    
Indeed, the real value of discussing Humboldt is precisely that he tries to come to 
grips with the kind of mentality or state of mind that one would need to live a unique, 
 
106  Withdrawal from society is also an important condition of liberty.  Emerson, in particular, was 
ambivalent about his own participation in society.  See, "Society and Solitude" in The Selected Writings of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson ed. Brooks Atkinson, (New York: Modern Library, 1950).  Nancy Rosenblum discusses 
this tension at length in Another Liberalism. 
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dynamic life.  As Burrow explains in his introduction to The Limits, Humboldt’s brand of 
liberalism has less to say about institutions than most theories of liberalism.  Rather, it is a 
sensibility--an invitation to share a view of life, not a draft for a highway code.107 Similarly, 
Mill says “I am now convinced, that no great improvements in the lot of mankind are 
possible, until a great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their modes of 
thought.”108
As I have mentioned Mill, following Humboldt, says that two conditions are required 
for the development of individuality--freedom and a variety of situations.  Neither of these 
are described in much detail in the chapter on individuality where Mill's principal concern 
seems to be to argue against conformity, and to argue for its opposite--individuality.  Most of 
the chapter is taken up with what one critic calls "eulogies upon individuality,"109 rather than 
practical directions for psychological and institutional reform.  Still, these may be 
reconstructed from other chapters in On Liberty, as well as Mill's Autobiography and other 
essays. 
Freedom  
Like Kant in his essay "An Answer to the Question: `What is Enlightenment?'"110 
                                                 
 
107 Burrow, xlix. 
108 J.S. Mill, Autobiography (London: Penguin, 1989), 180. 
109 James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993), 29. 
110 Immanuel Kant, in Political Writings Ed. by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 54-60.  Kant says that all men have the rational capacity and duty to think for themselves.  He 
blames laziness and cowardice for immaturity and calls for resolution and courage.  But Kant calls for the free 
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One reading of Mill is to interpret him as saying that once free from the constraints of the 
state and society, the individual will automatically choose to develop himself and move 
towards individuality (enlightenment).  Kant exhorts free individuals to emerge from their 
"self-incurred immaturity" and toward enlightened maturity.  Mill allows for restraints in 
connection with other-regarding behavior, but he wants purely self-regarding behavior to be 
free from all restraint so that they may develop their individuality.  He says "To be held to 
rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have 
the good of others for their object.  But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by 
their mere displeasure, develops nothing more valuable, except such force of character as 
may unfold itself in resisting restraint.  If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole 
nature."111 Considered in isolation, the condition of (mere) freedom for individuality is 
problematic, as several commentators have pointed out.  In her discussion of Humboldt, 
Ursula Vogel notes the same problem.  She says that the notion that withdrawal from the 
state will provoke a spontaneous association by the people to develop themselves seems to 
rest upon "mere optimism."  There is no necessary causal connection.  Vogel cites Robert 
Paul Wolfe's charge of the "poverty of liberalism" in this connection.  Wolff himself 
questions whether, in fact, the development of individuality might not be better served by 
 
use of public reason.  The private use of freedom (Millian individuality?) may be restricted, even quite 
narrowly.  
111 Ibid, 63-64. 
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some "judicious limitations upon the individual."112  An earlier more scathing version of this 
argument that was directed at Mill's appeared in the work of James Fitzjames Stephen:   
The great defect of Mr. Mill's later writings seems to me to be that he has 
formed too favorable an estimate of human nature.  This displays itself . . . by 
the tacit assumption which pervades every part of it that the removal of 
restraints usually tends to invigorate character.  Surely the very opposite of 
this is the truth.  Habitual exertion is the greatest of all invigorators of 
character, and restraint and coercion in one form or another is the great 
stimulus to exertion.  If you wish to destroy originality and vigor of 
character, no way to do so is so sure as to put a high level of comfort easily 
within the reach of moderate and commonplace exertion.  A life made up of 
danger, vicissitude, and exposure is the sort of life which produces originality 
and resource . . . Almost every human being requires more or less coercion 
and restraint as astringents to give him the maximum of power which he is 
capable of attaining.  The maximum attainable in particular cases depends 
upon something altogether independent of social arrangements--namely, the 
nature of the human being himself who is subjected to them; and what this is 
or how it is to be affected are questions which no one has yet answered.113   
 
The charge with respect to the excessively optimistic assumptions about 
human nature can only be settled empirically.  But it must also be said that Stephen's 
reading of Mill isn't entirely fair.  Mill was referring to a kind of relative freedom--
freedom from some institutions, but not total freedom.  On the contrary, Mill has a 
strong sense of moral obligation and duty, particularly in connection with the 
 
112 See Vogel, ibid, 80-81, and Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism, (Boston: Beacon, 
1968), 26-27.   
113 James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 31.  Stephen also quotes from an article by 
his younger brother who goes further still:  "The growth of liberty in the sense of democracy tends to diminish, 
not to increase, originality and individuality. ̀ Make all men equal so far as laws can make them equal, and what 
does that mean but that each unit is to be rendered hopelessly feeble in presence of an overwhelming majority?' 
 The existence of such a state of society reduces individuals to impotence, and to tell them to be powerful, 
original, and independent is to mock them.  It is like plucking a bird's feathers in order to put it on a level with 
beasts, and then telling it to fly," 30.  
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development of a conscience to guide our actions.  In fact, the Millian individual 
requires considerably more than freedom to develop, as Mill himself acknowledges, 
especially in his Autobiography.  In particular, he needs discipline and a good deal of 
education, including formal schooling to shape his natural capacities, as well as 
debate with others as they experience life.114   
Education and a Variety of Situations 
Like Humboldt, Mill relies upon certain innate capacities, but also particular cultural 
conditions, including freedom and a variety of situations, for the development of man as a 
unique "progressive being."  The latter involves extensive formal education or schooling and 
the broader education provided by the "experience of life," including political participation 
and cultivation and development in civil society with ones peers.  In the fifth chapter of On 
Liberty Mill states that parents have a duty to provide for their children and the state should 
require and compel the education of children up to a certain standard.115  Such education will 
help to strengthen their faculties, exercise their judgment, and give them a basic knowledge 
of subjects they need to know.116  In the Autobiography he details his own highly unusual 
education but this cannot be taken as a standard to be emulated by other individuals, and 
judging by Mill's description of his mental breakdown we should not expect that he 
                                                 
114 J.S. Mill, 1989, chapter 2. 
115 Ibid, 105.  However, the provision of education should be done privately.  State provided 
education will, as Humboldt argues, produce conformity and homogeneity. 
116 Ibid, 109. 
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considered it to be exemplary. 
Public Intellectuals 
At bottom, the crucial problem as Mill sees it is not in finding the means to the end, 
but rather public opinion and the indifferent attitude to individuality displayed by large 
portions of the population.  ("The danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but 
the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences.")  He says, 
If it were felt that free development of individuality is one of the leading 
essentials of well-being; that it is not only a coordinate element with all that 
is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is 
itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no 
danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the 
boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary 
difficulty.117  
 
If all individuals had the appropriate mentality for developing individuality there 
would be little difficulty in individuals realizing the value of individuality, both for 
themselves and for society.  But this is precisely the difficulty.118  In fact, being disposed to 
adopt such a mind-set and then actually adopting it is the chief means--a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition and the component for achieving individuality as an end.  Freedom and a 
variety of situations might be sufficient to cultivate individuality if one is already committed 
                                                 
117 Ibid, 57. 
118 Jeremy Waldron notes this "collective action problem," pointing out that Mill is charged with 
elitism because he looks to the educated and intelligent to help to reform public opinion.  If Mill had been 
concerned with political and legal repression instead of social repression, it would be obvious that one should 
look to an elite, since they are (on Mill's theory of representation) the one's who control the constitutional 
decision-making.  See "Mill as a Critic of Culture," paper presented at the American Political Science 
Association Meeting, Atlanta, GA, September 1999, n37.  
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to it as an ideal, but one must first become committed to the ideal.  This is what choosing to 
do things for ourselves means.  Presumably Mill thinks that some individuals--those, who 
like him, have already had extensive education and who recognize their own human 
capacities--acknowledge the value of individuality and pursuit it, but the rest of society 
needs to be persuaded and exhorted.  Mill suggests that part of the solution is for public 
intellectuals to appeal to society--especially the "intelligent members of the public," and to 
get them to recognize the value of individuality so that they may help to work on its behalf.   
Public intellectuals also play an important role in Emerson’s theory of individuality.  
This should not be surprising since Emerson himself was a prolific essayist and widely- 
travelled  public lecturer.  But these are not to act as models of genius or individuality at its 
most flourishing to be copied or emulated.  Rather, their role is to stimulate and inspire 
others to take responsibility for their lives and to live and to think critically. 
On both Mill's and Emerson's views, society has come to resemble Humboldt's state 
in so far as it shares similar features of force and rigidity.  Protestant commercial society 
cannot take account of difference and individual particularities--indeed it actively promotes 
conformity rather than diversity--but, unlike the state, this does not have to be the case.119  
 
119 This is suggests another important difference between Humboldt and Mill.  Humboldt is dealing 
with universal claims about the state in relation to freedom.  Mill's argument is more empirical and particular, 
having to do with a specific historical moment in a particular society.  Mill's historical sense is apparent in his 
Autobiography, when he employs it as one justification for his writing the book.  He says, "It has also seemed to 
me that in an age of transition in opinions, there may be somewhat both of interest and benefit in noting the 
successive phases of any mind which was always pressing forward, equally to learn and unlearn either from its 
own thoughts or from those of others," 25.  Both types of arguments are important for libertarians who are 
concerned about the theory and practice of liberty. 
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Rather, it rests upon the thoughtlessness and laziness of individuals who compose society, 
but who may, in theory at least, be persuaded and exhorted to act otherwise if the cultural 
norms of society are reformed.  The call for individuality is, then, in a narrow sense, a call 
for liberation.  But it is liberation from a particular kind of society--passive, protestant, 
conformist democracy.  It is decidedly not a universal call for individual liberation from any 
society or any social ties and standards altogether.  Rather, it is a plea for excellence and 
creativity—self-development, not self making or self-enactment--from within a broad-
minded, liberal society.  Some social constraints are still necessary (the harm principle 
backed by the power of the state, and conscience for moral guidance), it is a question of 
choosing the right ones and getting the balance between constraint, self-discipline and 
individual self- expression right.   
On Liberty is often considered to be a manifesto for individuality, and yet, as I have 
suggested, Mill's argument is not a straightforward as Humboldt's.  Certainly, there is no 
doubt that Mill is a complicated figure.  In On Liberty he draws on both utilitarianism and its 
antithesis--romanticism.  He proclaims that freedom means "pursuing our own good in our 
own way so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to 
obtain it,"120 but he clearly favors a particular kind of life--a life lived pursuing individuality 
(poetry not pushpin) is superior to a life of mere money making.  Alan Ryan says that the 
apparent contradiction here may be explained by the distinction between political (i.e. 
 
120 J.S. Mill, 1989, 16. 
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coercive power and enforcement of a type of open-ended political (neutral) liberalism by the 
state, and a moral imperative backed by persuasion and exhortation championed by 
enlightened individuals in the private sphere.  In other words, the argument is an example of 
the kind of argument that I discussed earlier.  It combines negative political theory with an 
ethics of positive theory.121  Furthermore, Mill's justification for pursuing individuality is 
both social and individual--which would seem to suggest that perhaps he has more in 
common with Murray than would first appear.  Consequently, in certain respects, Mill's 
notion of individuality, and the normative political and social theory that he locates it within 
are somewhat problematic for theoretical libertarianism.  However, his ideas are still useful 
precisely because he is complex--a true liberal pluralist--and because he points us to some of 
the theoretical and practical challenges associated with the cultivation of individuality in a 
free society. 
Implications for a Reform of Libertarianism 
If libertarianism is going to treat individuals and their freedom seriously, then a good 
deal needs to be said about the kinds of individuals it assumes already exist and that might be 
 developed within a libertarian regime.  Treating individuals and their freedom seriously 
means that libertarianism relies very heavily on individual character (personality) and action 
to guide behavior, and rather less (in some cases a good deal less) than other political and 
                                                 




                                                
social theories on social and political institutions.122  In short, the burden resting upon the 
individual is great.  Put more positively, however, we might also argue that the potential for 
individual development and flourishing is comparatively large, and this is where my focus 
lies.  Since I am interested in considering the development of libertarian freedom as 
individuality and since individuality is largely (but not exclusively) a state of mind, 
(individuals need to act on their thoughts) the basic mental disposition of an individual is a 
crucial component here.   
What is needed is a broader, pluralist conception of the self, not the substitution of 
one form of single-mindedness by another.  Culture and material wealth are both important 
for freedom, but first the discussion will focus attention on what is ordinarily neglected 
within libertarian accounts.  Thus, from the perspective of a libertarian vision, the work of 
theorists such as Robert Nozick and Milton Friedman are important and valuable, but they 
are also severely limited.  Presently I shall point out what is lacking in the reigning theories, 
before outlining a theory of libertarian individuality more fully, combining a broader model 
of the self with a particular set of personality traits to produce a free, distinctive, and unique 
 
122 However, obviously institutions, particularly law and associations in civil society, will still have 
some influence, as I shall argue in the subsequent chapters.  The free individual who pursues individuality is  
not a perfectly free existentialist or self-creating Nietzschean God, but rather a situated autonomous individual 
that develops himself within a social context.  See below. 
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life plan.  But first I want to say something about what I mean when I invoke the terms 
"mentality" and "personality" since these connote important ideas about the manner in which 
the individual conceives of the self and in turn the kinds of possibilities and opportunities 
open to the self in relation to living a free life. 
In discussing the reconstruction of civil society in Poland, Karol Soltan employs the  
concept of "mentality" that is apt in this connection.123  Soltan draws upon the work of 
various culturalist theorists including Harry Eckstein who describes mentalities in terms of 
"orientations to action."  These are "general dispositions of actors to act in certain ways in 
sets of situations.  Such general dispositions pattern actions . . . "Orientations" do the 
processing (of experience).  We may call them, as did Bentley, soul-stuff, or mind-stuff."124  
Eckstein describes "orientations" as having three components: cognitive elements that 
decode experience (give it meaning); affective elements that invest cognition with feelings 
that "move" actors to act; and evaluative elements that provide goals toward which actors are 
moved to act.  A similar approach has been developed by psychologists Hazel Markus and 
Paula Nurius who discuss the idea of "possible selves."  
This type of self-knowledge pertains to how individuals think about their 
potential and about their future.  Possible selves are the ideal selves that we 
would very much like to become.  They are also the selves we could become, 
and the selves we are afraid of becoming.  The possible selves that are hoped 
 
123 Karol Edward Soltan, "Agape, Civil Society and the Task of Social Reconstruction," Cardozo 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 4 (1996), 214-260. 
124 Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," American Political Science Review 
82:3 (September 1988), 790-791. 
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for might include the successful self, the creative self, the rich self, the thin 
self, or the loved and admired self, whereas the dreaded possible selves could 
be the alone self, the depressed self, the incompetent self, the alcoholic self, 
the unemployed self, or the bag lady self.125
 
Markus and Nurius explain that future possible selves can be imagined containing 
representations of potential roles or statuses.  These embody various individually significant 
hopes, fears, and fantasies, and as such are important in providing incentives for future 
behavior, as well as evaluative and interpretive tools for the current view of the self.  This 
approach seems particularly inviting for libertarianism since it places strong emphasis on 
free will: Markus and Nurius state that through the selection and construction of possible 
selves individuals can be viewed as active facilitators of their own development. To what 
degree are contemporary libertarian theories sympathetic to such views, and to what degree 
are they agnostic or even perhaps hostile to such views? 
Communitarian Libertarianism and Autonomy: An Ambivalent Relationship 
Generally, when libertarians think of autonomy they get rather nervous.  This is 
because thus far libertarianism has primarily concerned itself with minimizing the role of the 
state in society, and autonomy is frequently invoked by those who would like to utilize the 
state's powers to promote the positive welfare of its citizens using political institutions.  This 
is especially so in the case of economic welfare and redistributive economic policies 
generally.  So, for instance, in a discussion of "self-ownership" or the "right to life" 
                                                 
125 "Possible Selves," American Psychologist, 41:9, (September 1986), 954.  
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(synonyms for autonomy), David Boaz has complained "Other people, mostly on the 
political left, would argue that the "right to life" means that everyone has a fundamental right 
to the necessities of life: food, clothing, shelter, medical care, maybe even an eight-hour day 
and two weeks of vacation.  But if the right to life means this, then it means that one person 
has a right to force other people to give him things, violating their equal (natural) rights126 
(to be left alone, or "to live your life as you choose so long as you don't infringe on the equal 
rights of others.")127   Such worries have been exacerbated further still with the evolution of 
the therapeutic culture, particularly as this pervades the practices of administrators and 
caretakers in the state, causing alarm at intrusions on the most private aspects of the self.128  
Both kinds of interference are rejected by libertarians on the grounds of moral 
principle and empirical considerations.  According to libertarians a state that attempts to do 
more than provide security for the individuals who live under it goes beyond the legitimate 
bounds of its authority.  Secondly, empirically other non-political institutions within local 
communities such as families, churches, and voluntary associations within civil society 
(including the free market) are said to provide the goods desired by individuals more 
efficiently and effectively than the impersonal bureaucratic state and help to cultivate a 
moral sense, including responsibilities to others. Charles Murray has written extensively 
 
126 David Boaz, Libertarianism, A Primer, 64. 
127 Ibid, 59. 
128 This line of argument is continued and refined in James L. Nolan's The Therapeutic State, 
Justifying Government at Century's End (New York: NYU Press, 1998).  
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about the public policy implications of the welfare state's crowding out of "systems of 
enablement" in local communities in Losing Ground and In Pursuit (of Happiness and Good 
Government), as well as his recent What it Means to be a Libertarian.129
Granting these concerns their due, we should nonetheless expect that those who value 
individual freedom have a central place for a concept like autonomy, so long as it is linked to 
moral rather than political considerations,130 and in fact they do.  However, they tend not to 
refer to the idea using the term "autonomy," preferring instead to invoke claims concerning 
self ownership, or as we have seen, a "right to one's life."  On the other hand, when they 
occasionally refer to autonomy, it bares little resemblance to the neo-Kantian notions that 
political theorists tend to discuss when they refer to autonomy and this is because they have 
neglected personal liberty.   
One gets the impression that libertarians believe that once the state is removed we 
are, or should be, free morally and even perhaps, metaphysically.  Individuals are considered 
to be free as a matter of natural fact, and natural rights, respected by political authorities, 
signify this.  Moreover, the free character rests upon an inherently optimistic conception of 
human nature if it is liberated from the state.  To quote Charles Murray again ". . . man 
acting in his private capacity--if restrained from the use of force--is resourceful and benign, 
 
129 See also, David Beito, "Mutual Aid for Social Welfare: The Case of American Fraternal 
Societies," Critical Review 4:4 (Fall 1990), 709-36. 
130 Moral constraints rest on persuasion, education and exhortation.  Political constraints are coercive 
and are backed by power and force. 
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fulfilling his proper destiny; while man acting as a public and political creature is resourceful 
and dangerous, inherently destructive of the rights and freedoms of his fellow men."131  
Murray goes on to discuss a human capacity to act as an autonomous being, but this relates 
only to an innate moral sense or something that he calls "approbativeness"--an "ineradicable 
desire of men to receive approval and to avoid disapproval."  Following Adam Smith and 
A.O. Lovejoy, Murray claims that "approbativeness" is a natural trait that is stimulated by 
man's move into society--his natural need to secure approbation from fellow members of 
society.  When the moral sense derived from reason and virtue is lacking, approbativeness 
serves as a replacement "by leading people to behave in ways that are functional for the 
society in which they wish to reside."132  Furthermore, he claims that if we observe free 
societies we can see that approbativeness is an empirical fact. 
This account is quite different from most discussions of autonomy, since they draw 
upon, but also develop and cultivate (or curtail) natural capacities using critical rationality.  
Murray's account suggests a rather static, underdeveloped, and, for a libertarian, an overly 
communitarian conception of the self and her autonomous life.  It resembles Riesman's 
other-directed individual, rather than the inner-directed autonomous agent.133  This is hardly 
 
 
131 Murray, (1994), 127. Emphasis in the original. 
132 Ibid, 131. Emphasis added.  Cf. Joel Feinberg: "Perhaps we are all self-made  . . .  except those 
who have been severely manipulated, indoctrinated, or coerced throughout childhood.  But the self we have 
created in this way for ourselves will not be an authentic self unless the habit of critical self-revision was 
implanted in us early by parents, educators, or peers, and strengthened by our own constant exercise of it.  
"Autonomy," in The Inner Citadel, Ed. John Christman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Chapter 1,  9. 
133 See David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), and Wilfred 
 
 83
                                                                                                                                                            
the model of an individual who prizes freedom above all else.  Of course, Murray is right to 
situate the individual within a society or local community since no one--not even the 
strongest willed, free and most rational libertarian--is completely free in the sense of having 
no attachments and frames of reference.  However, on his view it is difficult to see exactly 
what kind of role choice will play in the development of the self and calls attention to the 
kinds of criticisms that J.S. Mill and Emerson made of society in On Liberty and "Self 
Reliance" respectively.   
In fact, the autonomous libertarian individual is closer to the individual described by 
Stephen Macedo: "The autonomous individual is a socially embedded individual, one who 
understands his intellectual and cultural inheritance but is determined to make that 
inheritance his own by fashioning an individual character and life plan, and by turning his 
participation in social practices into performances expressive of his individuality."134  
Liberal individuals are situated, but they are also--and must be--autonomous in the sense of 
having some ability to think for themselves and look after themselves.135  Within certain 
 
 
M. McClay, "Fifty Years of the Lonely Crowd," WQ, Summer 1998, 1-11. 
Cf. J.S. Mill: "In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as 
under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship.  Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only 
themselves--what do I prefer? Or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would allow the best 
and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and thrive?  They ask themselves, what is suitable to 
my position? What is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what 
is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine?  I do not mean that they choose 
what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination.  It does not occur to them to have any 
inclination, except for what is customary." On Liberty, 61. 
134 Liberal Virtues  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 219. 
135 When I use the term autonomy I am employing it in a rather loose and general sense to point to a 
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limits they have the capacity to interpret and criticize their own preferences, to choose to 
change their own life plans and commitments.  This must be so if libertarians are to retain 
their legitimate claim to be liberals who value freedom, rather than conservatives who favor 
custom, security, and tradition.  After all, libertarianism is more than a skeptical rejection of 
state power and control. 
Murray's naturalness account of freedom is unconvincing precisely because freedom 
is an achievement--both for the individual and the society that she lives within.  To the 
degree that this is so, a concept like autonomy will have quite an important role to play in a 
libertarian theory.136  This is especially true if the theory is oriented to practice, and attempts 
to go beyond narrow criticism of the state to outline how a libertarian vision or good society 
might look.  In that case, the concept of autonomy can be used to think through the means of 
achieving libertarian freedom in connection with mentalities and other capacities.  
Traditionally, this has meant looking to the family, religion, and community.  Are these still 
reliable institutions for fostering libertarian capacities in a post-modern age or do we need to 
 
minimal capacity for independence, reasoning, and judgment.  Here I follow Smith, Mill, and Terchek in their 
moral philosophy, rather than Rawls and other contemporary analytic philosophers.  As noted above, I am 
sympathetic to Galston’s preference for diversity over autonomy for a political theory--in terms of what 
individuals need to participate as citizens within the political domain; however it seems to me that the logic of 
libertarianism rests upon and requires something more of individuals than Galston’s liberal democratic 
pluralism when the focus shifts to civil society.  This is especially true of strong individualists and those who 
pursue self-development strenuously.   
136 Ronald Terchek criticizes libertarians' inattention to moral autonomy: ". . .one wonders about the 
little attention given to moral autonomy in the libertarian account.  The reduction of state intrusion and the 
protection of robust markets are not sufficient structural requirements for Smithian autonomy, however much he 
thinks these are important, contributory elements to the good life.  Smithian agents must also be able to 




                                                
look to new institutions? This is a question that Ronald Terchek poses in his article "The 
Fruits of Success and the Crisis of Liberalism,”137 and casts doubt upon liberalisms ability to 
sustain itself in the face of the decline of the influence of these institutions.  If this is correct, 
then those who wish to argue for a libertarian regime will need to think carefully about two 
questions: 1. The kinds of institutions desirable for their society to help to foster the 
psychology and other capacities libertarian individuals will need to achieve their freedom, 
but also 2. What is practically possible and viable in the light of changes in cultural and 
institutional norms, values, and expectations.  It seems likely that education--both formal 
schooling and education through experience of life-- will play crucially important roles for 
the development of mentalities and other capacities.138 But in relation to the second question, 
another possibility is to revise our expectations downwards, and instead of looking to foster 
or encourage a certain sort of romantic individual as I am trying to do here, or even a 
moderately rational, deliberative liberal democratic citizen as many contemporary political 
theories try to do, we might, as Judith Shklar and Nancy Rosenblum suggest, focus our 
attention first on the containment of the worst aspects of political-social life, and try to 
provide opportunities for the inclusion of those who are suffering from alienation and 
anomie, before noting that within the same regime there will be opportunities for other, more 
 
137 See Liberals on Liberalism ed. Alfonso J. Damico, (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986). 
138 See Richard Flathman’s outline of liberal education in his “Liberal versus Civic, Republican, 
Democratic, and Other Vocational Educations: Liberalism and Institutionalized Education” for the sort of 




stable, secure (and fortunate?) individuals to cultivate themselves and each other in free 
associations within civil society.  Nancy Rosenblum tries to answer this question with a 
discussion of various associations, including illiberal groups such as militia in her 
Membership and Morals. This will be discussed further in chapter 5.  Here I mention this to 
give a sense of the problems entailed in the attempt to realize a libertarian vision.    
From Autonomy to Individuality 
In his analysis of Mill's individuality, Peter Berkowitz equates individuality with 
autonomy and self governance.139  However, it seems to me that autonomy in the sense that I 
mean to employ it here--to convey a degree of individual self responsibility and self 
direction in planning a life as Tocqueville, Mill and other nineteenth century theorists used it 
(i.e. not a purely rational, deliberative analytic state in the manner of Rawlsian ideal theory) 
is not quite enough for individuality.  Rather, autonomy is a necessary pre-condition for 
individuality, where the latter means not only independence and responsibility, but also the 
development, using autonomy, of a unique, distinctive and flourishing personality.  
Evidently this is an ideal and the degree to which each individual is able to approach the 
ideal (and chooses to do so) will vary in practice according to differing capacities and tastes. 
 Nonetheless, it seems to me to be an attractive ideal for all, and all individuals should be 
encouraged to pursuit it to the degree they are able and wish to do so.  It is, in short, a 
democratic ideal in the sense that it (nominally) is open to all.   
                                                 
 
139 See Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 
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 What does this mean for today’s libertarian self in practice?  As a general 
disposition we would expect a libertarian orientation to be strongly in favor of individual 
freedom and against authority, to be supportive of individual initiative and against 
conformity.  Beyond this, however, we can expect the orientation to shape particular 
attitudes connected to experience within various spheres of society, such as individuals' 
attitudes to the state, their work in the market, and interpersonal relations and associations in 
civil society.  According to current libertarian conventional wisdom individuals should be 
hostile to the state since they are opposed to its authority and coercive means, highly 
favorable to the commercial market since it is the primary site of voluntary association and 
exchange producing freedom and wealth, and mildly positive or silent about the function of 
civil society--another site of freedom through free association, but not one that is considered 
to create much positive value since it is social rather than economic.   
By contrast, as a practical matter a revised libertarianism will encourage individuals 
to maintain their suspicion with respect to the state, but they should also recognize that so 
long as it abides by the rule of law, a limited but strong state is necessary and beneficial to a 
free society--even a society composed of individuals pursuing individuality--to the extent 
that it secures the basic conditions of liberty by providing the protection of property.  The 
market should be treated with cautious, but not uncritical respect so that it is valued for its 





creation (both necessary, but far from sufficient conditions for individuality), but its 
limitations and problems (the tendency to produce homogenization, rationalism, to consider 
means not ends) must also be recognized and counterbalanced by non-material spiritual 
elements cultivated in civil society.  Indeed, the potential role of civil society in developing 
free individuals through their associations needs to be given greater emphasis and 
consideration in libertarian thought since this is where individuals may become truly and 
uniquely individual, but as Mill warned, the oppressive aspects of culture must also be born 
in mind.  Thus, an important part of a libertarian disposition is its pursuit of freedom and 
criticism of authority in several different domains of society--not just the state.  A free life 
and the state of mind that accompanies it must be multi-faceted, critical, but above all, well-
balanced. 
That said, discussing a new libertarian state of mind as an orientation in this way still 
does not go quite far enough.  Considering orientations and attitudes in different domains of 
society is useful because it helps to highlight the scope--the multiple aspects of the self as 
citizen, producer, consumer, employee, and member of various associations--but it does not 
tell us anything about the manner in which an individual inhabits each domain or the 
potential for developing a unique personality.  Put differently, the other point I wish to call 
attention to is the dynamic and strenuous aspect of a libertarian personality.  Mill said "It 
really is of importance, not only what men do, but also the manner of men they are that do it. 
 Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and 
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beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself."140  Living a free life to its fullest 
requires strenuousness, discipline, vitality and creativity.  For true libertarians freedom is not 
passively discovered; rather it is a dynamic and perhaps even progressive achievement of the 
individual struggle for self-development.  Further, underlying all of this is a deeper 
assumption that goes to the heart of the nature of a libertarian self--a self that, to the fullest 
extent possible, casts off determinism and develops its will freely and strenuously within a 
particular historical and social context.  In this connection Nancy Rosenblum has highlighted 
one of the crucial underlying assumptions (and problems) of classical liberal (and libertarian) 
theory: 
. . . classical liberal thought describes an individualism for the strong.  This is 
especially true of Locke and Kant, for whom enlightenment requires "heroic" 
action, the throwing off of priestly and political authorities and striving for 
personal independence.  Autonomy demands struggle against tyrannies on 
every front and against ingrained habits and prejudices.  Enlightenment is 
something that can only be done by oneself, not by or for others.  Individuals 
are not simple beneficiaries of liberty, then, but aggressive personalities who 
need to assert themselves to win it in the first place.  And when they do, they 
are thrown back on themselves.141  
 
The use of the term "personality" (possible self) is significant here and I employ it 
quite deliberately instead of the more commonly used term, "character."  This is because 
"personality" conveys a degree of freedom and creativity as well as the possibility for 
development, together with dynamism, distinctiveness, discipline, and uniqueness, that the 
 
 140 J.S. Mill, 1989, 59. 
141 Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, 21.   
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word "character"--with it aristotelian associations--lacks.  Rather, the latter often suggests a 
collection of traits or characteristics that one is born with and must therefore live within, or 
the product of the working out of some given nature or telos.  In either case the individual 
"character" is, in some sense, pre-determined and settled.142  As such, there seems to be little, 
if any, room for imagination and creativity.  The problem with the idea of an individual 
"character" is that such a collection of elements does not bear the mark of choice and self-
development in the way that personality--especially as it was used by romantic 
individualists--appears to do.  In contrast to Aristotelian theorists, champions of individuality 
like Humboldt stress that the identity of the self is never fully arrived at or achieved; free 
identity is a continuous experiment or journey.  Thus, a libertarian self would rest on a 
plural, and strenuous or vital personality that champions distinctiveness and originality.   
With this bare sketch I have started to introduce the kind of self that I believe 
libertarianism might hold up as its promise--one that could be used to justify a minimal, but 
strong government. Cultivating the mentality of individuality may be desirable, but is it a 
viable ideal for all or most people living in the United States today?  This is a matter that has 
to be settled first theoretically, by making an appealing argument, and then empirically by 
persuading and encouraging public opinion to change.  Still, it must be admitted that it is a 
 
142 Although, cf. J.S. Mill, one of the chief modern liberal exponents of individuality who is 
tremendously concerned with free choice and self-development, does employ the term "character" rather than 
personality.  Mill says "A person whose desires and impulses are his own--are the expression of his own nature, 
as it has been developed and modified by his own culture--is said to have character.  One whose desires and 
impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character." On Liberty, 60-61. 
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strenuous requirement--undoubtedly one that is more demanding than Murray's "not very 
demanding standard."  Cultivating individuality will create a strain on individuals.  But it is 
worth remembering that, as Kateb points out, conforming with everyone else is also a strain.  
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP IN A LIBERTARIAN REGIME 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.  The interest of the man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place.  It may be a reflection on human 
nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.  
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?  If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.  In framing 
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies 
in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next 
place oblige it to control itself.  A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 
auxiliary precautions.143  
 
Outlining the mentality of a libertarian individual who pursues individuality as I did 
in the previous chapter is crucial to my argument since it highlights the essential theoretical 
and practical144 component necessary for the cultivation of the libertarian self, where the 
theoretical justification for re-conceiving libertarianism is that individuality is (or should be) 
more appealing to libertarians than individualism because it serves to fulfill the promise of 
libertarianism in promoting a truly free and unique human life.  On this view individuality is 
the (best) end of libertarianism, and a particular state of mind is the key element that 
 
143 James Madison, Federalist 51, The Federalist Papers, Ed. Clinton Rossiter, (New York: Penguin, 
1961), 322. 
 
144 Thinking the "right way" is insufficient.  Thoughts must impel individuals to act to cultivate their 
individuality.  Consequently, mere stoicism or ironic self-detachment is insufficient for individuality.  
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separates individuality from conventional libertarianism based on narrow individualism. 
 However, if the account is to be persuasive to libertarians who take pride in their 
practical, empirically grounded politics and policies, individual psychology must be 
supplemented by institutional design. i.e., What is needed in addition to a state of mind is an 
account of the likely state of society--the (pre-) conditions under which it would be possible 
to transform that aspiration into a reality so that they are free to choose to become active, 
cultivated members of civil society within a libertarian regime.  Mentalities, after all, require 
cultivation through training and education within particular institutional settings.  This is 
important because to be convincing an alternative account of libertarianism needs to provide 
a sketch of how the institutions of libertarianism would look, explain how they might help to 
foster certain capacities, and thereby provide some reasonable hope that the alternative 
vision would work in practice.  Only in a libertarian society can a life truly worthy of 
flourishing human beings be achieved.  To the extent that libertarian individuality is both 
theoretically appealing and practically possible, it should be attractive to those who take 
individual freedom seriously.  To the extent that it is merely an aspiration (i.e. utopian), it is 
(or should be) irrelevant to libertarians.  For libertarianism is a practical political theory in 
the broadest sense; it is not ideal theory.  Hence, there is a need to join individual 
psychology to practical social institutional analysis, to which I now turn in this chapter and 
the subsequent chapters.  Consideration of the individual will now take second place behind 
the institutional analysis starting with politics.  An outline of citizenship will follow the role 
of politics within the regime.  However, before introducing the particular domains within a 
revised libertarian regime, a few words need to be said about the overarching meta-
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theoretical approach which connects each of the parts to the other.  
Constitutionalism 
Although the theory that is advanced here--libertarianism conceived as a theory of 
individuality—would be most fully manifested within a particular sphere of society (civil 
society) it is not be sufficient to focus only on that sphere.  Rather, because the point would 
be to think about how actual individuals and institutions relate and work together to realize 
freedom in practice, we must think about the manner in which libertarian pluralism is 
practiced organizationally or structurally through its institutions.  This requires us to think 
constitutionally:  "Constitution" in the sense employed here refers to the "shape," 
"composition,' or "establishment" of a people in their political association.  The constitution 
of a regime, then, not only sets out offices and powers, the frame of government.  It is more 
generally an "ordering" by which the organization (order) of something gives it its 
constitution.  A constitution then forms a polity, enabling it to act by giving it form.  A 
theory of political constitution defines the constitutive institutions through which a regime 
acts.145  We need to think about the functioning of institutional connections, 
interconnections, and oppositions as we balance the parts of libertarian lives if we want the 
political system to function in a certain way (i.e. to protect and advance freedom).  Precisely 
how these will look in practice will depend on specific conditions, but the general point 
about the recognition of the social relations of individuals and institutions is the crucial one, 
                                                 
     145 Stephen L. Elkin, "How to Think Constitutionally" unpublished manuscript, 4-5. 
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and one that is typically ignored or forgotten in many of the current debates and single-issue 
policy prescriptions.  
Balancing and Incongruence  
Borrowing from constitutional law, one might characterize the interpretive approach 
employed as balancing.  As such, this should be regarded as a relatively friendly and modest 
proposal for reform--one that seeks to modify and supplement current libertarian psychology 
and institutional arrangements by adding consideration of aspects of the self that may be in 
tension with the economic and political aspects of the self.146  Put differently, it is an 
exercise in liberal pluralism, and one that does not require what Nancy Rosenblum refers to 
as congruence-- an identical relationship between the values and norms expressed and 
cultivated in both civil and political society.  So, for instance, in distancing herself from the 
various political theories of democratic community that do require congruence, Rosenblum 
says: 
The public, constitutive purposes democratic theorists assign social groups . . . 
                                                 
 
     146 Daniel Bell famously makes a similar point in his Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.  But 
for Bell this results in a theoretical incoherence and series of practical problems.  If the contradictions are 
considered less pejoratively as tensions, then perhaps we can talk more usefully about the strength, complexity, 
and flexibility of liberal pluralism, and the various psychological aspects of the self.  Nancy Rosenblum does 
this by employing Hirschmann's concept of "shifting involvements."  "Shifting involvements serves self-
cultivation only if one has a sense of oneself as a personality with a history of error, disappointment, 
imagination, and change.  It depends on tolerating a romantic sense of indeterminancy and possibility," 
Membership and Morals, 135.     
In general, the approach here follows Mill: "All that we are in danger of losing we may preserve, all 
that we have lost we may regain, and bring to a perfection hitherto unknown; but not by slumbering, and 
leaving things to themselves, no more than by ridiculously trying our strength against their irresistible 
tendencies: only by establishing counter-tendencies, which may combine with those tendencies, and modify 
them." J. S. Mill, "Civilization," in Essays on Politics and Society, Collected Works Volume 18 Ed. J M. 
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separates them from liberal pluralists like myself, for whom protecting the internal life of 
groups and associations from the demands of public culture is crucial for personality and 
liberty, and does not turn on whether or not they are democratizing.147  
By contrast, a more radical model--one that sought to revise both psychology and 
structural arrangements completely so that they might coincide in a single political value to 
create congruence across the domains within a regime, would call for the reform of all 
psychologies and domains of society including and perhaps especially the economy, to be 
used directly in the service of promoting a single value through a simplified psychology e.g. 
by substituting rational self-interest and free market economics which is based upon a 
hierarchical model, for a more affective democratic community sustaining stakeholder 
psychology and economy along the lines of say, Alperovitz and Faux in Rebuilding America, 
involving a thorough-going democratic or egalitarian way of seeing the world that goes all 
the way down.148  This might appear particularly attractive since it is less burdensome to the 
individual than liberal pluralism to the extent that it all activities are governed by a single 
value.  On the other hand, to reduce all aspects of the self to such a singular psychology 
seems to me unnecessarily reductive and to be counter to the humanism inherent in liberal 
pluralism, and indeed, to libertarianism as interpreted here.  Liberal pluralism, balancing and 
 
 
Robson,  (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 136. 
147 Nancy Rosenblum, “Democratic Character and Community: The Logic of Congruence,” The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 2:1 (March 1994), 88. 
148 Rebuilding America, Gar Alperovitz and Jeff Faux (New York: Random House, 1984).  
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incongruence between the various domains of society are the only appropriate logics for a 
libertarian individuality because theoretically they provide as much space and opportunity 
for the individual to live freely and to be an individual (meaning, a unique being with a 
particular set of characteristics) as possible.  Furthermore, as Rosenblum points out 
extensively in her work, if we want a political theory that has some prospect of being able to 
function in the real world we need to take account of certain facts about human beings and 
their lives as they are and as they might be.  Liberal pluralism can accommodate a whole 
range of peoples and lives--from romantic individualists to those suffering from radical 
anomie and some people’s ferocious attachment to groups that do not share, and  perhaps do 
not wish to adopt, the characteristic norms of democratic political culture, much less strong 
community149  At the same time, the reason for keeping my proposal relatively modest (as a 
supplemental reform  rather than a call for radical revolution) are concern for my stated 
project and staying true to my stated aims.  I am anxious not to stray into another variety of 
political theory that is not libertarian, but which might (on some accounts at least) appear to 
be promoting liberty from within participatory democracy or non-statist socialism, rendering 
liberty derivative from equality or vice versa.  Again, such models require congruence across 
all psychologies and all domains of society--promoting a single conception of equality (and 
liberty.)  Conversely, this model rests on a type of liberal pluralism that does not require 
 
 
149 Ibid, 96.  See also Membership and Morals. 
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congruence.  Indeed, it works hard to promote diversity not singularity.150  So that I am clear, 
I would  like to echo Wilhelm Roepke's thoughts on this matter: He says “Romanticizing and 
moralistic contempt of the economy, including contempt of the impulses which move the 
market economy and the institutions which support it, must be as far from our minds as 
economism, materialism, and utilitarianism.”151  
 
Libertarianism, Politics, Government, and the State 
A discussion of politics must come first in the part of the analysis devoted to the 
                                                 
 150  The phrasing is borrowed from Richard Flathman.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that this 
is an area of concern and contention for those who recognize the disciplining power of the market, including 
libertarians such as Richard Cornuelle and classical liberals, including Hayek.  Cornuelle has complained:  
 
Working people are far, far freer than slaves or indentured servants, but they are not as free 
as their bosses and not necessarily as free as they might be. . .In a society that is forever 
boasting of its dedication to democratic ideals, employees are, however affluent they may 
become members of a subordinate, unmistakably lower, class. . .The regimentation of work 
has created a political majority whose attitudes about themselves and their world are heavily 
conditioned by a lifelong habit of subordination--what Hayek called an "employee 
mentality."  How can people see the value of independence and self-propulsion when they 
work in a system in which they are dependent and subordinate?  There is little in their daily 
experience that would cause them to conclude that a society is kept alive by a continuous 
process of adaptation, led by independent, enterprising people.  They see society as 
something static--something to be administered.  Employed people can scarcely be expected 
to revere qualities they have been carefully instructed to repress.  Instead, they tend to 
become what the way of work requires: politicized, unimaginative, petty, security-obsessed, 
and passive. 
 
Richard Cornuelle, “the Power and Poverty of Libertarian Thought,” in The Libertarian 
Reader ed. David Boaz (New York: Free Press, 1997), 369.  See also F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of 
Liberty, Chapter 8, "Employment and Independence." The difference between so-called left and right 
libertarians is that most right libertarians fail to acknowledge the power of the market in shaping and 
structuring individual freedom.  When they do, they either are at a loss as to what should be done 
(Cornuelle) or accept this as part of the natural order of things (Hayek).  Left libertarians (e.g. Ellen 
Willis) will want to use democratic power to try to mitigate the worst aspects of the problem.   
 
151 A  Humane Economy, (New York: Regnery/Wilmington, D.E.: I.S.I., 1998), 107. 
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institutional aspect of any constructive critique of libertarianism.  This is partly because it is 
familiar territory, and the conventional critique which is largely focused on politics or 
statism may be compared with revised, alternative theories of libertarianism such libertarian 
individuality.  This is a kind of rhetorical maneuver to try to convince libertarians who 
already understand the virtues of freedom that individuality is simply an extension of some 
of their existing (cruder) ideas, not an imposter dressed in libertarian language.  But also, and 
more importantly, politics understood in a more abstract, constitutional form, is central to the 
creative construction, maintenance, and perpetuation of a regime, not simply the construction 
of a government.  If the appropriate mentality is crucial for the realization of individuality in 
the self, politics is crucial to the institutional life of the regime within which that self lives 
their life.  This is politics as the Founding Fathers understood it, not the world of hidden 
agendas, rent-seeking, and administrative regulation typically discussed by libertarians who 
have adopted the lessons of public choice economics.  Both views of politics, the critique of 
statism and coercion on the on hand, and the constitutional (and constituting) role of politics 
on the other, are important for libertarianism, but each has its appropriate place.  One is 
inadequate within the other.     
Since this is a constructive critique of the libertarian movement, I shall begin again 
with a brief summary of the principal attitudes of conventional libertarians within the 
movement toward politics, government, the state, and citizenship.  This will help to provide 
some context and a standard of comparison for the theory that follows in which a politics 
that is consistent with libertarianism, including one that gives priority to individuality, will 
be discussed.  I shall begin by examining the institutional dimension looking at politics, 
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government, and the state, and then turn my attention to the individual's political role, status, 
and psychology as a citizen. 
Conventional Wisdom 
If anything is widely known about libertarianism it is its great antipathy towards 
politics, government, and the state.  At bottom, these activities and institutions are identified 
with centralized authority and coercive power, and therefore considered to be in fundamental 
opposition to the advancement of individual liberty that libertarianism champions.  Edward 
Crane of the Cato Institute likes to present the arrangement of society in terms of a simple 
dichotomy: political society is governed by coercive power, whereas civil society is arranged 
voluntarily through the choices of individuals.   
At the Cato Institute we prefer to discuss the political battle--that is, the 
individual's relationship to the state--in terms of civil society versus political 
society, rather than liberal versus conservative or even libertarian.  In a civil 
society you make the choices about your life--how to spend your money, 
where to send your children to school, and so forth.  In a political society, 
based as it is on coercion, somebody else--a politician or a bureaucrat--makes 
those decisions.  The goal, it seems to us, should be to minimize the role of 
political society consistent with protection of our individual liberties.152
 
According to this view, morally government activity is regarded negatively because it 
encroaches on individuals' sphere of (natural) liberty; practically it is criticized for its 
                                                 
152  "The Future of Liberty," Cato Policy Report Vol. XXII No. 1, January/February 2000. Obviously 
this is tremendously over-simplified and neglects all of the various ways in which customs, norms, and other 
structures in civil society inhibit individual freedom, as I tried to point out in the previous chapter while 
discussing Charles Murray's (quite conscious) acknowledgment of this fact.  This will be taken up later in 




                                                
inefficiency (largely due to the knowledge problem identified by Hayek,153) and its 
corresponding displacement and crowding out of private, voluntary relations between 
individuals and institutions.  In addition, there is the problem of its corruption in serving 
special, privileged interests identified by the public choice school,154 rather than acting on 
behalf of all.   The following comment from Boaz and Crane is typical.  "Citizens 
increasingly recognize not just that politicians are indebted to special interests and will do 
anything to be reelected but that politics and government are becoming irrelevant to society's 
real needs.  In our complex world, governments cause far more problems than they will ever 
solve; in fact, governments themselves cause most of the social problems they are called on 
to solve."155  For his part, Charles Murray shares some of the same antipathies, but he 
recognizes three legitimate uses of government power: police power to protect people 
 
153 F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” The American Economic Review, Vol. XXXV 
(September, 1945), No. 4, 519-530. Hayek is describing the problem faced by rational economic planners, but 
the situation is just as pertinent for political theorists and designers. He says “the peculiar character of the 
problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the 
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the 
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. 
The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” resources—if “given” 
is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these “data.”  It is rather a 
problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose 
relative importance only these individuals know.  Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of 
knowledge not given to anyone in its totality.” 519-520. 
 
154 See David Boaz, Libertarianism, A Primer, chapter 9, "What Big Government Is All About," 186-
209, and, of course, the seminal work by James M Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). 
155 David Boaz and Edward H. Crane, "Introduction," Market Liberalism, (Washington, DC: Cato 
Institute, 1993), 13-14. 
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against force and fraud, the enforcement of private contracts, and the provision of a few 
select public goods.156 Taken together these points give rise to an apparently anarchistic 
tendency within libertarianism.  Indeed, anti-government pronouncements denote an attitude 
or disposition that is real within libertarianism.  (The first section of Boaz's Libertarian 
Reader is devoted to excerpts discussing skepticism regarding power--meaning skepticism 
concerning the state.)  Following the essentially critical line of argument, libertarianism is 
said to be an attractive political philosophy because government is bad 
(coercive/inefficient/too large and exceeding its rightful authority.)  Libertarianism is anti-
political politics.  But this is only one aspect of libertarian politics--at least, it must be only 
one aspect, rather than the totality of libertarian politics if libertarianism is to move from 
critique to a vision or regime theory because by itself such a critical attitude provides little 
guidance as to what should replace the power, coercion and interest of conventional political 
life.  At best, the anti-political libertarian relies too much on hope and reason.  Bernard 
Crick's discussion of the "a-political liberal" captures the problems associated with this 
outlook well.  He explains, the a-political liberal "overestimates the power of reason and the 
coherence of public opinion; he underestimates the force of political passions and the 
perversity of men in often not seeming to want what is so obviously good for them."  
Furthermore, "his claim that society is logically prior to the state begs the entire question of 
 
156 See Murray, What It Means to Be a Libertarian, chapter 1. Murray admits that “stricter” 
libertarians would not recognize any public goods. But he, like Boaz, begins with a discussion of government as 
having the monopoly on power, to stress the need for limits. 
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how politics holds divided societies together without destroying diversity."157  Boaz, Crane, 
and Murray employ anarchic arguments, at least in part, for rhetorical effect, and this is 
important in a political movement since it serves to motivate public opinion against coercive 
public power.  But a good deal more needs to be said if libertarians wish to be more than 
critics.     
From another perspective, however, libertarianism is regarded as an emancipatory 
politics, helping to secure and further individual liberty in the face of public power, but also 
to prevent harm from other individuals in society.  For libertarianism in its constructive guise 
is the political philosophy of limited government, not no government at all--the politics of 
limited, enumerated and dispersed powers that function to secure individual liberty.  
Consequently, we should not expect it to champion a particularly elaborate and enthusiastic 
theory of politics or a correspondingly robust theory of citizenship.  However, since it is a 
philosophy of limited government and not anarchy, there is certainly room and indeed a need 
for a theory of politics if maximally free lives are to be realized.  Since the first contract 
theories of Hobbes and Locke were developed, all liberals, including libertarians, have 
recognized that a small amount of individual freedom must be given up by each individual to 
achieve the greatest possible sphere of freedom for individuals living together in a secure 
and peaceful society.  This is what some libertarians refer to as the difference between 
 




                                                
(ordered) liberty (and responsibility) on the one hand and license (or anarchy) on the other.  
Politics, in this sense, is the institutionalization of ordered liberty, anchoring the regime and 
securing the maintenance of a way of life--libertarianism--through political institutions.  
Indeed, as I shall explain, politics, properly understood and constitutionally limited, is 
freedom--or at least one crucial part of it.158  Thus, in moving beyond the critique of political 
power it is important to recognize that there still a narrow, strong, but positive functional 
role for government within a libertarian regime, and indeed both Boaz and Murray recognize 
this once they move from their initial polemics.159
At this point libertarians typically introduce the notion of 
(natural/individual/intrinsic) rights and focus attention on the government's (but not the 
state’s) function in securing those liberty rights.  David Boaz is careful to draw a distinction 
between government and the state.  He says "A government is the consensual organization 
by which we adjudicate disputes, defend our rights, and provide for certain common needs . . 
. A state, on the other hand, is a coercive organization asserting or enjoying a monopoly over 
 
158 See Stephen Elkin, “Escaping From Politics,” Report from the Institute of Philosophy & Public 
Policy 15:2 + 3, (Summer 1995), 16-19, and “Madison and After: the American Model of Political 
Constitution,” Political Studies XLIV (1996), 592-604, especially the discussion of the institutionalization of 
the public interest at 599.  As a commercial republican, Elkin’s conception of the public interest (what I would 
call liberty and the life that goes with that) is thicker than any likely to be acceptable to a libertarian.  Still, this 
is a matter of degree, not kind, having to do with the essential components of any regime.  The broader point is 
that politics must pay attention to the creation, use and maintenance of the institutions necessary to enable other 
aspects of public interest (liberty) to be realized.    
159 See, for instance, Boaz, ibid, but also "Are Libertarians Anti-Government?" Cato Policy Report  4, 
(July/August 1998), 2, and Charles Murray’s more pragmatic account centering on the principle of subsidiarity 
in a section titled "An Image of Limited Government," in his What It Means to Be a Libertarian , 36-44. 
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the use of physical force in some geographic area and exercising power over its subjects."160 
 By "the government" libertarians really mean to point to the judiciary and especially the 
constitution to acknowledge and enforce rights, especially property rights, while (so far as 
possible) steering clear of the legislature ("the state") since the latter is the site of laws made 
for special interests, providing narrow benefits to select groups while dispersing costs over 
the public at large,161 or administering welfare functions that are more appropriately carried 
out by families, associations, and communities in civil society.  The point Boaz is 
highlighting is that instead of conflating politics, government and the state as many of the 
more polemical critiques have a tendency to do, a positive, complex, and realistic account of 
a libertarian vision that wishes to distance itself from interest-group style politics while 
advancing constitutionally limited, but strong and effective government, needs to be clear 
about the distinction between each of these institutions and their respective functions within 
a viable libertarian society.  As such, there are two branches of government/state which 
conventional libertarianism is concerned--the legislature (Congress) and the judiciary (the 
Supreme Court).  To some degree Boaz's distinction is helpful since it is a genuine attempt to 
escape from the more polemical assaults on politics by explaining the legitimate role of 
politics within a libertarian framework. Arranged properly, politics is not irretrievably 
 
160 Boaz, ibid, 187.   
161 See, for instance, Hayek's discussion of the distinction between law and legislation in The 




corrupt.  And yet in another sense Boaz does not go far enough because he seems to provide 
no place for any discussion or consideration of the institutionalization of the fundamentals of 
government discussed above.  While it is true that a libertarian regime would be able to 
assume that the individuals who compose it are committed to a certain way of life--i.e. 
libertarianism--this would still be quite general, and leaves room for a good deal of 
interpretation and variation in the instantiation of that ideal.   
If, as seems likely, a goal of a libertarian politics within a libertarian regime would be 
to keep congressional activity that results in legislation (i.e. statutory rules and restrictions) 
to a bare minimum and to guide behavior through obedience to general rules consistent with 
the constitution and enforced by legal institutions, we might expect, or at least hope, that 
politics will fulfill a severely abbreviated role within a larger free society.  Indeed, we might 
nearly eliminate its role altogether, if what we mean by "politics" is the governance and 
management of public power, since public power will be kept to a bare minimum, at a level 
that is just sufficient for the maintenance of the regime.  In their institutional analysis, Boaz, 
Crane, and Murray certainly appear to suggest that politics as we know it (i.e. an activity that 
has some vague association with public activities involving legislation) would virtually 
disappear in a libertarian regime, to be replaced by constitutional legal theory and the rule of 
law, but is this quite accurate?  Since politics is left undefined, it is difficult to say precisely 
what kind of legitimate function politics would have.   Circumscribing the scope of an 
activity is impossible if we do not know what the activity is.  In the quote above Boaz 
mentions the “provision of certain common needs” as one legitimate function of the 
government.  Presumably, on the conventional libertarian view, the other two--settling 
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disputes and defending (pre-existing) rights (e.g. those already enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights)--may be carried out by the judicial branch.  But is this likely to be satisfactory for the 
provision of common needs, since they are fundamental, likely to change their form over 
time due to alterations in political and economic circumstances and peoples’ perceptions of 
what is desirable and possible.  Someone or something has to decide what those common 
needs (and, indeed, for that matter, what those rights) are.  Perhaps there might be some 
minimal role for politics in the sense of collective, deliberative decision making after all, but 
there is no direct mention of this in any of the current libertarian discussions.  Congress is 
almost always vilified and denigrated--as many of the term limit debates indicate.  Instead, 
the positive focus rests upon constitutional government and the rule of law, and the workings 
of the free market.  But is that all there is to be said?  Another way of accessing the 
conventional wisdom concerning the appropriate role of politics in a libertarian regime is to 
consider discussions of individuals’ activities, and particularly individuals functioning as 
citizens.  What clues do Boaz et. al offer us in helping to understand the function and limits 
citizenship, and, by extension, politics more broadly? 
Citizenship and Libertarianism  
Typically, when libertarians point to the unit of analysis in their theories they refer to 
"individuals" rather than "citizens."  This is important because from the outset it serves to 
identify the status a person whose fundamental identity is not politicized, or at least whose 
identity is not primarily politicized.  In any modern liberal theory, as John Stuart Mill says in 
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The Subjection of Women (1869), "citizenship fills only a small place in modern life, and 
does not come near the daily habits or inmost sentiments."162  Compare, for instance, a 
republican theory such as Michael Sandel’s with that of Robert Nozick’s libertarianism.  
Sandel’s account always refers to persons as "citizens," thereby establishing and reinforcing 
a political identity with respect to the state, e.g. "The republican conception of freedom, 
unlike the liberal conception, requires a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in 
citizens the qualities of character self-government requires."163  By contrast, Nozick rests his 
theory on an intuitive claim that "individuals have rights and there are things no person or 
group may do to them (without violating their rights)."164  For Nozick, individual rights 
constrain political power, outlining and delimiting the bounds of liberty through which 
power should not enter.  On Sandel's account, citizens have no hope of becoming anything 
worthwhile until such time as they have joined together politically in the polity.  For Nozick, 
citizenship would be a necessary evil at best, deriving from the primary purpose of achieving 
individual liberty.  As Michael Walzer neatly puts it, "on the liberal view, men and women 
are not free in the state so much as from it."165  One of the crucial features of liberalism 
(including, and perhaps, especially, libertarianism) is, as we shall see below, precisely its 
 
162 Cited in Berkowitz (1999), 157.  
163 Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap/Harvard, 1996), 6. 
164 Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) ix, emphasis added. 
165 "Liberalism and the Art of Separation," Political Theory 12:3, (August 1984), 326.  
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reliance upon the "Art of Separation," dividing the public and the private spheres.  The 
reference to "individuals" rather than "citizens" helps to signify this.   
That said, “citizens” and “citizenship” are mentioned occasionally by libertarians.  
However, as we might expect, when libertarians use the term "citizen" it does not carry much 
weight.  It is used in a general, almost careless manner, rather than a deliberate, theoretical 
way as it is in republican theory to connote a certain encumbered identity with its respective 
duties and obligations.  For instance, libertarians occasionally employ it in a comparative 
sense, to talk about "citizens of the United States" as opposed to (e.g.) citizens of the United 
Kingdom.  Sometimes it will be used historically and legally when libertarians want to refer 
to a member of a country (again, usually the United States) governed by a particular set of 
political institutions--i.e. a republic with a Constitution (including a Bill of Rights that 
secures the rights of individuals against government).  But since, for a libertarian, the 
important and valuable parts of life are lived in the (relatively) non-political sphere of civil 
society, most of the time it is appropriate to refer to persons as individuals (or entrepreneurs, 
employees, taxpayers, parents, agents, and so on) rather than citizens.166  This is true even if 
 
 
166 Edward Crane prefers to look to "netizens"--those individuals who participate on the Net, as 
opposed to citizens deliberating in political society.  So, for instance, Crane cites Jon Katz writing in Wired in 
1997: "The Digital Nation constitutes a new social class.  Its citizens are young, educated, affluent.  They 
inhabit wired institutions and industries--universities, computer and telecom companies, Wall Street and 
financial outfits, the media . .  . Some of their common values are clear: they tend to be libertarian, materialistic, 
tolerant, rational, technologically adept, disconnected from conventional political organizations--like the 
Republican and Democratic parties--and from narrow labels like liberal or conservative. . .The digital young, 
from Silicon Valley entrepreneurs to college students, have a nearly universal contempt for government's ability 
to work; they think it's wasteful and clueless.  On the Net, government is rarely seen as an instrument of 
positive change or social good.  Politicians are assumed to be manipulative or ill-informed, unable to affect 
reform or find solutions, forced to lie to survive." ibid, 12.   
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it is recognized that living a free life is impossible without the guarantees of security and 
order provided by the state since it denotes a set of priorities in relation to the status and 
identity of the person.  For libertarians, politics is a necessary evil; it is an activity that is 
always instrumental ("procedural") and it is engaged in by individuals (as citizens) only 
fitfully and begrudgingly.  It is decidedly not the site of individuality.  (That is civil society, 
as we shall see later.)  Politics then, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for real 
freedom during times of normal, peaceful existence.  The exception to this would be a call to 
civil disobedience in times of severe crisis if freedom is threatened by malevolent 
authority.167  However, the hope would be that this is likely to be an extremely rare 
occurrence.  Nonetheless, at a minimum libertarian citizens would need to take to heart the 
old maxim that the price of freedom is "eternal vigilance," and consequently a minimal 
involvement in politics is necessary for some reasonable portion of the citizens of a 
libertarian regime.  
Politics, Libertarianism and Individuality 
Bearing the considerations mentioned above in mind, what might we reasonably 
expect the role of politics and individuals attitudes and behavior toward citizenship to be in a 
libertarian good society?  The previous chapter highlighted what I take to be the most 
                                                                                                                                                             
Superficially, this may be fine as far as it goes.  But netizens cannot replace citizens, for citizens share 
a basic equality in relation to other citizens who are also protected by and from the state.     Netizens are a 
privileged group who have access to information technology, and there is no particular reason why they should 
work together to sort out their "common needs." 
167  See Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1993). 
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appealing and worthwhile goal of libertarianism--individuality--in an effort to try to explain 
why a life of maximal freedom might be attractive.  In so doing it advanced an ideal for 
individuals who develop themselves so that they might become true individuals--distinctive, 
unique, persons who celebrate their difference in their individuality.  However, in order to 
achieve those kinds of ends a good deal of ground has to be covered to explain how 
individuals in society might first provide for their basic needs--security-- and the needs of 
the institutional framework that enables them to live a certain way, before moving toward 
something more sophisticated including work in the market, education in the family and 
schooling at school, and ultimately cultivation in civil society.  Consequently, we need to 
start with a foundation that would establish security on the basis of what individuals have in 
common, before they can go off and cultivate themselves as separate, distinctive 
individualists in civil society.  This is why libertarians need politics.  As Kenneth Minogue 
says “Politics, with difficulty, sustains the common world in which we may talk to each 
other. . . Politics is the activity by which the framework of human life is sustained; it is not 
life itself.”168 Treating people first and foremost as individuals means that differences 
between individuals must be guarded very carefully.  If different people are to be able to live 
together in a peaceful, prosperous and even flourishing manner, then in an account of a 
libertarian good society something needs to be said about the relations (institutional, 
behavioral, and psychological) between people that enables them to do this.  Individuality 
 
168 Politics.  A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995,) vii. 
 
 112
                                                
alone, as an achievable aspiration, will not supply the answer to this.  After all, individuality 
is based upon the development of the self,169 and while this may (but need not consistently) 
be carried out by interacting with others, such interaction is selective.  Within a libertarian 
regime of the sort outlined here, different groups of people will inevitably gravitate toward 
each other on the basis of their particular conceptions of their own individuality and their 
shared views of the good life. (This may include political debates and deliberations, but it 
would not be anything like the kinds of demands placed on civic republicans.) But even 
those who share very little in common--perhaps nothing beyond their desire for peace and 
security and the avoidance of harm from others--need to be able to get along in society in 
some minimal sense.  We need an account of a means by which people may learn to tolerate-
-get along, but not necessarily to respect and admire--each other.  The standard is 
deliberately set quite low so that it may be achieved by as many different individuals as 
possible, taking differing capacities for self-governance into consideration.  This need for 
toleration of diverse ways of living is precisely why politics and governance is important and 
must retain a place within a libertarian regime.  For politics is an activity that connects 
individuals to each other, where that connection, in a liberal and especially a libertarian 
regime is political--formal and legal,170 not metaphysical--revealing the relations between all 
 
169 Individuality is based upon a kind of self-interest.  It is broader, and potentially more well-
balanced than market liberalism; it might be closer to Tocqueville’s self-interest properly understood--but at 
bottom it is personal and self interested nonetheless.  Politics is not (or at least, not supposed to be) 
fundamentally personal or self-interested, it is collective and social.   
170 Or, as John Gray puts it when he describes Isaiah Berlin’s work, politics is a modus vivendi. 
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free individuals in society, including those who pursue individuality and those who do not.  
Politics is purely instrumental; it protects the pluralism and diversity that is at the heart of a 
free society by providing the means--the ordered institutions--that secure the foundations of 
freedom. 
Politics arises then, according to the great Aristotle, in organized states which 
recognize themselves to be an aggregate of many members, not a single tribe, 
religion, interest, or tradition.  Politics arises from accepting the fact of the 
simultaneous existence of groups, hence different interests and different 
traditions, within a territorial unit under a common rule . . . (It is) a process of 
deliberate conciliation.171
 
In all liberal theories, and quite unlike republican theories, politics serves as a forum 
for mediation not the immediate realization of the good.  Moreover, the greater the 
differences between individuals, the greater the need for politics to secure those differences. 
To give some concrete form to these rather general and abstract comments concerning such 
relational arrangements the following section will begin with a framework for the institution 
of politics using Berlin's theory of negative liberty and Shklar's liberalism of fear.  This will 
serve to provide the explanation and justification for the separation between state and society 
mentioned above.  Next, I shall discuss pluralism, and drawing on the work of William 
Galston argue that a libertarian politics must be based upon diversity rather than the 
autonomy associated with individuality in civil society if it is to create peace for all citizens, 
regardless of their pursuits in civil society, thereby providing a minimal equal liberty for all. 
 
171 Crick, ibid, 18-19. 
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 This contrasts sharply with the more strongly autonomy-grounded individuality outlined 
previously, which may be a goal of any individual within a libertarian regime, however the 
achievement of individuality is left entirely to the devices of each individual.  The state will 
play no direct role in the cultivation of it, and there is no expectation that equality will be a 
particularly influential value in the achievement of individuality.  
Self-government and democracy are two other themes that are central to current 
debates on politics and the good life.  How does libertarianism treat them?  Institutionally, 
would a libertarian regime be likely to adopt the characteristics of a constitutional liberal 
democracy?  Why not liberal autocracy or something similar?  What, if anything, is so 
special about democracy?  To discuss the status and behavioral component of citizenship I 
will draw on Richard Flathman's theory of citizenship and mention the need to be continually 
vigilant if conditions of freedom are to be maintained.  In extraordinary times this may 
require civil disobedience on the part of citizens. 
Finally, what kinds of psychological and behavioral demands would a libertarian 
politics make on individual citizens?  Nancy Rosenblum's democracy of every day life is 
useful here, together with consideration of Robert Putnam's notion of "bridging social 
capital."  Together, these elements--the institutional arrangements of politics, and the 
behavioral and the psychological components of citizenship will help to bring together some 
of the kinds of things a viable libertarian regime would need to contain and encourage. 
The Institution of Freedom: Negative Liberty and The Liberalism of Fear 
All liberals share an ambivalence toward government, but for some kinds of liberals 
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this is more pronounced than it is for others.172  In the case of libertarians, as I have 
suggested,  political power is considered to be a persistent and dangerous threat to liberty 
like no other.  (At its most extreme it conjures up visions of the state as "the men with guns," 
or slogans such as "taxation is theft.")  This is due to both theoretical concerns of libertarians 
as they understand liberty--the need to maximize liberty logically and practically entails the 
minimization of political power and coercion—as well as practical experience.   Historically, 
classical liberalism, libertarianism's predecessor, grew out of the religious wars, but all forms 
of strife, especially war, are obviously deeply antithetical to liberty.  As such, it is helpful to 
begin by considering the political theories of Isaiah Berlin and Judith Shklar respectively, 
each of whom, while not libertarians, layout theories that are consistent with the strongly 
negative and continually vigilant attitude to political power libertarianism adopts and 
promotes.  Both advance a variety of negative liberty, but Berlin’s argument is primarily 
conceptual and analytic, whereas Shklar’s is explicitly historical, empirical and institutional, 
explaining not only what is needed for liberty in theoretical terms, but how that need is to be 
realized institutionally in practice.  Together they help to describe some of the fundamentals 
with which a practical political libertarian theory would need to begin.  
 
172 Berlin notes that in practice liberty will need to be considered alongside other values, and that 
inevitably trade-offs between values will occur.  For instance, liberty will need to be considered and balanced 
alongside equality, but precisely what this means and what it entails will vary according to the definitions any 
particular liberal theory attributes to these values, together with their relative emphasis on each.  By comparison 
with other liberals, libertarians are less apt to compromise freedom and trade-off freedom for equality (or any 
other value.)  Liberty will take priority over other values and act as a constraint or fundamental reference point 
when other values are considered.  
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As I have suggested, libertarians recognize that political power is necessary to secure 
liberty through the guarantee of individual rights from encroachments by others.  But, 
government itself is and has been the greatest potential threat to liberty, theoretically and 
historically.  When defining liberalism as a political doctrine, Judith Shklar says “It is a 
political doctrine, because the fear and favor that have always inhibited freedom are 
overwhelmingly generated by governments, both formal and informal.  And while the 
sources of social oppression are indeed numerous, none has the deadly effect of those who, 
as the agents of the modern state, have unique resources of physical might and persuasion at 
their disposal.”173  Consequently, at bottom, liberals recognize that as Isaiah Berlin puts it, 
the central questions of politics are obedience and coercion.  Politics has to do first and 
foremost with power, not liberty, so the activity of politics needs to be treated skeptically 
and cautiously at all times.   
As a political institution, government must be guided by the principle of negative 
liberty that answers the question "What is the area within which the subject--a person or 
group of persons--is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without 
interference by other persons?"  Negative liberty informs government of its function and 
limits.  This is justified by Berlin in a number of ways; here I focus on only one of those 
ways.  Government is beneficial to individuals (citizens) because it provides individuals with 
 
173 “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Nancy Rosenblum,  Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 21.  
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(some of the) basic conditions under which they are free to be able to develop their natural 
capacities: 
. . . it is assumed, especially by such libertarians as Locke and Mill in England, and 
Constant and Tocqueville in France, that there ought to exist a certain minimum area 
of personal freedom which must on no account be violated; for if it is overstepped, 
the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even that minimum 
development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and 
even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred.174
 
Politics and government are beneficial to individuals when they secure liberty, but 
that is their only function in relation to individuals' freedom.  Anything more constitutes an 
abuse of power that may turn out to have sinister consequences for individuals, inhibiting the 
development of their capacities.  This is especially true when political leaders employ power 
to try to transform individuals so that they may become “better,” or more fully realized 
versions of their “true” selves.  When government asks the question "What, or who, is the 
source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than 
that?"  When government tries to render individuals positively free using politics it exceeds 
its legitimate bounds.  (Remember that individuality is a positive moral theory, not a positive 
political theory.  Individuals must develop themselves.  This may be done with others so 
 
174 “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
124.  Shklar justifies her version of negative liberty--the liberalism of fear--as a universal condition for the 
recognition of the dignity of persons.  Shklar in Rosenblum , 30.  
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long as it is carried out voluntarily.  But individuals must not be forced to be free by 
politicians using the coercive powers of the state, which is why individuality is consistent 
with, or at least not inconsistent with Berlin’s liberalism.) 
Drawing a line between the public and the private spheres of life--the art of 
separation mentioned above--is central to any liberal theory.  Shklar says that it does not 
matter where the line is drawn, only that it is drawn, but here is one of the distinctions that 
separates libertarianism from other varieties of liberal theory.  For a theory than maximizes 
liberty must draw a line so that the public (political as opposed to social) sphere is as small 
as is practically possible such that maximal negative liberty might be secured and 
maintained.  Precisely where that line would be drawn is impossible to say without having a 
concrete example of a particular regime, and such a line is likely to shift slightly over time, 
within a certain margin.  Nonetheless, we can be sure that in a libertarian regime it will be 
important than it would be in other kinds of liberal regimes to have a relatively clear division 
between public and private and also to make sure that the public sphere is minimized as far 
as is practically possible for the government to carry out its legitimate tasks--securing peace 
and rights and maintaining itself so that it can continue to serve that function--but that is all.  
Both Berlin and Shklar agree that politics should be confined to securing the 
conditions of liberty; the government should not act as a tutor and tell people how to live.  
However, both agree also that some ways of life are better than others, and some are more 
psychologically consistent with liberalism than others.  But for Shklar, to consider such ways 
of life is to go beyond politics.  She says that this is inappropriate--it is not the proper subject 
matter of politics, but something else--ethics or sociology, perhaps.  Moreover, to consider 
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other (related) areas of life is wrong for other reasons.  It is potentially highly dangerous 
because it may cause us to become distracted by utopian dreams, when in practice we ought 
to focus our attention on the precarious facts of reality and the omnipresent potential threats 
to our peace.  To forget these threats is to cast off the historical memory that reminds us of 
past atrocities, a memory that should haunt us and remind us of what a noble, but also 
delicate achievement true liberty--peace--really is.  This is a serious point, and by turning 
attention to individuality I do not mean to dismiss Shklar’s concerns.  However, perhaps I 
am slightly less pessimistic about society’s--at least the contemporary United States’--ability 
to maintain peace, and hopeful that individuals living in a free society can experience 
freedom as more than the absence of dire atrocities.  Accordingly, what I am after is more a 
recognition of the several factors that would need to be taken into consideration in order to 
achieve freedom as individuality in a libertarian regime.  In regime theory, as I noted in the 
first chapter, mere political doctrine is an insufficient guide for the good life (or, the best 
possible life, given human constraints) since, as Hayek, Rosenblum and others have noted, 
taken separately certain domains may not have the same logics or values, yet together they 
may function to create a regime that is morally desirable and, what is equally important, 
practically possible.  It is certainly the case that in a libertarian framework a good deal of 
attention and action would need to be directed at something like a principle of negative 
liberty or the liberalism of fear in connection with the state, but there is more to be said, both 
in relation to politics and other private social domains beyond the reach of the state.  
Naturally, in Shklar's liberalism different people would experience different positive ways of 
living too, but on the view being articulated here, this needs to be recognized quite self-
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consciously because it is an achievement that requires a good deal of work, and so that others 
may be persuaded to join in the fostering of a movement that promotes a culture of self 
development.  This is why I wish to consider a regime rather than (merely) a political 
doctrine.  However, as Berlin points out, in the end the connection between negative liberty 
and individual self-development is and would be empirical.  It might work, but it might not.  
Still, specifying the political focus on negative liberty helps to ground the basic political 
institutional framework within which a free life would be lived.  Furthermore, the separation 
between the public and private domains serves to give some sense of the breadth of that 
separation needed to maximize liberty.  
Pluralism 
Berlin’s and Shklar’s liberalism both rest on the fact of pluralism.  Berlin claims that 
we disagree about the ends of life, not just the means by which we achieve our ends.  
Discord, rather than harmony is the state that politics has to contend with, and this is why, 
from the perspective of more perfectionist or participatory political theories, liberal political 
theory must set its sights so low.  If liberalism is to remain true to its commitment to liberty, 
it must protect liberty for as many individuals as possible, perhaps even accommodating 
some illiberal elements so long as they do not threaten to undermine the broader liberal 
framework itself.  What implications does this have for a libertarian politics?  What are the 
limits of libertarianism?  Is it more or less capacious than other mainstream varieties of 
liberalism?  Furthermore, just how accommodating would it be toward those who choose not 
to pursue individuality?         
At first glance we might expect that libertarianism, since it is the self-proclaimed 
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champion of liberty, would take the "fact" of pluralism a good deal more seriously than most 
other liberal theories.  After all, the basic individualism that informs classical liberalism and 
market liberalism, as well as Nozickian libertarianism rests on an empirical recognition of 
the differences between persons who are physically separate--and in that sense distinct--
entities.175  However, libertarianism properly understood, not only recognizes the fact of 
separate plural individuals, it respects and even hopes to encourage the development of 
distinct, unique individuals.  For libertarianism, pluralism is not only a brute fact, but a value 
to be achieved and promoted.  This is clearly what individual flourishing means, at least in 
part, in a theory of individuality--individuality goes beyond physical variety to aesthetic and 
spiritual variety at the level of the personality and the soul.  The promise of individuality is 
for each individual to experience greater diversity, not standardization, within some very 
broad and minimally onerous political limits. 
On the other hand, specifying any type of lifestyle that is consistent with but also, and 
additionally, morally and aesthetically desirable within an open-ended political liberalism 
that in itself has nothing to say about the kinds of things liberal individuals are (beyond their 
respect for the basic laws of a liberal society that enable them to exist together peacefully) is 
inevitably going to present a theory than is more constrained and less accommodating to 
some free lives than to others because not all ways of living a free life entail self 
 
175 Shklar says “For political purposes liberalism does not have to assume anything about human 
nature except that people, apart from similar physical and psychological structures, differ in their personalities 
to a very marked degree", ibid, 35. 
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development.  To borrow from Richard Flathman (who, in turn, adapts Michael Oakeshott), 
theories of individuality are governed by adverbial principles and rules such as civility, 
magnanimity, generosity, fastidiousness, and courage.176  Such principles and rules describe 
a manner or attitude that attaches to the pursuit of individual goals, but it does not prescribe 
the goals themselves.  At bottom, many of these types of theories look to reason or 
imagination and, in Flathman’s case, will, to ground and motivate actions.  What about lives 
based on tradition, faith, and authority?  Or indeed, those based on simple lethargy?  Can 
such apparent (political) open-endedness, but also (moral) discipline and constraint be 
reconciled?  Ultimately, I am not sure that this contradiction may be settled satisfactorily, but 
one way of responding to this problem is to refer again to the distinction and relation 
between politics and moral theory.  In a libertarianism that promotes individuality, politics is 
the framework that establishes a set of minimal general principles in order that all 
individuals (regardless of their principles above and beyond their minimal commitment to 
freedom and therefore in libertarianism in the political sense) may live together peacefully 
and securely.  It requires a minimal respect of others rights (but not admiration for their 
lifestyle as such) and toleration of different ways of living.  It will be guided by a respect for 
the diversity at the heart of pluralism.  In principle, any mode of living could and should be 
tolerated in a libertarian regime (including those based upon so-called victimless crimes such 
as a life devoted to narcotic stupor or sexual perversity), so long as others are not harmed 
 
176 See Richard Flathman, Reflections of a Would-Be Anarchist, especially chapters 1 and 3. 
 
 123
                                                
and the way of life does not threaten the continued existence of the regime. 
However, practically and functionally some ways of life will be more consistent with 
libertarianism than others.  If the state is rolled back, then some individuals--perhaps many 
or even most individuals--will need to pick up the slack and provide for those individuals 
who cannot provide for themselves if a civilized society is to survive and flourish.  Thus, 
socially, a more creative and imaginative culture seems appropriate and maybe even 
necessary in practice simply for that society to maintain it’s institutions and its way of life 
for the individuals who live it.  Echoing Tocqueville, William Galston outlines a problem 
that libertarians will have to face squarely:  
A narrow society is one in which only a small fraction of inhabitants can live 
their lives in a manner consistent with their flourishing and satisfaction.  The 
rest will be pinched and stunted to some considerable degree.  All else being 
equal, this is an undesirable situation, and one that is best avoided.  To the 
maximum extent possible in human affairs, liberal societies do avoid this 
kind of pinching.  This is an important element of their vindication as a 
superior mode of political organization.177
 
Moral theories guiding lives in the non-political realm may be more demanding than 
political obligations so that individuals who share similar values can joining together in 
associations to pursue more strenuous visions of the good, including what Peter Berkowitz 
calls the discipline of individuality.178  Due to the primacy of individual freedom and 
responsibility accorded to individuals in libertarian theories self-imposed restrictions of 
 
177 William A. Galston, "Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of 
Liberal Theory," William and Mary Law Review (1999) 40:869 at 892. 
178 Berkowitz, chapter 4, 134-169. 
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freedom are acceptable to libertarians, whereas external restrictions, including political 
restrictions from the state above and beyond those required for security, are not.  Inevitably 
this will be more selective and those who do not share such a vision of the good will be left 
out, but they are free to pursue their own version of it. 
Freedom of association based upon voluntarily consent has always been a central 
tenet of libertarianism.  In his work on multi-cultural groups Chandran Kukathas has argued 
that virtually any lifestyle should be permitted within a larger libertarian regime so long as 
its members are free to leave whenever they choose.179  In principle having an exit option 
sounds adequate.  However, in practice there are likely to be many problems with this, such 
as having insufficient knowledge about one’s options in the world beyond the community, or 
having sufficient resources and skills to survive outside the group.  Thus, it would seem that 
a formal exit option is an insufficient guarantee for meeting the standards of liberty in a 
libertarian regime.  Instead, there needs to be some consideration of the substantive means 
by which the exit option can be made meaningful in practice.  This is likely to entail some 
mandatory basic level of education to make choice substantive more than merely formal, and 
thus to establish institutions that indicate to individuals that there are other ways of life that 
may be lived. 
Democracy and Self Government 
                                                 




                                                
Does a regime that prizes the pursuit of liberty also require some kind of commitment 
to democracy?  If so, what kind of commitment?  Historically, as Judith Shklar has noted, 
liberalism and democracy seem to have coexisted in a marriage of convenience.  But would 
this be true in a libertarian regime?  Again, typically there is little discussion of democracy 
within libertarianism, except insofar as the current broad institutional framework that is 
arranged according to the principles of a constitutional liberal democracy are generally 
accepted and discussed.  That is, there is no radical challenge to this framework.  However, 
in the “Two Concepts” essay Berlin questions the relationship between liberalism and 
democracy.  He says “self-government may, on the whole, provide a better guarantee of the 
preservation of civil liberties than other regimes, and has been defended as such by 
libertarians.  But there is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic 
rule.  The answer to the question “who governs me?” is logically distinct from the question 
“How far does government interfere with me?”180  He goes on to suggest that a benign 
autocracy is consistent with negative liberalism, and in certain circumstances it might be 
preferable to democratic government.  While I do not wish to rule out autocracy,181 it seems 
that democracy is a better companion for a practical libertarianism precisely because we 
have some idea of what we can expect from it, based upon past experience.  Moreover, if we 
take seriously the idea of maximizing liberty for all, democracy has an important expressive 
 
 
180 Berlin, ibid, 130. 
181  Although Mill’s discussion of the good despot in Considerations of Representative Government, 
chapter 3, might give us good reason for doing so—since the likelihood of finding an “all-seeing monarch is” 
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relation to individual liberty since it reflects a commitment to equal individual liberty based 
upon the rights or dignity of each person.  Still, libertarians need to be careful.  In both The 
Constitution of Liberty and The Political Order of a Free People182 Hayek warns against the 
rhetorical use of democracy as a substantive ideal--to advance equality--rather than as a 
procedure for governing.  In particular, he is concerned about the tendency of majoritarian 
government to lead to expansionist government, thereby violating the rights of minorities 
and abandoning principled limited power.  
 Libertarian Citizens and Citizenship 
After considering the institutional aspects of politics, it is now time to return to the 
perspective of the individual as citizen.  What, in practice, is the attitude of the ordinary 
libertarian individual toward politics in a libertarian regime?  How does this attitude 
compare to the priority accorded to other roles and activities in other domains?  Will the 
attitude to politics be consistent, or will it change, subject to circumstances such as severe 
threats to an individuals’ liberty from his own regime or other regimes? As I have already 
noted, libertarians will not embrace citizenship with much enthusiasm because it will entail 
participation in the domain that has the most power and authority to thwart freedom.  
However, practical considerations require a tempering of this skepticism because some 
                                                                                                                                                             
virtually nil, but also because of the passivity of the subjects that such a government would entail.  
 
182 See also Juliet Williams, “Many Roads to Serfdom.  Liberalism Against Democracy in the 
Writings of F.A. Hayek,” paper presented to the J.M.Kaplan Workshop in Political Economy at George Mason 
University, Spring 2000. 
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involvement in politics is necessary to secure maximal freedom within the regime through 
the state.  How is this ambivalence to be solved or at least accommodated?  In Toward A 
Liberalism . . .183 Richard Flathman proposes what he calls a chastened view of citizenship 
that seems appropriate for libertarian citizens.  It is neither wildly enthusiastic about 
participatory politics, as some of the descendents of Aristotle and Rousseau seem to be (e.g. 
Benjamin Barber,) nor wholly antagonistic, as many libertarians currently proclaim 
themselves to be.  Rather, it is chastened because libertarians recognize the need for politics, 
and therefore citizenship, but they are wary of potential expansions of power backed by the 
ability to compel individuals to act.   In fact, as Flathman notes, for those liberals who are 
primarily concerned with political authority as a threat to freedom, at bottom the problem of 
citizenship rests on the fact that citizenship will oblige individuals to do things that they 
would not otherwise do, based on the merits of the act alone.184   Libertarians, like Shklar’s 
liberals of fear, recognize this only too well.  Keeping a critical and vigilant attitude to 
political authority and one’s involvement in it are vital.  By contrast, in theories (and 
practices) of high citizenship, individuals will privilege politics and their status as citizens 
over all other statuses.   Furthermore, they will lose their independence insofar as they agree 
to uphold whatever decision is produced by the political process.  Civil disobedience and 
conscientious objection are out of bounds for supporters of high citizenship.      
 
183 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), chapter 3, “Citizenship and Authority: A Chastened View 
of Citizenship.”  
184 Ibid, 103-105. 
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The politics of high citizenship may begin in plurality and disagreement, but (insofar 
as it acts in a determinate manner on any specific question) it must end in unchallengeable 
agreement (concerning that question).  But of course agreement cannot alter (what as likely 
as not will be) the fact that there are excellent reasons against the decision or policy.  In 
short, the politics of high citizenship would not change the fundamental character of 
authority; it would change the attitudes of citizens toward authority.185  
For libertarians such as stance is unacceptable.  Since Locke and Thoreau individuals 
have reserved the right to threaten the withdrawal of their support for the government when 
it is considered to have exceeded its bounds of authority.  As Emerson said in his essay on 
politics, “Good men must not obey the laws too well.” Consequently, libertarians must adopt 
a theory of low citizenship instead.   
On a practical level involvement in politics obviously requires a trade-off of time and 
resources since it takes attention away from other pursuits that individuals would prefer to 
engage in civil society, so this is another reason for severely curtailing the citizen’s 
participation in politics, in addition to the principled point above.  Having said that, a case 
could be made for political participation as a means for fostering individuality in relation to 
statesmanship and leadership.  As I have noted above, many classical liberals and 
libertarians point to the Founding Fathers as exemplary individuals who served their country, 
but such examples are unlikely to be considered typical, and given the potential for the abuse 
 
185 Ibid, 104. 
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of power over others, in general politicians would not be the preferred exemplars of 
libertarian individuality. What will all of this entail in practice?  What can we reasonably 
expect libertarian citizens to do? 
Political Psychology and Behavior 
If citizens are to act individually and in associations, especially in a democracy, to 
protest and block any sign of government illegality and abuse, they must have a fair share of 
moral courage, self-reliance, and stubbornness to assert themselves effectively.  To foster 
well-informed and self-directed adults must be the aim of every effort to educate the citizens 
of a liberal society.  There is a very clear account of what a perfect liberal would look like 
more or less.  It is to be found in Kant's Doctrine of Virtue, which gives a very detailed 
account of the disposition of a person who respects other people without condescension, 
arrogance, humility, or fear.  He or she does not insult others with lies or cruelty, both of 
which mar one's own character no less than they injure one's victim's.  Liberal politics 
depend for their success on the efforts of such people, but it is not the task of liberal politics 
to foster them simply as models of human perfection.  All it can claim is that if we want to 
promote political freedom, then this is appropriate behavior."186
Libertarianism is notoriously poor at specifying the virtues and habits of character or 
personality that are necessary and desirable to make their aspiration real.  As we noted 
above, historically, classical liberalism relied upon the family, the market, and religion to 
                                                 
186 Shklar, ibid, 34-35. 
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help to foster the “right sort of citizens,”187 but in post-modern times this may be an 
unrealistic hope or expectation.  Instead, perhaps the best that we can hope for as a political 
goal is for is some (very) minimal standards so that people may live together peacefully.  
And yet, individuality is a rather strenuous ideal.  This seems contradictory, except for the 
fact that I am referring to two different, but related things.  Most immediately liberty for 
individuality champions what Robert Putmam calls “bonding social capital”--exclusive, 
private voluntary associations of individuals who come together in civil society to “reinforce 
exclusive identities and homogeneous groups.”188  Within such groups, as I began to suggest 
in the second chapter on the self, and will discuss further in chapter 5 on civil society, 
individuals will often join together and use their will, imagination, and creativity to perfect 
themselves and others similar to themselves.  The libertarian movement itself is a good 
example of bonding social capital, as I shall show later.   However, for a regime--a collection 
of very different, and potentially antagonistic groups-- to live together peacefully in the 
regime as a whole, a certain amount of “bridging social capital” is required.  That is, 
connections among people using networks of trust and norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that includes all members of a libertarian society, regardless of whether they 
 
187 Ronald J. Terchek, “The Fruits of Success and the Crisis of Liberalism,” in Liberals on Liberalism 
Ed. Alfonso J. Damico (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986), 15-33 at 30.  And of course, historically it 
was relatively easy to point to a certain level of homogeneity and common standards because some sectors of 
the population, such as women and minorities, were systematically excluded from political consideration. 
188 See Bowling Alone, The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2000), 22-24. 
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in fact choose to pursue individuality through self development, or not. 
In relation to the maintenance and perpetuation of liberal democracy in Membership 
and Morals Nancy Rosenblum describes two mechanisms to help bridging social capital and 
the institutions that will help to hold the regime together.  One is direct and the other is 
indirect.  The first is an approach that she calls the democracy of everyday life.  It describes 
a set of psychological attitudes and behavioral traits. 
Much of life in public is carried on in the interstices of groups and attachments.  A 
foundational moral temperament allows us to get along.  The democracy of everyday life is a 
habitual way of going about our ordinary business as we move about among groups and 
institutions, public and private.  For many moments we are all on our own in society.  So the 
democracy of everyday life has to do with mundane face-to-face interactions and involves 
encounters with strangers, since involuntary association is a fact of social life.189
According to Rosenblum, the democracy of everyday life requires two rather minimal 
standards: 1. treating people identically and with easy spontaneity, and 2. speaking out 
against ordinary injustice.   
 
189 1998, 350. 
Easy spontaneity refers to the rejection of deference and various sorts of cultural, 
ethical and economic differences that create status divisions between people.  It is a kind of 
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reciprocal democratic norm that accords basic respect to oneself and to others and is part of 
the traditional cultural makeup of the United States.  Speaking up against ordinary injustice 
describes a reflexive disposition to call attention to mistreatment of ourselves and others.  
Both kinds of attitudes and behaviors will be learned from experience within groups with 
others in civil society, often through imitation.   
Secondly, her phenomenology of liberal pluralism explains how the personal uses of 
pluralism in the form of membership within voluntary associations (Putnam’s bonding social 
capital), serve to support the regime.  This is in spite of the fact that many of these groups 
appear to be in direct contradiction with the overall liberal democratic regime as a whole due 
to the kind of illiberal values and sentiments some groups promote. This is because groups 
like the militia provide a home for the disaffected, a space where they may practice their 
illiberalism within the group, thereby acting  as “safety valves” without threatening the 
continued life of the (liberal) regime as a whole.  Together, these behavioral traditions and 
institutional arrangements would work to make libertarian pluralism workable. 
Conclusion 
Contrary to much conventional wisdom, libertarians need politics.  But the kind of 
politics that libertarians would require in the construction of a good society would have to be 
quite different from the kind of activities we typically think of when we refer to politics 
today.  The public choice school is right to point out the corruption and waste associated 
with the buying and selling of votes to select interest groups.  However, that does not mean 
that all politics is necessarily and irretrievably corrupt.  Rather, politics needs to be 
considered more abstractly and in connection with freedom--as an activity that helps to 
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shape, guide, and maintain the institutional framework of a libertarian regime.  While it is 
certainly true that the practice of politics is not or should not be libertarian individuals’ main 
preoccupation, the relationship between politics and the continuous enjoyment of their 
freedom must be stressed repeatedly to avoid inertia and ultimately the loss of freedom that 
libertarian individuals will need to work hard to achieve.  Extraordinary efforts in the form 
of civil disobedience would be a last resort if threats to freedom could not be avoided, but it 
is to be hoped that this would take the form of a potential threat to, and therefore constraint 
on, public power rather than an occasional practical tool actively utilized for the protection 






                                                
CHAPTER 4: LIBERTARIAN LEGAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONS 
. . . the task of the lawgiver is not to set up a particular order but merely to 
create conditions in which an orderly arrangement can establish and ever 
renew itself.  As in nature, to induce the establishment of such an order does 
not require that we be able to predict the behavior of the individual atom--
that will depend on the unknown particular circumstances in which it finds 
itself.  All that is required is a limited regularity in its behavior; and the 
purpose of the human laws we enforce is to secure such limited regularity as 
will make the formation of an order possible.190   
 
On the face of it, outlining and criticizing a libertarian legal theory should be 
relatively straightforward.  Given a theory that is associated with minimal state interference, 
notions of negative liberty and "leaving people alone," we should expect that there would not 
be much to a libertarian legal theory except the securing of peace and property rights.  Of 
course, in practice securing peace and property rights are not easy tasks, but to understand 
the proper role of law in a libertarian regime we need to consider its function abstractly and 
relationally before we consider its more narrow particular role.  In fact, like the political 
theory examined in the previous chapter, it turns out that law is extremely important because 
it anchors and secures basic liberties within an institutional framework.  Without law, 
together with the politics that prescribes the functions of law, there will be no liberty in a 
libertarian regime.  Furthermore, there will be no realization of individuality since the 
necessary conditions for its achievement would not exist.  Put simply, in a libertarian regime 
 
     190 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 161. 
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law will play a more expansive and complex role than is usually acknowledged by those who 
consider libertarianism.  
More than that however, law, unlike politics, has, and should have, an important 
private function in a libertarian regime.  For private law, in the form of contract law, forms 
the basis of much of the activity associated with the realization of one variety of liberty--
economic liberty--between freely consenting persons acting voluntarily within the market.  
Indeed, when the state (including the welfare state) is severely pared down in a libertarian 
regime many of the functions previously undertaken politically will be transferred to the 
market sphere, increasing the scope of private law further still.  Thus, in relation to the 
establishment and workings of the basic conditions of liberty, law is both a constraining and 
an enabling mechanism within a libertarian regime.  What this means in practice is that in a 
libertarian good society law would be likely to play a much greater role in individuals' lives 
than politics.  Accordingly, in devising the arrangements of  a good society libertarians 
would need to turn much of their attention away from politics and toward law.   
At the same time, however, like politics, law--because of its uniform and general 
standards--is in tension with the plurality at the center of individuality in both theory and 
practice.  Consequently, like politics it will need to function, but within certain specified, 
controlled limits so that the space for individual self cultivation is maximized and the 
practical tension is rendered manageable.  Law, like politics, is a necessity but insufficient 
condition for individuality, providing an opportunity for individuals to develop themselves 
within that secured sphere should they choose to do so.  Again, ultimately, the relationship 
between law and liberty as individuality is not logical and only indirectly causal; it is 
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empirical.  Individuals may choose to use their basic freedom to develop themselves, but 
they may not. 
This chapter will consider three areas.  First, the basic legal-political (constitutional) 
structure of government is taken up.  Second, while the role of contract law will not be 
discussed directly since that is well documented elsewhere and the burden of the argument 
presented here is to make a case for cultural or aesthetic liberty, some application of market 
principles to legal theory will be considered and criticized in light of some of the ideas 
presented earlier about the appropriate conception of the libertarian individual, including 
pure restitution criminal theory, and law and economics.   Third, I take up the law's relation 
to individuality in a regime that values individual self development, but that also requires 
social order and peace.   
The Basic Structure 
 In an effort to try to sort out some implications that derive from the basic political 
theory and to suggest how such a legal theory ought to look, this section will distinguish 
between a number of levels of analysis, starting with 1. The conventional and revised 
relations between politics and law, including the location of the place of legal theory within 
libertarianism.  Then, the analysis will move towards 2. Some basic principles that may be 
drawn from the general concept of libertarianism to try to highlight some of the minimal 
characteristics a libertarian legal theory would need to have, focusing primarily on the 
protection of rights and the rule of law to limit public power.  3. Structurally, what kind of 
institutions would a regime that is committed to individual liberty require?  Here I borrow 
from the existing liberal democratic constitutional order, and note the importance of 
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institutional design for the realization of liberty, especially with respect to the separation of 
powers and federalism to constrain power, and the bill of rights to add further protections for 
individual liberty.  Strains of both federalism and anti-federalism exist within and are 
compatible with libertarianism, depending upon the degree of conservativism or radicalism 
that any given particular regime takes.  4. In relation to the structure of government and 
especially the legal-constitutional order something needs to be said about constitutional 
interpretation.  Evidently, a regime that intends to constrain public power is likely to 
construe the powers of government enumerated in the Constitution narrowly and fairly 
strictly, so it seems that some variety of originalism will be preferred, although there are 
problems with this.  Still, on balance, originalism seems to be the least dangerous doctrine 
available to libertarians.  Together these points will help to continue to sketch out the 
fundamental political-legal structure of the regime upon which the practical achievement of 
individuality rests. 
1.The Conventional View: From Law v. Politics to Politics and Law 
 What are the differences in function and scope between politics and law as they are 
employed now?  What should the differences be between law and politics in a libertarian 
regime?  As we saw in the previous chapter, when libertarians currently discuss "politics" 
they have in mind a subject (rather than a discipline) that deals with power, interests, and 
voting.   From the comparatively lofty perspective of more principled disciplines such as law 
and philosophy, the term "politics" carries with it distinctive empirical and normative 
characteristics.  Indeed, normatively it may even be said to convey certain pejorative 
connotations precisely because it lacks the logic, elegance, and consistency of its rival 
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disciplines.  However, the relationship is certainly not a strictly separate one, although there 
are those who, like Robert Bork and Roger Pilon,191 wish that it were.   
If we begin at the beginning with the Federalists192 and the Constitution, a 
straightforward functional account will tell us that government is structured around a 
separation of powers, with each branch--executive, legislative and judiciary--performing its 
own particular functions.  The supremacy clause in the Constitution (Article VI, section 2) 
states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.  This, together with the doctrine of 
judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison (1803) supports our belief that there is 
indeed something different and separate about the law.  If there were not, we would not need 
a separate judicial branch.  Libertarians typically accept and support this constitutional 
ordering of power, but argue that so far as is practically possible we should return to a 
government that is strictly limited in scope and powers to a government of limited, 
enumerated powers: if the power for one of the branches of government does not exist in the 
Constitution, then government may not act and individuals are at liberty to do as they wish. 
As compared with the pervasive notion that politics is driven by competition and 
strategy about "who gets what, when, and how," libertarians, and indeed, most constitutional 
                                                 
     191 See The Tempting of America. The Political Seduction of the Law.  (Bork is often cited by 
libertarians for just this reason.)  Also, Roger Pilon "Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On 
Recovering Our Founding Principles," in Market Liberalism ed. Crane and Boaz, (Washington, DC: Cato 
Institute, 1993), 21-52.  Pilon prefers to distinguish between "principles" and "policy" (since he is a natural 
rights theorist whose legal theory derives from claims about our nature.  See below.) 




                                                
theorists reserve to law a more noble understanding.  For law embodies "first principles" and 
"higher law,"193 it is "the forum of principle,194" or the embodiment of our aspirations.195  
Instead of dividing us as politics appears to do, law brings us together as a people.  It 
captures our sense of identity (who we are) and our aspirations (who we would like to be) in 
our written constitution and the practices employed by our public institutions, particularly 
the Supreme Court.  Even if we have slipped a little, and our legal practices are converging 
with our political practices, the idea that law is "special" and distinct from politics is 
embedded in American political culture.  As political jurisprude, Martin Shapiro explains: 
We do not know why Americans still identify the Court with the law of the 
Constitution rather than with simple policy making.  We suspect, however, 
that part of the reason is that the Supreme Court is called a court, its members 
called justices, and its law making continues to be dressed in the language of 
discovering, not making, the meaning of the Constitution. 
 
When all is said and done, the Supreme Court's power stems not only from its 
service to particular constituencies or its collaboration with other segments of 
government but also from the fact that its pronouncements are perceived as 
"the law" in a nation that believes in obeying the law--and not only "the law," 
but "the constitutional law" in a nation that believes that the Constitution is a 
higher and better law.196
 
Such an understanding is shared by libertarians.  Indeed, since they have a tendency 
 
 
     193 Pilon, 21. 
     194 Ronald Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle," 56 New York University Law Review May-June 
1981, 469-518.  
     195 Sotirios Barber, On What the Constitution Means (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1984). 
     196 Martin Shapiro, "The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger," in The New American Political 
System, Ed. Anthony King (Washington, DC: AEI, 1978) at 195.  Of course, Shapiro does not subscribe to this 
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to dismiss politics as being irretrievably corrupt and interest driven, the appeal to law--
especially the Constitution--is especially marked in contemporary libertarian theory.  Indeed, 
at times this verges on what Judith Sklar calls "legalism: . . .the ethical attitude that holds 
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties 
and rights determined by rules. . .The habits of mind appropriate, within narrow limits, to the 
procedures of law courts in the most stable legal systems have been expanded to provide 
legal theory and ideology with an entire system of thought and values.  This procedure has 
served its own ends very well: it aims at preserving law from irrelevant considerations, but it 
has ended by fencing legal thinking off from all contact with the rest of historical thought 
and experience."197    
And yet, what I would like to suggest, and have been hinting at in chapter 3, is that 
the gap between politics and law is, or should not be, quite as stark as it is sometimes 
presented if libertarians are to move from a critique of the existing system to the 
establishment of a libertarian regime.  Perhaps a more profitable way to think about the 
relationship between law and politics is to re-conceive "politics" in a legal manner.  On this 
view what is needed is not a separation of law and politics, but rather a kind of political 
emulation of law, where law is considered to be "argumentative" as Dworkin puts it--in the 
philosophical rather than the conventional sense.  Law requires us to seek out reasoned 
 
particular interpretation himself. 
     197 Legalism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 1, 3. 
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arguments and to make public justifications for our conclusions,198 and we should employ 
these methods in politics as well as law.  This would not entail advancing as far as 
republicans such as Sunstein199 and Sandel,200 who call for a deliberative politics--a more 
consensual, clear thinking forum in which citizens (in the strong or "higher" sense) learn 
how to think  as citizens about the public interest first, and their private concerns second.  
Nonetheless, it is true that for a libertarian regime to work citizens would need to consider 
the basic requirements that are needed to establish and maintain that (libertarian) way of life. 
 The kind of acquisitive behavior associated with the "politics" that I mentioned above 
would, so far as possible, be reserved for the economic sphere.  Law would be the means by 
which the vision that is hammered out in a political arena is actively established and secured 
through the constitutional structure, especially the courts, together with a commitment to the 
supporting culture of liberty (the mentalities, dispositions, norms, and mores) that is shared 
by individuals who would choose to live in a libertarian society.    
2.Libertarianism and Law 
As we saw in the previous chapter, at bottom, libertarianism is a political theory that 
defines a relationship between the individual and the state, and to some degree, between 
different citizens who are governed by that state.  As a strictly political theory (as opposed to 
                                                 
     198 See also Stephen Macedo Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
     199 "The Enduring Legacy of Republicanism," in A New Constitutionalism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1993). 
     200 See, Democracy’s Discontent (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard 1997.) 
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a kind of regime theory, or theory of the good society), it has nothing to say about morality 
or the good life.201  Rather, it establishes a framework within which the individual is as free 
as he may be, consistent with the freedom of others, to pursue the life he wishes to pursue.  
Thus, conventionally understood libertarianism is not primarily a legal theory, (much less a 
cultural or aesthetic theory or way of life).  However, the legal theory derives from the 
political theory.  Indeed, it is instrumental in securing the liberty of the individual in so far as 
it provides the basic practical framework protecting the individual from encroachments from 
others, including and especially the state.  If we move from the narrow focus of political 
theory to a more abstract and general perspective of regime theory we can see how law and 
politics relate to each other.  Fundamentally, law has a role in securing the life, liberty and 
property of the individual.  In philosophical parlance, within libertarianism legal theory does 
the work of political theory.  As such, in a theory that advances beyond mere critique, it 
turns out that there may be a lot more to libertarian legal theory than we typically recognize. 
  
3. Basic Principles for the Content of a Libertarian Legal Theory 
    To make a legal theory distinctively libertarian it must secure the liberty of the 
                                                 
     201 "Libertarianism is not at base a metaphysical theory about the primacy of the individual over 
the abstract, much less an absurd theory about ‘abstract individuals.’  Nor is it the anomic rejection of traditions, 
as Kirk and some other conservatives have charged.  Rather, it is a political theory that emerged in response to 
the growth of unlimited state power.   Libertarianism draws its strength from a powerful fusion of a normative 
theory about the moral and political sources and limits of obligations and a positive theory explaining the 
sources of that order: each person has the right to be free, and free persons can produce order spontaneously, 
without a commanding power over them."  Tom G. Palmer, "Myths of Individualism" Cato Policy Report 
(September/October 1996), 7. 
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individual and the rights that help to protect it.  All libertarian legal theories will include 
something like a theory of public law that seeks to limit government power (or, more 
generally, the central institutional framework that secures peace).  In addition, however, 
theories that go beyond a critique of the existing order and the minimal state will set out a 
theory that describes how law may be used to facilitate and realize liberty through a system 
of private law, such as contract law involving the free exchange of goods and services--
which in some theories extends to the private provision of policing through protective 
agencies.202  (Just how far it is reasonable and desirable to extend the principles of consent, 
contract, and exchange to parts of life normally governed by other principles (such as equity, 
justice, respect for the human being as more than a collection of roughly equal preferences) 
is an important consideration, and the answer to which will help to circumscribe the limits of 
libertarianism conceived as market liberalism.  For now I mention contract law to give some 
sense of the scope of law, and the varieties of law that are important to libertarianism--
especially regime-style libertarianism.  This will be taken up later in the discussion of Randy 
Barnett's pure restitution theory.  Since this is a project in political theory broadly 
understood, and not contract law I shall devote attention to the arrangements of the 
governing order, and discuss contract law incidentally, to point to the principles that should 
be employed to guide this.  
 The rule of law is a concept that is frequently placed at the center of libertarian legal 
 
     202 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), chapter 4. 
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theory since it serves to define and confine the reach of public power.  In his chapter "Law & 
the Constitution," David Boaz's discussion of law rests on this idea, and borrows from 
Hayek's discussion of "general and abstract principles" to guide and limit power and to 
prevent its abuse.203 At a minimum this refers to a system that excludes the arbitrary exercise 
of power creating the celebrated "government of laws not of men."  More broadly, it denotes 
a number of propositions about the character and form of law--a kind of “meta” law or law 
about law-- that must pertain if the law is to work, and to work consistent with the protection 
of the liberty of the individual.  Here we might look to Lon Fuller's eight rules defining the 
"inner morality of law" as a guideline outlining some general characteristics for any legal 
theory without specifying the precise content of those laws.  As Fuller defines them, there 
are eight rules to failure: 
The first, and most obviously, lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every 
issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis.  The other routes are: (2) a failure to publicize, or 
at least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the 
abuse of retroactive legislation, which cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity 
of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) 
a failure to make rules understandable; the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that 
 
     203 See Libertarianism: A Primer, (New York: Free Press, 1987), chapter 6.  Boaz also mentioned 
the preference for common law over administrative regulation since common law involves particular real 
disputes.  Without a dispute, under common law, judges could not rule and make a new law.  Other complaints 
are made against special interest law.  Boaz's constructive suggestions include giving the constitution real teeth 
to limit power (enforcing the Bill of Rights), a balanced budget, forbidding congressional delegation of powers 
to administrative agencies, term limits and the line item veto. 
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require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) introducing such frequent 
changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them; and finally, (8) a 
failure to achieve congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration.204
 Fuller says "A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result 
in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system of 
law at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can still be said 
to be one kind of contract."  Of course Fuller’s rules apply to all systems of law--they are 
generic rules.  Something more still needs to be said about libertarian laws. 
Hayek and the Common Law: Protecting Liberties 
Hayek is usually considered to be a classical liberal rather than a libertarian.205  The 
vital distinction rests on the absence of rights in his theory.  This is important since rights 
claims are used by libertarians to signify the importance and even inviolability of the 
individual.206  However, Hayek is frequently cited as an authority in discussions of 
                                                 
     204 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), Chapter 2, 
especially 39.  See also Geoffrey Marshall's discussion of Dicey "Rule of Law," in The Blackwell Encyclopedia 
of Political Thought ed. David Miller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 458-459.  Also, F.A. Hayek, Chap 11, 
"The Origins of the Rule of Law," in The Constitution of Liberty.  
     205 As Jeremy Shearmur has pointed out, "his liberalism is founded, ultimately, on his belief that a 
social order of a classical liberal character best enables the individual citizen to satisfy his preferences and to 
avoid coercion by others.  His argument is consequentialist, and broadly utilitarian in character.  But all this is 
qualified by the almost Kantian requirement that laws should treat every citizen equally." “Friedrich von  
Hayek, “in Miller, Ed., ibid, 195. 
     206 Recall again Nozick's oft-quoted opening of Anarchy, State, and Utopia "Individuals have 
rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)," ix or the 
frequent appeal to property rights scattered throughout libertarian theories. 
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libertarian legal theory, along with Lon Fuller and Bruno Leoni, who share his evolutionary 
approach.207  This is because much of Hayek's writing is motivated by a critique of socialism 
and various welfarist systems.  As a result, the focus of his theory examines how law has 
been used to reign in government power, the latter being considered a necessary evil in 
ordering liberty.  
At the heart of Hayekian legal theory, then, is a commitment to the preservation of 
the individual's liberties against arbitrary power rather than the protection of a sphere of 
individual rights.  Crucially, there is a presumption that individuals are free, and a burden is 
placed on those who would regulate conduct through law.  (This avoids complicated and 
often unconvincing appeals to natural rights and moral intuitions associated with rights-
based theories that will be discussed below.)  Since individuals are not assumed to be terribly 
rational--or at least they are incapable of meeting the kinds of pure deliberative rational 
autonomy-based models required for individuals by some Kantian theories and/or the social 
blue-print models preferred by the old left--Hayek recommends looking to a spontaneous 
system of social order, including legal order based upon norms and conventions, that has 
evolved over time.  On this view law is a product of experience (tradition) not reason, and so 
much of Hayek's legal theory derives from anthropological studies relating to norms, 
customs, and the like.  This approach has been adopted by Richard Epstein who favors 
 
     207 The Morality of Law.  See also Barry Macleod-Cullinane, "Lon Fuller and the Enterprise of 
Law, Legal Notes 22, (London: Libertarian Alliance, 1995).  Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law, (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1991).  Hayek is cited favorably throughout David Boaz's chapter "Law and the Constitution," 
Chap. 6, in Libertarianism: A Primer. 
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regulation of behavior via local norms over centralized legal power.208  Up to a point relying 
upon the evolution of spontaneous systems of social order may seem preferable if we are 
concerned to limit the growth of government power.  But, as we saw previously in the 
discussions of Mill and Charles Murray's communitarianism, the personal or individual 
(often nonmonetary) costs need to be balanced alongside social order and will depend in part 
upon the options for exit available to the person being punished and the level of cruelty 
inflicted since this harms both the person receiving the punishment and the punisher by 
diminishing their humanity and civility.       
One way that may be helpful in drawing the distinction between liberty and rights is 
to think about the Federalist model of constitutional government that set up a structure of 
checks and balances and separation of powers, together with an enumeration of powers.  
(Meaning that if the power is absent from the constitution, the government may not act, 
leaving a sphere of individual freedom to act wide open.)  Like the market system that it 
supports, law is spontaneous, dispersed, and competitive.209  This is important for Hayek, 
 
     208 See "Enforcing Norms: When Law Gets in the Way" The Responsive Community, with a 
comment, "Social Mores Are Not Enough," by William Galston.  Also Epstein's The Principles of a Free 
Society (New York: Perseus, 2002). Galston criticizes Epstein for his utilitarianism (social norms are favored by 
Epstein because they are more cost-effective than expensive legal institutions) since this fails to protect the 
individual liberty he claims to be advancing adequately.  As we saw earlier in the discussion of Mill's On 
Liberty, social norms may be (unfairly) oppressive to individuals, they may provide the "right" outcome by 
punishing offenders, but they may not.  As Galston points out ". . .Epstein is silent about the non-monetary costs 
of social enforcement, which are very real and may loom large enough to induce us to turn to the law," 17. Such 
costs include the unpleasantness of face-to-face confrontations and ostracism.   




                                                
who is particularly well known for his distinction between law (common law), and 
legislation (statutory law).  He describes the problems facing society: 
. . .the loss of the belief in a justice independent of personal interest; a 
consequent use of legislation to authorize coercion, not merely to prevent 
unjust action but to achieve particular results for specific persons or groups; 
and the fusion in the same representative assemblies of the task of 
articulating the rules of just conduct with that of directing government.210
 
To the extent that Hayekian legal theory fails to create guarantees for the protection 
of individuals (i.e. rights) it may be considered inadequate as a libertarian legal theory.  
Instead we need to turn to other more radical conceptions.  But, it should also be said that 
one of the virtues of the Hayekian approach is that it is empirically grounded and regime 
oriented, (The Constitution of Liberty) connecting law to other institutions in society.  If 
libertarianism wishes to advance beyond a critique of the existing order to a general and 
viable theory about society, then we will need to know how such a legal theory will relate to 
the other parts. e.g. we will need to know how people learn to obey the rule of law (this, in 
fact, is notably absent from Hayek,211) which will probably include some discussion of 
education, and socialization. This is not typically part of a libertarian legal theory, but it is 
vital because such norms and habits of character or personality are necessary for it to work.  
Some of this will be taken up in he next chapter on civil society.  Charles Murray's work on 
 
 
     210 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 1, Rules and Order, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1973), 2. 
     211 That is, except in a very vague and general sense.  Hayek discusses his theory of knowledge 
that is based upon cultural evolution at the end of Law, legislation and Liberty Volume 3, The Political Order of 
a  Free People, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).  See the "Epilogue: The Three Sources of Human 
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the welfare state suggests that if public institutions are removed, the culture of dependency 
that they promote will, to some large degree, be replaced by greater personal and communal 
responsibility and forms of self-help.  This may go some way to clearing up this problem, but 
I am not convinced that it would be wholly adequate.  This is clearly an area that requires 
more work if libertarianism is to be viable for a society of diverse individuals, rather than a 
select group of strong, healthy, independent, anarchists. 
Pilon and Barnett Protecting (Natural) Rights  
As described above, Hayekian legal theory is said to be the product of generations of 
experience.  It is careful to avoid any appeal to any single kind of moral theory to ground 
itself (this might include a kind of Kantian deontology or Aristotelian teleology--both types 
of value theories have been used by libertarian philosophers,) although there is no doubt that 
Hayek recognizes that fundamentally the framework that governs our lives rests on a type of 
moral intuitionism combined with an accretion of knowledge based upon experience.212  By 
contrast, pure libertarian legal theories look to natural rights, or at least some kind of rights--
                                                                                                                                                             
Values," 153-176.   
     212 For instance, "From this it follows that no person or body of persons has complete freedom to 
impose upon the rest whatever law it likes.  The contrary view that underlies the Hobbesian conception of 
sovereignty (and the legal positivism deriving from it) springs from a false rationalism that conceives of an 
autonomous and self-determining reason and overlooks the fact that all rational thought moves within a non-
rational framework of beliefs and institutions.  Constitutionalism means that all power rests on the 
understanding that it will be exercised according to commonly accepted principles, that the persons on whom 
power is conferred are selected because it is thought that they are most likely to do what is right, not in order 
that whatever they do should be right.  It rests, in the last resort, on the understanding that power is ultimately 




                                                
natural or otherwise--to ground legal theory.  One version of this view is espoused by Roger 
Pilon of the Cato Institute.  He combines Hayekian legal theory (enumeration of powers) 
with a vigorous defense of the Bill of Rights.213  Randy Barnett's work on the Ninth 
Amendment ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people,") and his book The Structure of Liberty 
takes a similar approach.214  
There are theoretical, practical, and even historical problems with the natural rights 
view.  First, it is notoriously difficult to convince anyone who does not already subscribe to a 
natural rights theory to follow the reasoning of a natural rights argument since, at bottom, it 
has to be taken on faith.  We cannot prove that individuals have rights; rather we make an 
intuitive moral claim that is groundless if it is not shared by others with similar intuitions.  
For a variety of reasons this has become harder and harder to do, and it is difficult to 
convince critics that claims to naturals rights are not merely ideological constructs that are 
designed to defend narrow class, gender or other ideological interests.  Part of the appeal to 
libertarians who make appeals to natural rights in their arguments seems to be that the 
argument takes on a kind of absolutism accompanied by a set of guarantees--there is a 
 
     213 See, for instance, "Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recovering Our 
Founding Principles," 68 Notre Dame Law Review 3, (1993), 507-547, including numerous appeals to natural 
rights, natural law, the higher law tradition. 
     214 See "Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication," 12 
Constitutional Commentary (1995), 93-122, and The Rights Retained by the People (Fairfax, VA: George 
Mason University Press, 1989), as well as The Structure of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998). 
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Dworkian "rights as trumps" quality to these arguments.215  But real life is rarely so cut and 
dried.  Moreover, life in a liberal polity should not be.  For as Judith Shklar has shown, the 
problem with appeals to natural law theories is precisely the fact that such theories "set a 
premium on moral agreement and social cohesion and that these ends are not compatible 
with freedom in a diversified society."216 Indeed, such extreme claims run the risk of 
imposing perverse consequences, inhibiting life rather than simply liberating it from 
"artificial" constraints in practice.217
Furthermore, as Walter Lippmann has argued, the regime of private property that is 
said to flow naturally out of the recognition of natural rights and the laissez faire 
arrangements of the eighteenth century is a fallacy.  Rights to property are legal constructs 
that may be made and unmade as the people wish.   
The whole regime of private property and contract, the whole system of 
enterprise by individuals, partners, and corporations, exists in a legal context, 
and is inconceivable apart from that context. 
 
Just how the latter-day liberals came to overlook something so obvious as 
that is rather obscure.  But apparently they had some sort of notion that 
because the existing law of property and contracts had not been formally 
 
     215 And it is noteworthy that Dworkin’s political inclinations are a long way from libertarianism, 
supporting instead a much more egalitarian vision.  This should give us further pause when considering the 
natural rights strategy as a worthy, or at least unproblematic, support for libertarianism and libertarian legal 
theory and practice.  
     216 Shklar, ibid, "Natural Law and Ideology," 64-88. 
     217 See, for instance, Mark Sagoff's discussion of free market and libertarian environmentalism.  
Although generally more sympathetic to a rights-based rather than a free-market style environmentalism, Sagoff 
says when applying it through the common law remedy of nuisance "the problem with allowing routine 
injunctive relief in nuisance cases . . . is that individuals who refuse to be bought off could close the economy 
down."  "Free Market versus Libertarian Environmentalism,, Critical Review 6:2-3, (1993), 227. 
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enacted by the legislature, but had evolved by usage and judicial decision 
under the common law, it was somehow a natural law originating in the 
nature of things and valid in a superhuman sense.  They came to think of 
these traditional laws of property and contract as prevailing in a realm of 
freedom, and when statutes they did not like were enacted to amend the 
traditional law, they thought of them as interferences by the state.218
 
Lippmann continues, "Contracts are legal instruments. Corporations are legal 
creatures.  It is, therefore, misleading to think of them as existing somehow outside the law 
and then to ask whether it is permissible to interfere with them."219  For Lippmann the source 
of legitimacy for law and the state comes from the people, but it is also the product of moral 
experiences and reflects changes in human relations.  This seems right.  A practical legal 
theory would rest upon a set of principles that emerge out of a kind of human moral tradition 
that is shaped and modified over time by reason and circumstances.  Thus, although natural 
rights theory is appealing to a libertarian in principle, it seems that a Humean/Hayekian 
approach that combines principle and experience would be more useful to a view that intends 
to be viable--especially in a world of pluralism and diversity.  Still, there is the sticky 
question of the place of fundamental individual rights, and this is why a Bill of Rights is so 
important. 
4. Institutional Structure: The Separation of Powers, Federalism, and the Bill of 
Rights. 
This is a vast and complex area and I cannot hope to do justice here.  However, it is 
                                                 
     218 Walter Lippmann, The Good Society, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1943), 189. 
     219 Ibid, 269. 
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worth pointing out that institutional structure is vitally important to libertarian legal theory, 
and indeed, the broader regime, as I have already mentioned.  All libertarian legal theories 
are likely to support the institutional separation of powers since as one theorist puts it,”the 
overwhelmingly distinctive feature of checks and balances is that almost all of them operate 
negatively.  Each branch is given the power to negative--to veto--actions of the other 
branches.”220  Evidently any political theory that hopes to minimize political power will 
applaud such an inherently conservative institutional mechanism.  However, the matter of 
federalism (or anti-federalism) is not so straight forward.   
The libertarian movement is made up a coalition of individuals who share an 
antipathy toward government, especially large, centralized government.  However, as I noted 
in the second chapter there are disagreements as to the nature and type of individuals 
libertarians believe exist (or, in their more ambitious variants, might exist when called upon 
to govern themselves.)  One strand of thought that we see in Murray and to some degree in 
Hayek is relatively conservative and hierarchical, and therefore favors a federalist approach 
to law.  Another strand is much more democratic, localist, and anti-authoritarian in all 
spheres of life.  The latter will tend to favor anti-federalism, at least in principle.221  Since it 
 
 
     220 Geoffrey P. Miller, “Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory,” Social Philosophy and 
Policy 8:2, (1981), 202.  
     221 See, for instance, Michael Allen, “Anti-federalism and Libertarianism,” Reason Papers 7, 
(Spring 1981), 73-94, especially the discussion of the Anti-federalists’ opposition to a standing army on the 
grounds of a violation of civil liberties at 82.  Allen says that “the Anti-federalists believed the federal 
Constitution to be an outright repudiation of the goals and ideals of the American Revolution,” 84 . The legacy 
of the Revolution was thus anti-authoritarianism--a belief in democratic, local control and a subservient national 
government. Of course, since we are also concerned with practicalities the anti-federalist view is likely to fall 
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is so integral to our constitutional thought and practices any libertarian who wanted to 
abandon the bill of Rights and rely only upon the separation of powers and checks and 
balances of the Federalist model would be hard pressed to make their case.  Furthermore, for 
those more pragmatically minded libertarians, the Bill of Rights is useful means of 
protecting individual liberties from central power.  At least, this is true when they are 
interpreted strictly and narrowly.   
5. Constitutional Interpretation 
The first way to further individual liberty is to limit government.  One way to do this 
is to interpret the powers of government as strictly and narrowly as possible, consistent with 
the enumerated powers of government in the Constitution.  Accordingly, it would seem that 
practically speaking original intent is the most appropriate doctrine of constitutional 
interpretation for libertarianism, and indeed, it is the doctrine most often employed by 
libertarian legal theorists and practitioners.  This approach is not without its problems, 
especially if libertarianism, (as compared with Conservatism) is to live up to its promise of 
providing a genuinely dynamic view of liberty that may be enjoyed in a variety of forms by 
increasing numbers of people in future generations.  Critics of originalism notoriously 
criticize it for its conservative rigidity ("freezing a fixed set of rights into constitutional ice in 
                                                                                                                                                             
out of favor since the kinds of people and the lives that they lived, small yeoman farmers and the like, have 
virtually ceased to exist in today’s modern world of corporate employees.  Even if anti-federalism is an 
appealing intellectual option, it may not be practically viable.  
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accord with a supposed "original meaning" of that provision"222) and yet this is precisely 
what libertarians need from their law if they are to be able to devote most of their time to the 
enjoyment of economic, moral, aesthetic and any other kinds of liberty that are practiced 
beyond the political-legal structure.   
 
     222 The characterization is Laurence Tribe’s, although he claims to share more in common with 
Scalia that Scalia himself recognizes since both appeal to "sets of principles whose understanding may evolve 
over time.,"  See Tribe's comment in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 81.  
By contrast, the more expansive "living constitution" approach is less appealing 
because it allows for greater use of public power in the service of what may or may not be 
(from a libertarian perspective) admirable goals (e.g. civil rights legislation advancing 
negative liberty might be greeted enthusiastically; however affirmative action law certainly 
would not be.)  But the living constitution approach would require greater use of public 
power to force citizens to expand their liberties, which is antithetical to libertarianism.  
Furthermore it is not clear what the source of legitimacy would be for applying such an 
approach.  Pragmatism won't do.  This violates Hayek's general principles of the rule of law. 
 Thus, we are left with originalism.  To the extent that the living constitution approach has 
any appeal for libertarians--especial those focused on social rights such as abortion, or as a 
strategic tool for "getting from here to there"--for moving from liberal democracy to 
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libertarian democracy it may also contain some temptations.  However, to use the "strong 
arm of the state" (in this case, the courts) would be inappropriate to a libertarian philosophy 
and if employed it entail a severe departure from its own self-declared principles.  The 
means could not justify the ends.  Instead a libertarian regime would need to rely upon 
peaceful change through changes in public opinion.  Securing, e.g. a right to abortion would 
either have to be undertaken through the political process and added to the bill of rights as a 
constitutional amendment.  Or, what is more likely in a large, culturally and religiously 
diverse country such as the United States, as a matter of federalism it could be left to the 
states, to be regulated or not on a state by state basis.    
In The Tempting of America, The Political Seduction of the Law, (1990) Robert Bork 
employs a version of originalism to criticize what he regards as the pervasive distortion of 
law by politics, conceived as ideology, particularly left-wing or liberal ideology.  According 
to Bork, policy making, including decisions regarding hard moral questions (e.g. abortion, 
the death penalty) are "questions left for the people and their elected representatives, not for 
courts, to decide."223  Judges are (or should be) bound by the law, which means that they 
have a duty to apply or administer the law enacted by the other branches of government.  
Further, judges do not really interpret, rather they judge using neutral standards.  He says, 
"[W]e administer justice according to law.  Justice in a larger sense, justice according to 
morality, is for Congress and the President to administer, if they see fit, through the creation 
 
     223 Robert Bork, The Tempting of America, (New York: Free Press, 1990), 9. 
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of law."224  By way of clarification he relates the following tale: 
There is a story that two of the greatest figures in our law, Justice Holmes 
and Judge Learned Hand, had lunch together and afterward, as Holmes began 
to drive off in his carriage, Hand, in a sudden onset of enthusiasm, ran after 
him, crying, "Do justice, sir, do justice."  Holmes stopped the carriage and 
reproved Hand: "That is not my job.  It is my job to apply the law.225
 
The problem with Bork's view is that it assumes that the meaning of the Constitution 
is clear and distinct.  It suggests that when judges consult the Constitution during their 
review of cases that come before the Court there is no gap between what the Constitution 
says and what the judge understands it to mean.  Politics--the forum of choice, power, and 
even morality (Bork does not distinguish among these)--is unnecessary because we need 
only consult the Constitution to discover how we should act.  He says that there is no need 
for us to choose our understanding of the Constitution because the Framers already decided 
for us when they constructed the Constitution and its meaning is self evident.  Further, 
looking to the Constitution is not one more value choice, rather it belongs to a separate 
category because it carries with it the support of the people who ratified the document and 
who continue to accept the authority of the Constitution.  If there is a choice to be made in 
some area of law, it should be done in Congress not on the court.   
While there may be something to this--as Bork said in a earlier article226 why bother 
 
     224 Ibid, 6. 
     225 Ibid. 




to have two legislative chambers?--it seems to me that it is too simple.  His separation is 
overdrawn.  First, because it fails to take account of the spirit of the Constitution--that 
includes constitutionalism, which means creating institution that provide both continuity and 
change, so something other than a straightforward reading of the text needs to be employed 
to help us to apply the Constitution to modern cases.  Also, while many parts of the 
Constitution are clear and straightforward (e.g. Art. I "No Person shall be a Representative 
who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five years, and have been seven Years a 
Citizen of the United States. . . "), there are large parts that are not, and which therefore 
require interpretation, not mere application. (e.g. The first amendment regarding free speech-
-what is Speech? What constitutes the "establishment" of religion?  The equal protection 
clause and due process clauses, and so on.)  Bork's view cannot adequately deal with the 
penumbra of the Constitution, (He would not have found a right to privacy as per Griswold, 
for example, which many libertarians strongly support) so we need to look elsewhere--
possibly to politics, possibly somewhere else, to help us to find answers to the hard 
questions. 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Antonin Scalia also employs a variety of 
originalism in his opinions.  He is not quite a strict as Bork, preferring to apply standards of 
reasonableness when necessary.  Still, Scalia is quite clear about the need for discerning the 
precise meaning of the text and the need to apply standards of consistency to law: Besides its 
centrality to the rule of law in general, consistency has a special role to play in judge-made 
law--both judge-pronounced common law and judge-pronounced determinations of the 
application of statutory and constitutional provisions.  Legislatures are subject to democratic 
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checks upon their lawmaking.  Judges less so, and federal judges are the insistence upon 
consistency and the application of the teachings of the mother of consistency, logic. . . courts 
apply to each case a system of abstract and entirely fictional categories developed in earlier 
cases, which are designed, if logically applied, to produce “fair” or textually faithful 
results.227  
Both Bork’s and Scalia’s approaches are firmly grounded in both a conservative 
(small “c”) and Conservative (large “c”) philosophy.  Consequently, someone who is more 
attracted to libertarianism might find it unsatisfactory.  However, taking a conservative 
approach seems appropriate for law in a libertarian regime.  The real work of self-creation, 
development, and even liberation does not require and is not intended to receive direct 
constitutional sanction through the courts.  All that is necessary is that individuals have the 
freedom guaranteed by law to pursue their goals.     
The Use and Abuse of Market Principles as Applied to Law 
                                                 
     227 Antonin Scalia, “Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis,” Case Western Reserve 
Law Review 40:581, (1989-90), 588-589.  See also A Matter of Interpretation, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997). 
Barnett's theory of restitution is distinctive because it goes beyond the usual 
arrangement of political power and attempts to treat the individual seriously by examining 
criminal behavior as crimes against the person rather than the state.  On this view, private 
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law is considered superior to public law for both moral and economic reasons.  [It treats the 
individual seriously, and it is argued that a system of competing policing agencies would 
have a stronger incentive to work (via the market mechanism--if you don't protect me I can 
take my services elsewhere--so it is more efficient.] 
Thus, crime should be seen as an offense by one individual against the rights of 
another.  The victim has suffered a loss.  Justice consists of the culpable offender making 
good the loss he has caused. . .Where we once saw an offense against society, we now see an 
offense against an individual victim. . . The armed robber did not rob society; he robbed the 
victim.  His debt, therefore, is not to society; it is to the victim."228
On this view individual rights and obligations are the principal focus.  Barnett says 
"Restitution recognizes rights in the victim, and this is a principal source of its strength.  The 
nature and limit of the victim's right to restitution at the same time defines the nature and 
limit of the criminal liability.  In this way, the aggressive action of the criminal creates a debt 
to the victim."229  "No longer would the criminal deliberately be made to suffer for his 
mistake.  Making good that mistake is all that would be required."230
With the substitution of criminal law by a pure theory of restitution, crime becomes a 
crime against the person not the state. This, presumably, is why Barnett refers to the wrong  
 
228 Randy Barnett, "Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice." Ethics, 87:4 (July 1977), 287-
88, cited in Roger Pilon, "Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Punishment, or Both?" Ethics, 88: 4 (July 1978), 
349. 
229 Barnett, ibid, 291. 
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as a “mistake” rather than a “crime.”  Insofar as Barnett's theory engages a principle that 
treats seriously the harm done to the individual libertarians would surely wish to embrace 
him.  However, a second glance at the theory suggests that the implications of restitution 
theory do not in fact do that, if we are concerned about an individual as a human being, 
rather than an object that has suffered some diminution of value.  In fact, as it turns out, this 
theory misses the point in a fundamental way.  For as Roger Pilon explains, the element 
missing from tort law that is captured by criminal law is not just a harm, but an affront to 
one's dignity or integrity.  "There is simply no amount of money that will rectify certain 
kinds of wrongs.”231 The criminal act and the mere tort are altogether different magnitudes; 
they are different categories of action, calling for different remedies.  Indeed, the criminal act 
calls not only for compensation but for punishment as well."  Moreover, it follows that this 
policy could create perverse incentives for the wealthy criminal (murder or rape might be 
committed with impunity by Bill Gates,) while also failing to substantially compensate the 
wealthy victims (in relative terms).  The point is that there is no amount of money that can 
rectify rape or murder.  They are non-negotiable acts, which goes back to my earlier 
comments about individuality and the law. Having said that much, and in spite of these 
problems there is no doubt that some sort of rights-based legal theory would be preferred by 
libertarians over a theory that fails to include rights because of the guarantees they accord 
 
230 Ibid, 289. 
231 Pilon, ibid, 352. 
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the individual.   
Law and Economics 
To the extent that libertarians are interested in helping and promoting the values and 
interests of the individual, it surely matters what our conception of the individual is.  
Commonly, as was noted previously, libertarianism is associated with the model of economic 
man--a rational chooser who bargains with others to maximize his freedom, and this has 
been extended to legal theory through law and economics. Many of the criticisms that may 
be made here have already been outlined in the chapters above, so it is not necessary to dwell 
on them at length.  Suffice to say that when acting in the legal domain libertarian individuals 
and judges should not only consider personal preferences and the costs and benefits of the 
social policy or law with which they are concerned.  Indeed, since law is the means through 
which politics (conceived in the constitutional or regime sense) is practically enacted 
practically and functionally, we should expect individuals acting as citizens to be concerned 
with something rather different from individual preferences.  Instead, it is likely that we shall 
want to consider values, beliefs and opinions about how we ought to live--our aspirations as 
a libertarian regime, and other expressive, moral, or aesthetic judgments about our lives that 
are not captured in an economic calculus.  Thus, as Jane B. Baron and Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
explain in their critique of economic based legal theory, to apply economics in this way is to 
make a category mistake.  It is also to disregard the deeper question about whether certain 
aspects of life ought to be judged in relation to economic calculation.  Of course, a balanced 
and reasonable view of social policy will not therefore abandon economic considerations 
altogether.  Rather, it will require a balancing of different kinds of values (e.g. economic, 
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moral, aesethetic) to capture what is at stake for human beings.232  
Law and Individuality 
In his chapter on the rule of law in Reflections of a Would-Be Anarchist, Richard 
Flathman discusses the fundamental tension between law and other forms of rule-following 
and individuality.  The problem is that 
As with "institutionalizing" a person, to institute an organization, arrangement, or 
procedure is to attempt to fix and to settle, to structure and to secure, to order and to 
control, larger or smaller aspects of the thinking and acting of some number of 
human beings.  It is an attempt to render uniform, constant, and predictable that 
which would otherwise be diverse, fluctuating, and uncertain.  By adopting and 
enforcing the norms and rules, offices and procedures of which institutions primarily 
consist, successful processes of institutionalization confine and direct the conduct of 
those who are subject to the arrangements that those processes establish.233  
 
By contrast, Flathman notes that freedom, individuality, and plurality call forth that 
which is unique, particular, spontaneous and unpredictable.  Nancy Rosenblum echoes this 
assessment when she considers the relationship between the "law of the heart" that governs 
romantic anarchists and liberal legalism in Another Liberalism ". . . romantic anarchy has 
nothing to do with social order and control.  It is concerned with individuality and self 
                                                 
     232 See Jane B. Baron and Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of 
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory," 17 Cardozo Law Review 1996, 431-496 comparing environmental ethics, 
civic republicanism and commodification theory to law and economics; Also Robin Paul Malloy, “Is Law and 
Economics Moral?--Humanistic Economics and a Classical Liberal Critique of Posner's Economic Analysis,"  
Valparaiso University Law Review 24: 2 (Winter 1990), 147-161, arguing for a theory of value that extends 
beyond efficiency, wealth creation and cost-benefit analysis; also see Martha C. Nussbaum, "Flawed 
Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics," 64 University of Chicago Law  
Review,  (Fall 1997), 1197-1214. 
     233 Flathman, ibid, chapter 5, "Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political 
Institutionalization: The case of the Rule of Law" citing MacIver at 79.  
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expression, with perfect freedom."234  Accordingly, at the very heart of individuality is a 
tremendous antipathy toward law and all forms of institutionalization that will need to be 
accommodated in a practical political theory.  Any individual who values individuality will 
maintain a distinctly skeptical attitude with respect to law and following the rule of law and 
it entails that law must be confined not only to generality and regularity, but also in its very 
scope.  This is where Hayekian classical liberalism is transformed into libertarianism, for, as 
Flathman points out, neither Fuller nor Hayek are especially concerned with the application 
of law once it is confined by regularity.235 Rule-following is insufficient.  The rules 
themselves must be given some content so that the scope of political authority is limited.       
Conclusion 
                                                 
     234 Rosenblum, ibid, 41.  Also, "individualism always draws attention to the common and invariant 
characteristics of persons . . . there is no trace of the affective or original, the imaginative or unexpected", 55. 
     235 "The dominant concern of these thinkers, accordingly, has not been whether or how much 
governance there should be, but rather how to prevent arbitrariness and other misuses of political authority and 
power," 84. 
Libertarians need to recognize that law is not a panacea that cures all ills, or even 
completes all (voluntary, consensual and freely chosen) visions.  Law would not ultimately 
be the key to the realization of all aspects of individuality, and to suggest that it does would 
be to miss the point.  Rather, law would have a clearly delimited place within a broader 
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theory that secured  and that enhanced certain aspects of individual life, while staying out of 
other areas (e.g. cultural sphere) altogether.  Thus, a libertarian legal theory is vitally 
important for securing basic conditions (public law) and furthering some forms of liberty 
(private law), but it must be clearly delimited so that it does not interfere with other areas (no 
law, or at least only moral and conventional law such as norms).  In practice, particular 
policies may generate tensions between the different spheres, in which case some hard 
choices will need to be made.  For now it is important to recognize that as a general principle 
the bounds of law are at least as important as its formal structure and content.   
It is vitally important to include within libertarianism a general attitude that is self-
consciously critical and continually evaluating its own aim and methods.  Such an attitude is 
vital for the realm of law because the consequences of legal sanctions are potentially great 
both positively (securing markets to make money) and negatively (denying life, liberty or 
property in the case of crimes).   
In relation to the economic analysis of the law and natural law theories I have tried to 
suggest that they are both relevant and likely to play significant roles in a libertarian theory, 
but they both suffer from a kind of reductionism.  Economics stresses freedom of exchange 
and choice, but reduces the individual to a rational maximizer, a consumer.  This takes 
account of only one aspect of individuals. Similarly Judith Shklar has complained about 
natural law's stress on moral agreement at the expense of diversity and tolerance.  The 
question, then, would appear to be to what extent to which we want to legislate diversity, 
tolerance and individuality through law.  But this is the wrong question.  Instead, we should 
try to minimize the extent to which law threatens individuality.  This can only be done if we 
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maintain a critical stance and focus on the individual and his place within the larger 
constitutional structure and look at law in relation to the other spheres of life.  
 
 167
                                                
CHAPTER 5: LIBERTARIAN COMMUNITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
In the West . . . we have lived in civil society for many years without 
knowing it.  Or, better, since the Scottish Enlightenment, or since Hegel, the 
words have been known to the knowers of such things but they have rarely 
served to focus anyone's attention.236
 
In spite of a rich historical tradition including the theories of Smith, Hume, and other 
members of the Scottish Enlightenment within classical liberalism, libertarians have been 
largely absent from the contemporary debate regarding community and civil society beyond 
the market.  When they have participated, they have been on the defensive, fending off 
criticisms against individualism (atomism), abstraction, and neutrality with respect to the 
good.  This chapter will argue that in fact, intelligent and thoughtful classical liberals have 
and indeed need to have, a vibrant and dynamic theory of community if a society secured by 
a limited government is to present a viable but also attractive alternative to more statist 
political theories.  This is especially true if it is to promote and encourage the cultivation of 
individuality. 
Unfortunately, it must be admitted that currently, to the extent that community is 
considered at all within libertarianism, it usually appears in its barest form in the guise of the 
free market.  However, I shall argue that such an approach--the advancing of individual 
interests collectively--fails to capture some of the distinctive aspects of community--namely, 
its sense of connectedness and solidarity.  Instead, what is needed is a theory of community 
 
     236 Michael Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society," Dissent, (Winter 1991), 293. 
 
 168
                                                
that fosters affective ties at the non-state, non-market (i.e. what has come to be called "civil 
society"237) level through a complex plural system of voluntary associations.  Such 
organizations, I will argue, complement rather than contradict the state and market.  This is 
because they are necessary to support a political theory that lays out the relationship between 
the individual and the state, while also taking seriously what one does with that freedom 
once it is secured.  Strictly speaking, a liberal theory of community is not therefore a 
political theory.  Rather, it is a social theory, but one that closely relates to the overarching 
political theory that outlines and defends liberties and rights.238  Moreover, it is a vital 
element of the larger political theory or regime theory.  For civil society helps to protect and 
realize the freedom of an individual, where an individual is considered to be something more 
than a consumer, a property owner, or a rights holder.  Instead, on this view the individual is 
conceived as a human being, and his capacities and individuality are developed as he freely 
engages with others in civil society.  This will be followed by a discussion of the application 
of the ideas grounded within such communities--voluntarism and reciprocal altruism--in the 
institutional practices of a libertarian organization.  
 
 
237 "The words "civil society" name the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of 
relational networks--formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology--that fill this space." ibid. 
238 Compare this, for instance, with more explicit political theories of community such as nationalist 
theories in which we look to the state for our source of identity.  See, "Conventions and Conversions, or, Why 
Is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?" by Robert Goodin in The Morality of Nationalism Ed. Robert McKim 
and Jeff McMahan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 88-104.  Or, communitarian theories that argue 
for community because of the kinds of characters it fosters, disposing its citizens towards a more deliberative 
and participatory (civic republican) polity.  See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).  
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In 1991, as libertarianism appeared to be gaining increasing influence after the fall of 
communism, Richard Cornuelle published a short essay titled “the Power and Poverty of 
Libertarian Thought.”239 Cornuelle argued that at the time libertarians were unprepared to 
seize the opportunity that the collapse of communism provided since they were wedded to 
their critique of socialism and lacked a coherent positive vision.  In particular, he identified 
two problems: 1. the lack of a distinct libertarian vision of community and 2. a myopia in 
relation to disparities in freedom between employers and employees.  The second was 
mentioned in an earlier chapter.  Here I take up the first omission.  
Cornuelle complained and noted a curious irony--the lack of a coherent, 
comprehensive vision of voluntary community has forced libertarians, unnecessarily, I think, 
into an individualist emphasis, a suspicious aversion to any kind of collective activity 
beyond the commercial, in spite of the fact that the libertarian movement is, itself, a 
voluntary collective with a strong sense of solidarity and remarkable power.240 Instead of 
devoting attention to politics and economics, Cornuelle said that it was time for libertarians 
to turn their attention to the social sphere and to consider the voluntary relations between and 
among individuals in the non-profit independent sector (or what has come to be known as 
“civil society).  If libertarians do that, they might begin to have a greater appreciation for the 
 
 
239 Reprinted in The Libertarian Primer, Ed. David Boaz, (New York, Free Press, 1997), 363-371. 
240 Ibid, 370. 
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complexity of their project—the achievement of freedom, and indeed the sophistication of 
the individual whose freedom they are supposed to be championing.  Cornuelle pointed out 
that one of the principal authorities often cited by libertarians, the economist Ludwig von 
Mises, recognized that within the vast spectrum of human activities “economics treated only 
a slice.”  Other areas of free lives needed to be studied so that theorists and policy makers 
could begin to appreciate the tremendous benefits of civil society in helping to support and 
promote free lives within a society, not simply an economy. 
Writing in Reason Magazine, a libertarian publication, two years later Paul Weaver 
echoed Cornuelle’s sentiments and called for a “do-good libertarianism.”241  Specifically, 
Weaver said that what libertarians needed was to transform libertarianism from a negative 
critique of state power and regulation of the market and adopt a more positive programmatic 
approach to convince the public that libertarianism could provide a genuine viable 
alternative to the command and control politics of the preceding period.  Weaver exhorted 
“The time has come to wage a war for hearts as well as minds, and to recover or re-create a 
classical liberal culture.”  To some degree theorists like Boaz and Murray have begun to 
move in this direction, but there is still much to be done. Not only in developing a 
psychology associated with libertarian civil society, but also its relation (tension or 
“contradiction”) with other psychologies associated with other domains of society.  To talk 
blithely about relations of consent and voluntarism is inadequate for any serious 
 
241 Paul H. Weaver, “Do-Good Libertarianism,” Reason Magazine, May 1993, 61-63. 
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understanding of what constitutes a free life, as I shall note later in this chapter.  The point I 
wish to make here is that libertarian individuals must be concerned with the cultural aspects 
of the self, not just the political or economic aspects. 
Community: Some Conceptual Models 
In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought Raymond Plant lays out three 
models of community that are useful for this discussion.242 These are:    
1. The Organic Community Model  
                                                 
242 Ed. David Miller, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 88-90.   
2. The Commonality of Interests or The General Will Model and  
3. A Community of Communities Model.   
Starting with the thickest or most robust form of community and moving to the 
thinnest we can see that there is in fact no single theory of community. 
1. The Organic Community (strong community):  
Following Ferdinand Tonnies’ Gemeindschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and 
Association) (1887), on this view the defining characteristic of community is its origin.  A 
true community is based upon blood, kinship, shared habitat and locality, as well as a set of 
common attitudes, experiences, feelings and dispositions.  Community, therefore, is 
something which one is born into and grows within.  As such, an organic community is 
clearly not a social order that is self-consciously built by a group of rational individuals 
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trying to escape from the perils of the state of nature.  Further, it is distinct from a society or 
an association because it is based upon birth, status, habit and disposition rather than interest 
or contract.  Once an individual is a member of such a community he can never leave it.  Or 
rather, he may choose to exit it physically, but he will always remain tied to the community 
because of his kinship ties.   
2. Commonality of Interests or The General Will (association):   
In contrast to the liberal/contractarian model outlined below, on the General Will 
model community is not constituted by the aggregate of individual private interests.  It is 
more than that--indeed it is dependent on the existence of the group for its identity and 
proper functioning.  In contrast to the organic model, a community based upon a 
commonality of interests may be created by will to form an association, but it has to be a 
particular kind of will--one which expresses the common good, or a set of interests which the 
group as such has in common.   
3. The Community of Communities (market):  
The third model describes a series of overlapping, competing and contrasting 
associations, clubs, and groups to which individuals form partial attachments to defend or 
advance a set of private interests collectively.  According to this view, an individual might 
consider himself to be simultaneously a member of the Internet community, a religious 
community, a family, and some type of professional association. 
Primitive societies are an example of the first type of communities, but these ideas 
are also invoked to some degree by nationalists and strong communitarians, especially those 
who share a kind of republican nostalgia.  The second conception is most famously 
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associated with Rousseau's social contract but also, and perhaps more charitably, with 
Tocqueville's "self-interest properly understood."  Here the application of these ideas might 
range from communitarians (including Sandel in his less polemical moments), but also 
Amitai Etzioni and William Galston (who refers to himself as a "worried liberal").  However, 
I shall argue that this approach may be utilized by classical liberals so long as it is done 
within civil society rather than at the level of the state.  The third view is, of course, a 
version of market society, and this is precisely the view that is typically identified with 
libertarians.  However, it seems that this is an inadequate conception of community because 
it does not capture the essential communal feature that is distinctly related to community.  
(The parts never become more than the sum of the parts.)  Furthermore, it tells only half of 
the story of libertarianism.  The view that I want to argue for seems to have elements of the 
second and third conceptions of community since it advances more than shared interests,243 
but it is likely to do this within a community that exists alongside other partial communities 
(or associations).244  But, I shall return to this is a moment.  First, we will consider the 
relationship between community and liberalism at the conceptual (and political) level, before 
moving to a conception of liberal community--libertarian communities. 
Macedo and Liberal Community 
                                                 
 
243 The kinds of ideas supported by the organization that I discuss in the second half of the chapter 
probably contain a mixture of values and interests, where interests are contingently related the individual's 
position in the social structure, while values are relatively autonomous and advanced for their own sake, as 
goods in themselves, rather than instrumental goods (interests.) 
244 Hence my title "libertarian communities" in the plural, that may be compared with the singular 
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In his book Liberal Virtues (1990) Stephen Macedo responds to some of the 
criticisms leveled at liberalism by communitarians, while maintaining true to the basic tenets 
of it, including the principles of consent and voluntarism.245  He states that at bottom the 
crucial distinction between liberals and communitarians is their sense of self, which guides 
the kinds of political institutions that communities and societies construct.  
Communitarianism focuses attention on the characteristics we share as citizens--the "social" 
quality communitarians wants to emphasize--and therefore our sameness and connectedness. 
 By contrast, liberals look to the differences between individuals (as such), and try to 
construct institutions so that individuals may coexist within groups that reflect their 
differences rather than cohere in a self-governing community.246  Thus, for Macedo 
liberalism is a political (rather than a moral or social) creed: 
The liberal project is to find regulative political principles for people who 
disagree.  Disagreement about ends, goals, and the good life is a basic 
precondition of liberalism, generating scarcity among altruists.  Liberal 
justice is best understood . . . as a public morality that all citizens have a duty 
to interpret, criticize, and support in their own conduct and against the 
possible transgressions of public officials.  Liberal politics protects the equal 
right of persons to devise, criticize, revise and pursue a plan of life, and it 
furnishes institutional settings for the activity of public justification.247
 
models of nationalism and communitarianism. 
245 I have chosen Macedo because he is sympathetic to classical liberalism, and therefore quite close 
to a broad libertarianism, although he pitches his argument at the more general conceptual level by talking about 
liberalism per se.  As one conception of libertarianism the theory that I wish to present fits into Macedo's 
framework, but places emphasis on particular aspects of it.  
246 I borrow this distinction from Chandran Kukathas who says "the good society liberal political 
theory describes is not a unified entity," The Liberal Archipelago, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
247 Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 203-4. 
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Notice that Macedo places critical or self conscious rationality at the center of his 
theory--the very element for which Sandel is criticized for neglecting in his account of the 
socially constituted self.248  But in so doing, Sandel would argue that liberals like Macedo 
forgo the possibility of ever experiencing true solidarity in a real community. 
Instead of looking to community as a source of identity through which individuals 
discover who they are, Macedo suggests that liberals ask the question "what kind of life do I 
want to live?"249 and choose to join, or remain within, or exit their various communities 
accordingly. 
Achieving autonomy is not a matter of detaching one's "self" from all one's 
commitments and aspirations and from social understandings and ideals, 
choosing a purely abstract subject constituted only by "reason" or sheer 
arbitrary will.  Situated autonomy involves critical reflection on inherited 
values, personal commitments, and basic goods, not a flight from and 
abandonment of them.  Liberal autonomy engages our understanding and 
responsibility at a deep level by engaging the capacity critically to reflect 
upon morality and personal identity, itself already constituted by projects, 
 
248 See Macedo (1990), Chapter 6 "Freedom, Autonomy and Liberal Community," and Will 
Kymlicka, "Communitarianism and the Self," chapter 4 in Liberalism, Community and Culture Ed. Will 
Kymlicka, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989)  
249 I borrow this distinction from Will Kymlicka (1989). 
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plans, commitments, and strong evaluations.250
 
 
250 Macedo, ibid, 220. 
 
What counts for Macedo is that we criticize and live according to good publicly 
justifiable reasons.  By comparing the rewards and obligations that membership within 
different communities afford us, we can continue to revise and improve our lives as freely 
choosing, but thoughtful individuals who enjoy life in many communities.  What counts for 
communitarians like Sandel is that we belong--we have a sense of identity which is part of a 
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Conceptually, libertarianism is associated with concern for the sanctity of the 
individual, toleration, peace, constitutional government with limited powers, freedom of 
contract, and the free market.  When conceived as a pure political theory, it places emphasis 
on the relationship between the individual and the state.  Therefore, when engaging in 
analytic political theory we may reasonably expect to exclude community from our 
considerations.  However, it seems to me that if we are interested in using our analysis 
profitably, we need to be concerned with the way in which the various parts of a society 
relate to each other in practice.  Indeed, echoing Judith Shklar's comments regarding the 
abstract treatment of liberalism251 one might argue that makes little sense to discuss 
liberalism as a concept.  Rather, we would be better served to conceive of liberalism in terms 
of historical traditions and particular conceptions, and perhaps differing interpretations of 
conceptions within a conception.  That is, we might consider libertarianism as a conception 
of liberalism, and the free market version of libertarianism (market liberalism) as compared 
with a more balanced version including the cultivation of individuality in civil society as 
interpretations of that conception.      
As it turns out, contrary to the communitarians' broad statements about liberalism in 
general, it is not the case that one version of liberalism--classical liberalism--necessarily 
 
251 Judith N. Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Nancy Rosenblum, Liberalism and the Moral Life, 




                                                
excludes consideration of community from its theory.252  However, it would probably be fair 
to say that when libertarian theorists have considered the place or function of community in a 
liberal society, their attention is drawn to community because of its relation to the 
individuals who compose it.  That is, consideration is derivative, not first order, as it is for 
communitarians.   
Libertarians tend to approach community with ambivalence, recognizing that as an 
institution of mutual aid, friendship, and affective ties it may offer a preferable alternative to 
the (by definition) coercive state.253  However, they also recognize that in practice 
communities may turn out to be at least as oppressive as the state.  Due to the proximity of 
communities in relation to the people who live within them communities are often better able 
to gather information about what the members of that community need and can provide. This 
is particularly true when one considers again the community's proximity to the members of 
it.254  Thus, within a classical liberal theory social efficiency in the provision of public and 
 
 
252 For instance, Michael Sandel's criticisms concerning the liberal "unencumbered self" are 
misguided because they fail to recognize that the abstraction used by liberal theorists to identify an individual is 
a methodological device, and it is not intended to say anything about actual individuals who live in the world.  
Rather, it is used to clarify careful thought about a complex world, not to reduce the world to a simplistic 
parody.  See Ryan, 1990.   
253 F.A. Hayek, "Coercion and the State," chapter 9 in The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), 133-147. 
254 I.e. Norms of behavior in communities may be regulated with public shame and humiliation.  J.S. 
Mill knew this only too well, and it formed the focus of his critique of prejudice and custom in On Liberty.  By 
contrast, it may be the case that the expensive, but frequently inefficient and therefore ineffective state leaves 
the average citizen more or less alone (save for the payment of taxes.)  Of course, Tocqueville makes similar 
criticism about the tyranny of the majority throughout Democracy in America,  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, Press, 2000). 
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private goods needs to be carefully counter-balanced with concerns for freedom (autonomy) 
and privacy. 
  One of the enduring characteristics of libertarians is that they are at pains to 
distinguish themselves from the right and the left.  A way of doing this is to criticize others' 
conceptions of community.  They point, for instance, to traditional communities that are 
venerated by the romantic right or the rational blueprint models of the left.  Thus, to the 
extent that libertarians have considered community, they have tended do so cautiously and 
often critically.  
Taking these points together, it is hardly surprising that digging up libertarian 
conceptions of community, particularly within contemporary political theory, is a little 
difficult.   Furthermore, we might consider that during the twentieth century libertarianism 
has taken the form of a critical theory that has developed in response to what its supporters 
regard as excessive government intrusion into the private sphere.  To the extent that this has 
been true, libertarian theorists have been even more preoccupied than they might ordinarily 
be with the relationship between the individual and the state.  Consequently, the part of 





However, if libertarians wish to advance beyond mere critique to advance a 
constructive theory of the free society, they must be prepared to discuss "freely evolved 
intermediary institutions".255  Functionally, somebody and something need to do the work of 
the welfare state, so in theory and especially in practice we should expect to see a vibrant 
market and civil society.256  Beyond that, however, communities are a crucial counterbalance 
to the state, with its political equality and legal neutrality.257
Libertarian Conceptions of Community 
1. The Economic Model 
Undoubtedly, in the minds of many people, including some who consider themselves 
to be its supporters, classical liberalism and libertarianism is identified solely with the free 
market.  As a result, classical liberal and libertarian scholarship has tended to focus on the 
virtues of self interest and even egoism in motivating individuals to act spontaneously to 
produce ordered liberty.  Indeed, theorists ranging from Bernard Mandeville to Adam Smith, 
                                                 
255 A Student's Guide to Classical Liberal Scholarship (Fairfax: Institute for Humane Studies, 
undated), 4. 
256 On this point, the work of historian David Beito on mutual societies and self help is particularly 
illuminating.  See "Mutual Aid for Social Welfare: The Case of American Fraternal Societies," Critical Review, 
vol. 4, no. 4, (Fall 1990), 709-36.  In a similar vein, in Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 and 
In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government Charles Murray has documented how the state has crowded out 
traditional communities. 
257 Recall Robert Nozick's account of communities in the third section titled "Utopia" in Anarchy, 
State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974): “Utopia will consist of utopias, of many different and 
divergent communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions.  Some kinds of 
communities will be more attractive to most than others; communities will wax and wane.  People will leave 
some for others or spend their whole lives in one. Utopia is a framework for utopias, a place where people are at 
liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal 
community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others)”, 312. 
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David Hume and Friedrich Hayek have championed laissez faire economics and the related 
theory of the spontaneous order of the market as an alternative to other planned political 
orders.258  In The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order, Ronald 
Hamowy describes the theory: 
The theory (of spontaneous order) holds that the social arrangements under 
which we live are of such a high order of complexity that they invariably take 
their form not from deliberate calculation, but as the unintended consequence 
of countless individual actions, many of which may be the result of instinct 
and habit.  The theory thus provides an explanation of the origin of complex 
social structures without the need to posit the existence of a directing 
intelligence.  Rather, such structures come into being as a consequence of the 
aggregate of numerous discrete individual actions, none of which aims at the 
formation of coherent social institutions.  Society is not the product of 
calculation but arises spontaneously, and its institutions are not the result of 
intentional design but of men's actions which have as their purpose an array 
of short-term objectives.259
 
Hamowy's account describes individuals who are motivated by self interest "not a 
disinterested concern for the welfare of others."  He cites Hume, noting that "Hume believed 
it was not possible to infuse "a passion for the public good" sufficient to act as a spur to 
industry, as was apparently the case in the ancient republics.  Therefore, "it is requisite to 
govern men by other passions, and animate them with a spirit of avarice and industry, art and 
 
258 The latter having been found to be wanting both theoretically and practically because of the 
burden placed on rationality, the need for coercive techniques to facilitate political programs thereby 
diminishing freedom and consent, and the practical inefficiencies associated with actual political programs, 
well-documented by the public choice school. 
 
259 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 3. 
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luxury."  By such indirection, Hume contended, could one provide for the public welfare."260  
Reading such extracts one has the impression that there is nothing more to libertarian 
theory than a discussion of the relationship between the individual and the state.  Community 
is utterly absent.  Moreover, from the perspective of other theories that extend beyond 
narrow self interest, the values and motivations undergirding the theory of the classical 
liberal market are unappealing to say the least. But this tells only part of the story.  
 
260 Hamowy , 10 citing Hume "Of Commerce," from Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, 1, 294-95. 
 
Hamowy's and Hume's discussion is about social order and therefore one that is posited at  
the most general level--society, not communities within society.  Further, it refers to only 
one set of activities in society: commerce.  In fact, self interest is a necessary but not 









2. Communities in Civil Society   
That classical liberals do indeed have a theory of community may be seen if we shift 
our attention away from political economy and toward moral philosophy and social practice. 
 Starting with a broader, more human conception of the individual we are told by Adam 
Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments that human behavior is regulated by a collection of 
sentiments including self interest, justice and benevolence.261  His notion of sympathy 
describes how individuals moderate their selfishness:   
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.  
Of this kind of pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of 
others, when we see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.  That we 
often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to 
require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original 
passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, 
though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility.  The greatest 
ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without 
it.262
                                                 
261 I am following the conventional reading of Smith's theory as outlined in "Setting the Scene: Adam 
Smith's Moral Philosophy," by Jerry Evensky in Adam Smith and the Philosophy of Law and Economics (ed.) 
Robin Paul Malloy and Jerry Evensky, 7-29.  This suggests a dichotomy between Smith's Wealth of Nations 
(propounding a social and economic theory of self-interest) and his Theory of Moral Sentiments (a social and 
moral theory grounded in benevolence and sympathy).  However, according to D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie a 
more accurate reading of Smith would recognize that there is continuity between the two works.  In both works, 
 Smith relies upon self-love (self-interest) but this may include a concern for others.  See "Introduction," Theory 
of Moral Sentiments (Oxford: Clarendon: 1976), 20-22.     
For an interesting application of the conventional approach to contemporary legal theory see Robin 
Paul Malloy "Debate: Is Law and Economics Moral?--Humanistic Economics and a Classical Liberal Critique 
of Posner's Economic Analysis," Valparaiso University Law Review 24:2, (Winter 1990), 147-161.  
 
262 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie) (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1976), 9.  
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Thus, we learn that individuals are not strict individualists.  Still, we need to look 
elsewhere to examine the kinds of communities I wish to incorporate into libertarian theory 
on the basis of such traits.   
Anthony Black's analysis of the role of guilds263 in medieval and modern society is 
instructive in this regard.  In his Guilds and Civil Society,264 Black provides an account of 
the "history of medieval and modern political thought from the viewpoint of the guild and of 
the values which have been associated with it."265  In so doing he calls attention to a version 
of community that falls between the second and third models that I contrasted above.  Black 
presents an analysis of tightly-knit affective communities based upon mutual oaths rather 
than blood ties.  Crucially, (since we are trying to outline a libertarian theory), Black notes 
that entry into the guilds was voluntary and consensual, but that one joined in order to form a 
permanent bond of "eternal brotherhood" in organizations that resembled "artificial 
families."  (Although it must be pointed out that Black emphasizes that at no time did the 
guilds supercede the natural family.266)  Instead, the values promoted within the guild--
 
263 "Guilds" includes primarily craft guilds, but also social guilds, territorial fraternities, and 
communes, and extends later to trade unions. 
264 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1984) 
265 Ibid, xi. 
266 "Gierke exaggerated when he said that guilds 'embraced the whole man.' At no point, it would 
seem, did they outweigh family ties which, craft-guild membership usually being hereditary, were actually 
incorporated in the guild system." Ibid, 27.  "Gierke's analysis is not borne out by the evidence.  His model is 
essentially based on his own strong imagination, reinforcing a popular nineteenth-century myth still alive today 
of a good, old, warm, cohesive society, located in a fictitious past,"28. 
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fellowship, honor and mutual aid--ran parallel alongside the values of the market (which 
Black calls civil society--not to be confused with its current use to denote the guild-style 
values of non-market, non-state society) including contract and exchange.  In describing the 
spirit and practice of the early trade union and the co-operative movements which continues 
some of the traditions of the guilds Black says 
While it is true that workers professed an affective attitude towards their 
associations, and did not regard them solely as a means either to individual 
well-being or to the ̀ improvement' of living standards, this does not indicate 
that their attitude was ̀ collectivist' as this term is generally understood today. 
 For, like medieval guilds men, they believed no less devoutly in individual 
rights and liberties, to secure which was one reason why they acted in unison: 
there is no evidence that the subordination of the individual to the community 
was part of their programme.267
 
What is of particular interest, however, is that Black argues that the value system and 
its impact on political theory have been largely ignored.  (Marsilus of Padua, Althusius, 
Bodin, Gierke and Hegel are the notable exceptions.)  He provides a number of reasons to 
explain this.  Part of the problem is that political theory was written by individuals schooled 
in the ancients, and who were therefore unfamiliar with new modes of arranging society that 
 





                                                
developed in the medieval and modern period.  In addition, there is a class dimension since 
intellectual history and political theory was done by those who were unfamiliar with the 
values and ethos of the artisan class.  Also, guild values tended to be overlooked by theorists 
of the new state who were caught up in the values of liberal civil (market) society.   
Black's work is important since it highlights an aspect of society that is "essential to 
man."  He says the idea of the guild is "deeply, perhaps genetically, imprinted upon the 
human psyche. . . It is implanted in our experience as a species."268 Judging by the empirical 
studies of anthropologists and sociologists, together with an appreciation for the way in 
which the liberal-communitarian debate has captured the minds of so many, this seems right.  
Drawing on Black and Nozick it is evident that practical and desirable classical 
liberal communities combine a degree of flexibility to the extent that they retain voluntary 
entry and the right of exit.  However, this must not be construed to mean that communities 
are unstable and that members are free to come and go as they please, exiting as soon as the 
strictures of membership become too onerous, as communitarians argue.  Rather, members 
enter such communities precisely because they recognize that the qualities of the 
relationships that are forged in guild-style communities are grounded in a set of duties and 
obligations.  Since these may be unfamiliar to members outside the community they are 
frequently undervalued, if they are recognized at all.  But, understanding that place of such 
duties and obligations is vital for an appreciation of community. To understand how the 
 
268 Ibid, 241.   
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social practice that is community would work within a libertarian world we need to look to 
elsewhere to work on reciprocity. 
Case Study: The Institute for Humane Studies 
The Institute for Humane Studies is a classical liberal organization affiliated with 
George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia.  Established in 1961 the Institute promotes 
classical liberal and libertarian ideas through programs devoted to research and education 
primarily involving university students at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.  The 
Institute's website describes its mission in the following manner:  
The Institute for Humane Studies supports the achievement of a freer society 
by discovering and facilitating the development of talented, productive 
students, scholars, and other intellectuals who share a commitment to liberty 
and who demonstrate the potential to change significantly the current climate 
of opinion to one more congenial to the principles and practice of freedom.269  
 
In practice, the Institute advances its goals through a variety of programs.  However, 
it’s summer seminar program, together with a scholarship program that it administers on 
behalf of the Claude R. Lambe Charitable Foundation270 form the core of its activities.  
While it is true that a formal institutional structure exists within the organization to plan, 
organize and execute its programs--and I shall say more about those in a moment--my 
                                                 
269 "The Mission of the Institute," at http://mason.gmu.edu/~ihs/story/mission.html. 
270 “The Claude R. Lambe Charitable Foundation is a private charity that seeks to advance the 
understanding and appreciation of the value of a free society in advancing the well-being of mankind.  Through 
its grants and programs, the Foundation supports the development and application of market-based ("market" is 
used in the broadest sense, to cover all voluntary exchanges among the actions of individuals.) solutions to 
pressing societal problems,” taken from the back page of An Investment in Change, (Fairfax, VA: Institute for 
Humane Studies, no date) based on a speech delivered by Charles G. Koch on January 23, 1993, to the Institute 
for Humane Studies' 10th Anniversary Celebration of the Claude R. Lambe Fellowship Program. 
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purpose here in describing these programs is to suggest that they have given rise to a diverse 
network of classical liberals and  who together resemble one of Black's guild communities as 
a voluntary association that has been established to promote interests (intellectual careers), 
but which also fosters a type of friendship and solidarity among and between libertarians, in 
addition to helping individuals to cultivate their own individuality.  Members of the 
intellectual community associated with the Institute (and its sister organizations) share a 
commitment to a common set of values and ideals, and as such they exhibit various norms of 
reciprocity and an example of bonding social capital as they help each other in the exchange 
and promotion of ideas. 
To understand how this works we need to refer to Kant's distinction between perfect 
and imperfect duties, together with more recent work on reciprocity, especially reciprocal 
altruism.  In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant distinguishes between perfect 
and imperfect duties.  Perfect duties are those that we owe in the political and legal spheres; 
they are narrow and clearly defined.  (E.g. a duty to pay taxes.)  By contrast, imperfect duties 
fall into the sphere of moral duties, and they are inchoate or vague, (e.g. a duty to support 
charity that is owed to the public at large.)  The reciprocity exhibited within the classical 
liberal community resembles an imperfect duty because as a member of the community an 
individual feels himself bound by duty and obligation to help others (to the extent that he is 
able to do so) whose identity is unspecified (save for their own membership in the 
community) at some unspecified date (i.e. whenever they need help). In Sharing Without 
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Reckoning, Imperfect Right and the Norms of Reciprocity271 Millard Schumaker discusses 
the practice of general reciprocity (mutual aid) in which neighbors lend a hand without 
keeping account of the "debt," confident in the knowledge that at some future point when 
they are likely to need help they will receive help from their neighbors as well.  Helpers are 
not "paid" for their services in the sense that they receive monetary rewards.  Rather, they 
help because they consider it to be their duty to do so and because that is what one does on 
the basis of their shared relationship. 
If we apply this to the Institute for Humane Studies (I.H.S.) we can see that through 
the institutions of the Summer seminars and scholarships programs, individuals are 
introduced to each other, they engage with others and after they leave (or their scholarship is 
completed) they are encouraged to maintain informal ties with members of the community so 
that they may continue to advance their own knowledge, but also to encourage others who 
they believe may have an interests in these subjects to participate in future years.  Thus, via 
an informal process of networking, which is undertaken for both professional and personal 
(fraternal and self developmental) reasons, and by the contributions to the "favor bank,"272 
 
 
271 (Waterloo, Ontario: Canadian Corporation for the Studies in Religion, 1992). 
272 "The favor bank" is a term that apparently was coined by Tom Wolfe in The Bonfire of the 
Vanities and it is frequently employed by Tom Palmer of the Cato Institute, a former IHS employee, to describe 
the particular version of reciprocal altruism employed by members of the classical liberal community who are 
associated with the Institute.  Specifically, each time a person provides a favor to another individual he makes a 
kind of metaphorical deposit to a common pool (the favor bank).  At some point in the future he may make a 
withdrawal from the bank when he needs help from a member of the community himself, but the help may or 
may not be provided by the original recipient of his aid.  The process is voluntary, decentralized and 
spontaneous.  Individuals who have benefited from the libertarian community (by attending seminars and 
lectures, receiving free books, scholarships, etc.) return the favor to other up-and-coming classical liberals, (via 
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the Institute helps to maintain an intellectual community of young scholars.  
Unfortunately, much of the reciprocal altruism and networking that takes place 
within the community surrounding I.H.S has taken place implicitly not explicitly because it 
appears to be carried out by individuals acting on tacit knowledge.  That is, the people who 
belong to the community understand the rules of the game, so they have not found it 
necessary to publicize them.  Both the ideas and the process by which they are promoted are 
experiential, educational, voluntary and incremental.  Indeed, they appear to function along 
the lines of some of the ideas Black articulates toward the end of his book:  
The configuration of man's social instincts cannot, any more than his physical 
and emotional make-up, be radically altered.  In this respect, therefore, the present-
day champions of civil society are indulging in a utopian dream with the usual 
results.  On the other hand, no amount of socio-economic crisis will of itself change 
our fundamental moral beliefs, whatever these may be.  Belief in the solidarity of 
labor can only be awoken by experience of it, and by persuasion.273
This is unfortunate since libertarians might be more successful in persuading others 
to adopt their approach to life if they took the time to explain how an alternative social 
arrangement might in fact work.  
 
 
recommendations, lecturing to new students, mentoring, etc.) thereby maintaining and promoting the continuity 
of ideas over time.   
 




Throughout this chapter I have tried to outline a theory of community that is 
consistent with libertarianism.  Unlike nationalist and communitarian theories, libertarian 
communities are not explicitly political entities, but they are crucial constituents of a broader 
social theory.  They serve to support and separate the political sphere from the rest of 
society.  The absence of theories of community from libertarian theory may be attributed to a 
number of factors.  These include:   
1. The fact that many who regard themselves to be classical liberals are (naive) 
materialists.  Or, put differently, they misunderstand what libertarianism is. 
2. In the twentieth century, in the face of the growth of government and particularly 
the welfare and regulatory state, classical liberalism has not advanced beyond critique to 
provide a constructive analysis of how a the good society might function in a classical liberal 
world. 
3. In an effort to understand small parts of the complex world liberal, analytic 
philosophers have employed methodological individualism and this has been misconstrued 
as an endorsement of individualism, or worse, atomism. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4. If we look at the history of political thought carefully, we can see that with few 
exceptions large chunks of political theory are absent from the account provided by those 
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who write intellectual history.  One plausible reason for this is that such theorists are either 
ignorant of or disinterested in the ideas and practices of a different class (the artisans). 
5. The values and decentralized practices of classical liberal groups are based on a 
kind of tacit knowledge, and consequently they are often applied without conscious and 
explicit knowledge. 
  Libertarian theorists should be particularly interested in community if they want to 
convince those who are sympathetic to their ideas that they actually have some practical bite. 
 Theory needs to be embedded in real experience.  From time to time one may find it useful 
to discuss ethical egoism and side constraints, but if one is seriously interested in getting 
people to consider libertarianism as a viable alternative to say, theories of social justice, then 
theoretical discussions must be related to lived experience to show how the capacities 
necessary for living a free and responsible life for all people may be achieved, including self 
cultivation.  Community may not be libertarians' first concern, and silence on the matter does 
not mean that libertarians are ignorant of the need for communities.  But if they are going to 
continue to congratulate themselves on the fact that their conception of the self and the 
society is truly realistic, it is time for a consideration of community.  
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CONCLUSION 
Besides general opposition to change, another reason that conservatives traditionally 
have opposed libertarianism is because libertarian ideas often are associated 
exclusively with the promotion of market capitalism.  Conservatives (and socialists 
for that matter) make serious arguments that something more than markets is 
required for human flourishing.  Libertarians must address these concerns.  The 
appeal of libertarianism must be based on claims of ethics and morality, not simply 
on the ability of a libertarian state to deliver superior material goods.  And, perhaps 
most importantly, libertarians must be able to identify concrete things that people 
want (that are currently being offered by the government) and explain how these 
things still will be available (in the market) under a libertarian system of social and 
economic ordering…economic arguments alone are unlikely to succeed in public 
policy debates over the desirability of a shift to libertarianism.  In order to succeed, 
libertarianism must be supported by credible appeals to people’s higher conceptions 
of themselves, both as individuals and as citizens in a broader society characterized 
by mutual respect for individual liberty.274
 
In this thesis I have sought to provide three things: l. a friendly constructive critique 
of contemporary libertarianism 2. a positive alternative ideal in the form of a psychological 
theory of individuality grounded in notions of the self that combines economic and personal 
freedom, with an emphasis on the latter, describing what individuality means for an 
individual and how he could achieve it. 3. a constitutional theory that explains how 
individuality is institutionalized—that is, how the institutions of a libertarian regime or a 
good society secured by a minimal state act in a formative manner to shape individuals so 
 
274 Jonathan R. Macey, “On the Failure of Libertarianism to Capture the Popular Imagination,” 
Problems of Market Liberalism, Ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 373-4, 375. Macey’s argument is specifically directed at concerns that are 
quite different from those propounded here. Specifically Macey mentions, the movement’s inability to respond 
to people’s systematic risk-aversion and their concomitant demand for insurance (e.g. welfare).  However, some 
of his broader claims and suggestions for reform overlap with those discussed here, especially his discussion of 
individual’s desire to participate within civil (but not necessarily political) spheres of society. 
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that they have the opportunity and the requisite capacities to become free and responsible 
beings. The intention is to show that a more balanced interpretation of libertarianism than 
goes beyond narrow political freedom or market liberalism is, or should be, more appealing 
to supporters committed to libertarian ideals, and potentially, in the long run, it is hoped, to 
others individuals who could be persuaded that adopting the ideals of libertarian 
individuality would help them to enjoy a better life.   
 If it is the case that libertarians are genuinely keen to transform the world and to 
make it freer and more consistent with their professed values, they will need to do a lot more 
than rely upon trends such as increasing disenchantment with government or the spread of 
free markets via technology and globalization to achieve their vision.  Libertarianism must 
become more than a marginal critique.  Discussing the moral and practical failings of 
government is insufficient.  So are narrow discussions of specific policy issues or 
institutional debates.  Rather, libertarians must present an attractive and viable vision of 
freedom for individuals living in a libertarian society.  This requires libertarians to reveal 
their larger aspirations, and to demonstrate that there is a reasonable expectation that such 
aspirations may be achieved.  Both Charles Murray and David Boaz recognize this and they 
have gone a long way towards the articulation of something that approaches the sort of 
libertarianism that is needed to make the transition from a critique to a viable vision, but 
their views are still partial and underdeveloped. What is needed now is a more substantial 
vision that connects with individuals as individuals, to show why a libertarian life is valuable 
to them, and, as Macey says, can help them to lead a life of flourishing in which they are 
able to attain the things that they want.  Such a variety of libertarianism is more 
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perfectionistic than critiques concerning the use and abuse of state power alone, however it 
does not require it’s adherents to be perfect.  Rather, it needs to convey a genuine belief in its 
hopes for the future, which rest on solid understandings of formal and informal institutions 
(including culture), as well as the self reliance and self-cultivation of individuals who are 
committed to individual liberty.  As they consider the way ahead and adapt to meet the new 
challenges before it, members of the movement will need to make choices about the 
priorities they share and the issues that they raise.  
 The crucial question that needs to be considered here is the following: if something 
like my interpretation of libertarianism is right--that is, more consistent with the underlying 
ethos of libertarianism, and therefore more appealing than the prevailing variety to those 
who are sympathetic to robust individual freedom, then why have these ideas failed to be 
taken seriously and developed in the practices of the political-social movement thus far?  Is 
there a serious chance that individuality will become a more prominent goal of libertarians in 
future?  There are a number of ways to respond to these questions, theoretically and 
practically. First, to return to the place where we began we need to ask--is this really 
libertarianism or is it some other set of ideals that have been grafted on to a libertarian 
political theory?  Second, throughout the previous chapters the discussion has drawn 
comparison between the stated ideals of the some members of the movement and those of 
individuality, taking the respective ideas at face value and comparing each of them.  What 
kinds of problems—externalities or unintended consequences might arise on the way to 
realizing libertarian individuality?  Are these problems fatal to the stated project of 
libertarianism, or can they be ameliorated and contained sufficiently to keep libertarianism 
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authentic and viable?  And third, apart from theoretical similarities and disjunctions between 
libertarianism as it is and as it might be reinterpreted, what sort of difficulties might arise 
given the current nature of the libertarian movement, including its goals, priorities and 
overall political strategy?  What sorts of constraints exist within the institutional structure of 
the movement itself and the broader political context that it works within to promote change? 
 Finally, taken together, what do these three questions imply for the intellectual prospects of 
the of the libertarian movement, and for the adoption of individuality as part of its program? 
1. Is this really Libertarianism? 
Perhaps the most fundamental issue that needs to be raised is, is this really 
libertarianism or something else?  The answer to this question could be variously “yes,” 
“no”, and “maybe.”  Liberty for individuality is grounded in a commitment to minimal 
government which provides for the maximum political liberty for individuals.  At the same 
time, it is clear that liberty for individuality goes beyond narrow political libertarianism, and 
to the degree that that is true, and there are those who refuse to consider anything having to 
do with institutions and actions of individuals outside the state (“libertarianism is a political 
philosophy, not a complete guide to life,”), this could not be properly referred to as 
libertarianism. However, as it has been noted above, since most self-professed libertarians do 
not in fact subscribe to such a narrow view themselves, as we can see given their discuss of 
economic and philosophical matters in addition to politics--this hardly seems to be a 
trenchant or, indeed, an accurate, criticism.  The two proponents of libertarianism that have 
been criticized here—Charles Murray and David Boaz go far beyond politics and arguments 
for limiting government, for instance, by engaging in discussions with communitarians to 
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discuss the relationship between individuals and community in a free society.   
On the other hand, to be charitable, we might consider the possibility that there are 
libertarians who do take other kinds of individual freedom that exist beyond the market very 
seriously indeed (for instance, religious observation, the creation of artistic works). In fact, it 
might be argued that it is precisely because they take these ideas seriously, and, like all 
liberals, uphold a careful distinction between the public and private spheres, that they 
recognize that a political-social movement is not the place within which to advance 
individual freedom. By definition, only individuals can advance individual freedom. 
However, again, this is probably presented as a false dichotomy since American libertarians 
join together to consider all sorts of issues that are vital to the practice of their freedom, and 
indeed the nature of libertarianism itself in seminars, colloquia, and listserv discussions on 
the web.  Many of these are not directly political, but they are discussed in relation to the 
state because libertarians are keen to preserve their independence from it. 
Similarly, as we noted above, there are those who identify libertarians with those who 
apparently care only about the free market--they are only radical free marketers who apply 
economic theory to any institution they study, and they treat individuals as rational self-
interested maximizers who perform cost-benefit calculations as they perform any actions in 
any sphere of society.   If we import the logics of analysis used by other disciplines (e.g. art, 
psychology, or sociology) are we necessarily going beyond the bounds of libertarianism?  It 
could be argued that insofar as liberty for individuality does not places emphasis on these 
traditional disciplines of libertarian discourse (namely, politics, philosophy, and economics), 
or to the extent that it does it tries to grapple with them in relation to other areas, such as 
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psychology, sociology, and cultural theory, it is not libertarian in the contemporary sense, 
but rather a reform, supplement, and expansion of existing theory.  It is a revised 
libertarianism.  This is the point. Descriptively, liberty for individuality is not libertarianism 
(as it currently exists), but normatively—in terms of the shared values that are at the center 
of the theory--individualism, minimal government, voluntarism, free will, choice, toleration 
and skepticism with respect to power and authority, it is.  However, these are interpreted in a 
slightly different way from e.g. Nozickian libertarianism to give priority to the cultivation of 
a unique person, not simply an individual or a physically separate person.  Politics and 
individual political freedom are still the primary concerns that ground the other areas of 
concern.  For without political freedom, as Humboldt and Mill said, there can be no 
individuality.  Freedom is the fundamental political value, but human flourishing is the 
ultimate human value.  For it to be meaningful, freedom must be connected to the activities 
we engage in once we have achieved political freedom. Freedom is the preeminent thing that 
people need so that they can get the concrete things that they want.  This is the promise of 
libertarianism and this is why pursuing individuality is integral to it.  
2. Practical Difficulties and Possible Unintended Consequences 
As it is outlined here, individuality is a moral and aesthetic aspiration that is open to 
all. It is achieved by self-cultivation with others in civil society. It is not directly political. 
However the political and legal institutions of a libertarian regime would be crucial to the 
realization of freedom because they provide the security and order that are essential for 
creating opportunities to shape freedom for themselves. Of course, freedom alone is 
insufficient for the development of the individual. As Humboldt, Mill, and Emerson note, 
 
 199
education, persuasion, varieties of experience, and the emulation of role models who value 
individuality and who pursue it by living their own lives in their own way in civil society 
will be vital too. What is not quite clear is whether these will be sufficient for most people to 
develop their individuality in fact. Or indeed, if the kinds of resources libertarians would be 
prepared to use to support schooling and the development of basic capacities more generally, 
such as independence and responsibility (i.e. in voluntary, non-coercive, privately funded 
educational institutions), critical thinking, and toleration would be sufficient for the 
rudimentary skills needed to pursue the cultivation of individuality subsequently. If they are 
not, there is a serious danger that individuals may become frustrated and turn to politics and 
the state to achieve their goals, thereby abandoning their initial commitment to libertarian 
ideals. This, after all, is one of the lessons that libertarian economists have taught us in their 
discussions of rent-seeking.  So while individuality might appear attractive and feasible if 
considered as an extension of existing ideals because it is addressed to individuals who 
already share certain commitments, practices, and assumptions about how a free individual 
ought to live, (as evidenced by their participation in the libertarian movement), we still need 
to think further about the way that these ideas are likely to be established and maintained in a 
broader society if liberal democracy were to be transformed into libertarian democracy. This 
requires careful empirical comparisons between people who rely on the state and those who 
rely upon institutions in civil society to support their welfare.   
As noted above, one of the fundamental questions that all libertarians have to grapple 
with is why should we expect libertarians to be any different from any other group of 
politically motivated individuals? Why should they resist use of the state to achieve their 
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goals? What kinds of institutions might libertarians employ to help to preserve and maintain 
their integrity and commitment to freedom using civil rather than political society for the 
achievement of libertarian individuality? Libertarians are fond of quoting Madison’s famous 
comment from Federalist 51 where he says “If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary.”275  And yet, some might quip, it appears that if libertarians 
move to a world of minimal government that co-exists next to a vital civil society, as if by 
magic, individuals suddenly become disciplined, self-policing lovers of freedom who keep 
themselves in check so that they do not abuse their access to political power.  Mysteriously, 
human nature in civil society appears to be cooperative, virtuous, and reciprocal, while 
human nature in political society is avaricious, self-serving, and devious.  On the one hand, 
libertarians have a tendency to consider human nature rather skeptically and pessimistically, 
and on the other, there is a kind of naïve romantic-anarchic quality that is curiously similar 
to some of the ideas found in the writings of one of their arch enemies.  Which is it? 
Undoubtedly, some libertarians simply are more optimistic than others about the potential for 
individuals to develop their human nature freely and responsibly. However, even within that 
optimism there must be a certain amount of guardedness, and a  recognition that some people 
will not meet the strenuous expectations demanded of individuals such as Mill or Emerson. 
Otherwise libertarians would be anarchists.  In a libertarian society some are likely to abuse 
                                                 




                                                                                                                                                            
the access that they have to power, but the impact of this may be minimized if such behavior 
is kept to the private sphere in one of the relatively small voluntary associations of civil 
society rather than broadcast across the entire domain of politics that affects all individuals 
within that society.  Consequently, there must be some institutions, both formal and 
informal, that will create barriers to using the state for inappropriate matters, as well as 
inducements to participate anti-social or illiberal activities within private associations in civil 
society.276 This is why constitutional design, including the appropriate checks and balances 
and the dispersal of power will be extremely important in a libertarian regime. At the same 
time, however, culture will help to reinforce these formal arrangements, and may even build 
upon them so that free individuals are encouraged to be strenuous, vital, excellent persons. In 
his recent writings dealing with what he calls “constitutional political economy,” James 
Buchanan has composed an “extended essay in persuasion” that outlines a formal 
constitutional design that is complemented by a civic religion.  What Buchanan’s work 
indicates is that attempting to deal with the political and psychological problems that arise 
when establishing and maintaining a free society is not a matter of relying on changes in 
human motivations, or political institutions or culture, but rather combining all of these so 
that they are mutually reinforcing.277 This is what I have tried to do here. 
 
1961), 322. 
276 Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
277 The Reason of Rules, Volume 10, The Collected Works of James Buchanan, (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 2000), especially chapter 9, “Is Constitutional Revolution Possible in Democracy,” 149-167. 
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Perhaps promoting individuality focuses attention on the wrong set of ideas and 
places too great a burden on libertarianism.  Libertarianism can only work if the burdens on 
it are kept to a bare minimum and libertarians confine their attentions to politics within the 
state apparatus.278 This can only be settled empirically if a libertarian society were 
established.  Alternatively, some would argue that establishing a free society with a strong, 
but limited state to secure freedom, while providing private provision to support the welfare 
of those who have fallen on hard times, or those who fear falling on hard times (i.e. most 
people) is asking more than enough. This is because the single factor that dominates 
individual preferences and inhibits them from embracing libertarianism is their aversion to 
risk.  In an essay that explicitly deals with what he takes to be the reasons for libertarian’s 
failure to capture the popular imagination, Jonathan Macey says that at bottom libertarians 
need “to develop their conception of security more fully if libertarian ideas are going to 
reemerge as viable concepts in the social philosophy and public policy of the nation.”  On 
Macey’s view the crucial issue is insurance and weaning people away from the dependency 
of the welfare state. He says 
Libertarians need to tie their arguments about how to deal with uncertainty with 
libertarian theories about community.  The ineluctable reality is that people all over 
the world exhibit a strong redistributive impulse.  Libertarians would do well to 
recognize that this emotional impulse exists.  Libertarians are also wrong in thinking 
that they can win supporters by merely demonstrating that the state does a poor job in 
helping the neediest.  That is beside the point.  What matters is that the state allows 
private citizens to have an excuse to avoid charity.  The all powerful state substitutes 
 
278 See, for instance, Douglas B. Rassmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Norms of Liberty, A 
Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics (State College: Penn State Press, forthcoming.) 
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for the principle of personal responsibility.  People have the state, and the state 
allows them to think that something is being done for the neediest.  The state 
provides a convenient, albeit costly, outlet for the redistributive impulse.  And more 
importantly, the state provides the assurance that something will be done for them if 
they become needy.279
 
According to Macey, “Libertarians should stop trying to change people’s 
preferences” and focus on the kinds of private institutional arrangements that will help to get 
the kinds of things that they want now, living in a liberal democracy with a relatively large 
welfare state, but through the market.  Yet, we might ask, if the welfare state can and does 
tend to cultivate a certain sort of state of mind (and therefore change people preferences so 
that they favor even more welfare), changing institutional arrangements so that people have 
greater independence will also have an impact in the other direction.  Institutions, within 
certain limits, can and do shape the way people think and behave.280  The important 
empirical question is, to what extent may people be influenced by such institutional shifts?  
Boaz and Murray both note that the welfare state and big government in general can have an 
enervating effect on individual personality, fostering dependency, irresponsibility, and an 
overall lack of discipline—the very opposite of the sort of personality that they seem to 
imply (but never fully articulate) is desirable within a libertarian regime.  And indeed, 
throughout libertarian accounts we see an ambiguity about human nature—whether it is 
relatively timid and risk averse (Hobbesian), or more independent and critical, but still 
 
279 Ibid, 377. 
280 Stephen L. Elkin, City and Regime, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 105-123 on 
formative institutions.  See also, more generally, Charles Murray’s works on the welfare state mentioned above. 
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fundamentally bourgeois—tolerant, property loving etc, (Lockean), or even progressive, 
expressive, and creative (Millian.)  Since the libertarian movement is, as I have said, a broad 
coalition of concerns, different kinds of sympathizers with different assumptions about 
individual personality are to be found within it.  Moving forward to promote a positive 
position on some issue would require a degree of agreement on what kind of individual the 
libertarian individual is—but at what level and to what degree must this agreement be 
reached?  There may appear to be relatively small differences of opinion among those who 
identify themselves as libertarians.  Yet when they are compared to other moral and political 
ideologies, such as Conservatism, there is no doubt that Libertarians share an assumption 
that the individual is (or should be) independent, dynamic, rational, assertive, and “pro-
choice on everything.281”  This brings us to the next important consideration—the 
Conservative/Libertarian alliance. 
3. The Libertarian Movement 
Since the end of the Second World War libertarians have joined forces in an uneasy 
and somewhat tension-ridden alliance with groups of individuals who are best described as 
Conservatives or traditionalists.  The purpose of this alliance has been to try to influence 
political power directly, from within the Republican Party, and indirectly, throughout the 
broader social and political grouping that is known as the “right wing.”  George Nash’s 
                                                 
281 The phrase is from Robert Teeter, quoted by E.J. Dionne in Why Americans Hate Politics, (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 261. 
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classic intellectual history, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America282 describes 
a post-war coalition of libertarians, new conservative traditionalists, and militant, evangelical 
anti-Communists who united in a common cause against twentieth century liberalism and 
Communism.  As he explains it, so long as the alliance directed its attention at its common 
enemies it could unite and seemed to be quite effective in pushing back the forces of modern 
welfare liberalism and communism.  However, periodically, there were fractures and even 
breaks in the alliance when the respective groups turned from their enemies and toward the 
ideas they wished to promote.  This was especially true in the case of issues such as abortion, 
foreign policy, and drug legalization, and revealed the fundamentally different visions for 
society that they hoped to achieve.  (Broadly speaking, Conservatives were more likely to be 
pro-life, more hawkish on foreign policy, and against drug legalization.  Libertarians, tended 
to be pro-choice, non-interventionist, and in favor of drug legalization.)  Numerous 
commentators have analyzed the differences and similarities between these groups, and it is 
possible to give only a brief sense of the alliance and division here, but it is important 
because it helps to explain the reason why certain sorts of issues such as constitutionalism, 
the free market, property rights have been championed by the Libertarians from within the 
“right wing,” as opposed to others, including calls for self-development, self-expression, and 
ultimately, the cultivation of individuality.  For instance, speaking from the Conservative 
perspective, Nash says: “on a purely philosophical or “ideological” level, American 
 
282 (Wilmington, DE: ISI, 1996) 
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conservatism did not speak with a single voice.  It had never done so and probably never 
would.  There was a continuing gap between the traditionalist ethos of self-restraint, of limits 
on will, and the libertarian ethos of self-assertion, self-cultivation, and resistance to the 
State.”283  From the libertarian wing, F.A. Hayek, famously wrote the chapter “Why I am 
Not a Conservative,” in The Constitution of Liberty, which reveals some large divisions 
between conservative and libertarians attitudes to a number of topics, including authority and 
liberty, (Conservatives are apt to be less suspicious of different forms of authority—the 
State, the Church, or Society-- over the individual as compared with libertarians who are 
skeptical of all forms of authority,) rationalism, (libertarians tended to favor enlightenment 
rationalism, conservatives were likely to use tradition, emotion or feeling, received wisdom) 
the past, present and future (libertarians tend to be future-oriented, “cultural optimists”, 
whereas traditionalist and conservatives prefer the status quo or the past and are often share a 
romantic nostalgia for what has been lost, and a fear or pessimism with respect to the future), 
and finally, Hayek suggested that Conservatives lacked principle so they had no standards by 
which to judge the fruits of their labors, and no genuine vision for society.   
It would be misleading to portray this marriage of convenience simply in negative 
terms, since libertarians and conservatives share a commitment to many political values and 
institutions in common, including the free market, the institution of private property, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and restrictions on the power of the federal 
 
283 Ibid, 322. 
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government.  However, their reasons for their respective commitments differ sharply in 
relation to the assumptions under girding these features of right-wing doctrine.  Explaining 
this difference in value and their conceptions of the individual in his chapter on 
libertarianism, E. J. Dionne contrasts the views of Jeff Riggenback, a libertarian writing “In 
Praise of Decadence” in the Libertarian Review followed by Conservative intellectual, 
Russell Kirk: “When an individual chooses his ideas for himself, judges them for himself, 
and does with them what he wishes to do with them, he is much more likely to devote 
himself to ideas with enthusiasm and dedication than when he is forced to rely on an 
authority to decide for him what is worth studying and what use is made of it.” 
For traditionalists such as Russell Kirk, libertarians such as Rigenbach had learned 
exactly the “wrong” lessons—the sort of lessons that capitalism, when uniformed by 
transcendent values, could teach.  “The ruinous failing of ideologues who call themselves 
libertarians,” Kirk declared, “is their fanatic attachment to a simple solitary principle—that 
is, to the notion of personal freedom as the whole end of the civil order, and indeed of human 
existence.”  The libertarians accepted “no transcendent sanctions for conduct,” said Kirk, 
and thus bought into their own version of Marx’s “dialectical materialism.” 
Throughout the fifties, sixties, and seventies some intellectuals on the right tried hard 
to maintain the alliance.  Some understood it to be purely pragmatic, while others claimed 
that there were ideological connections between the two sides.  Among libertarians the best 
known of these is Frank S. Meyer, who propounded a theory of “fusionism”: 
…the principles which inspire the contemporary American conservative movement 
are developing as the fusion of two different streams of thought.  The one, which, for 
want of a better word, one may call the “traditionalist,” puts its primary emphasis 
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upon the authority of transcendent truth and the necessity of a political and social 
order in accord with the constitution of being.  The other, which, again for want of a 
better word, one may call “libertarian,” takes as its first principle in political affairs 
the freedom of the individual person and emphasizes the restriction of the power of 
the state and the maintenance of the free-market economy as guarantee of that 
freedom.” 284
 
Many Conservatives and Libertarians were convinced by Meyer, but even those who 
were not recognized the strategic value of at least pretending that there were close ties 
between the two sides.  Dionne relates the historical development of the Cato Institute and 
notes that there was a distinctive conscious shift to the right in the early 1980s, after Cato 
moved from California to Washington, D.C. and abandoned publication of it’s magazine 
Inquiry, which had included civil libertarians and other who championed a kind of adversary 
culture that is usually associated with the left.285  Such a strategy is politically astute.  Non-
economic (“social”) issues and policies are more divisive than economic issues, so 
strategically--both in terms of fund raising and gaining support for policies through the ballot 
box--it makes sense for a relatively marginal political-social movement to advance ideas that 
will command support from a range of supporters who would like to roll back the state.  If 
the libertarian movement wishes to reach those who influence the use of political power it 
behooves it to try to meet other with whom it can form a critical mass of power to achieve 
it’s goals strategically.  On the other hand, does this mean that contentious issues must be 
 
284 “The Twisted Tree of Liberty” originally published in National Review January 16, 1962 and 
reprinted in Freedom and Virtue, The Conservative/Libertarian Debate ed. George Carey (Wilmington, DE: 
ISI, 1998), 16. 
285 See Dionne, ibid, 272-280. 
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dropped?  What is the price of this compromise?  Does it mean forgoing some of the ideas 
that are at the very heart of libertarianism and animate it’s loyal supporters, or can it work 
slowly and strategically to reform the culture so that it becomes more favorable to it’s ideas 
and concerns?  Only time will tell.  However, the matter of the sustainability of the 
conservative coalition has been raised again recently.  In writing about the growth of 
conservative power in America, (or as they refer to it, “the Right Nation,”) John 
Michelthwait and Adrian Wooldridge call into question the viability of the current coalition 
precisely because of it’s overlapping contradictions.286 Some libertarians may choose in 
future to break away from the coalition.  On the other hand, even if some libertarians wish to 
maintain their strategic alliance within the right wing, there is a possibility that they may be 
ousted from it by some of the more traditional elements of it who are no longer prepared to 
try to make compromises on certain issues.   
Taken together, these points will help to determine if the libertarian movement is 
necessarily confined to advancing market liberalism. For the movement, a richer theoretical 
conception of libertarianism may be beside the point if institutional and organizational 
factors conspire to limit the impact of policies based upon concerns for individuality. Worse 
 
286 The Right Nation, Conservative Power in America (New York: Penguin, 2004), especially chapter 
10, “How It Could Go Wrong: Too Southern, Too Greedy and too Contradictory,” 252-253.  Michelthwaite 
divide up the right wing into slightly different categories: they identify an “ideological split between libertarians 
and traditionalists; the social split between religious conservatives and the business community; and the logical 
tension between free-market principles and the heartland’s values.”  Nonetheless, the underlying point remains. 




still, any consideration of these ideas may be beyond the scope of the public policy process 
because of its structural limitations. If this is so, libertarians may be doing the best that they 
can, given such constraints.  However, this is significant because such findings will suggest 
that libertarianism, if not doomed theoretically, may be doomed practically, since it is 
unlikely ever to capture a broad base of support among a large mass of people who might be 
inclined to support a more humanist libertarianism. Still, even if a libertarian regime based 
upon individuality is a long way off, perhaps a few will reconsider their interpretation of 
libertarian freedom and work to promote cultural liberty to influence the bounds of market 
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